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ABSTRACT
NON-LINEAR ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE REAL INTEREST RATE PARITY FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN ECONOMIES
by
Fabricio Linhares 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2006
This study assesses the extent to which selected economies in Southeast 
Asia are financially integrated among themselves and internationally, and 
investigates whether financial integration in the region increased following the 
deregulation of their markets over the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The analysis is 
carried out by examining the relationship between ex post real interest rates over 
1970-2005. Following the work of Meese and Rogoff (1988), countries are 
considered financially integrated based on the stationarity property of their real 
interest rate differentials. Conclusions are drawn from a confirmatory analysis, 
which contrasts results from unit root tests, with and without structural breaks, 
with results from Bai and Perron (1998) technique. Changes in the level of 
financial integration are evaluated through a modified Band-Threshold 
Autoregressive model. In this framework, constraints to financial integration 
determine the degree of interdependence between real interest rates, if the 
deregulation process was effective in promoting a greater financial integration,
x ii
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this interdependence is expected to increase over time. A number of interesting 
results is obtained. First, the majority of the real interest rate differentials for 
Southeast Asia have structural breaks. Estimates from Bai and Perron (1998) 
procedure indicates that these breaks occurred mainly over the 1980’s, when 
Southeast Asian economies enacted several reforms in their financial markets, at 
the beginning of the Asian crisis and in the following two years after this crisis. 
Second, unit root tests provide supportive evidence that, except for Thailand, 
Southeast Asian economies are financially integrated at both regional and 
international levels. The possible reason for this finding is that Thailand started 
liberalizing its financial markets the latest and that its financial market controls 
are relatively stronger. Finally, this study finds that the degree of financial 
integration in Southeast Asia has been recently increased. Nevertheless, 
Southeast Asian economies have become more financially integrated with Japan 
and United States than with other members of Southeast Asia. Such result 
suggests that the extensive process of financial liberalization that took place in 
the region over the 1980’s have biased the course of financial integration towards 
international rather than regional markets.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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INTRODUCTION
In general terms, financial integration is the process through which 
segmented financial markets become inter-reliant and unified allowing market 
participants to enjoy the same unrestricted access. It can occur from the removal 
of domestic and international barriers or controls on trade in financial assets and 
services. Or it can simply occur by a reduction in the effectiveness of these 
impediments in a market -  for example, by avoidance or non-enforcement. In any 
case, the integration of financial market links banking, equity and other types of 
financial markets. Financial market integration thus implies an increase in capital 
flows and a tendency for the prices and returns on traded financial assets to 
equalize on a common-currency basis.
There are several reasons why financial integration is an important subject 
among economists and public officials (policymakers). First, it is universally 
recognized that the degree of financial integration has important macroeconomic 
implications in terms of the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in 
influencing aggregate demand as well as the scope for promoting investments in 
an economy (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963). When the degree of capital mobility 
increases, financial assets become more substitutable and it is more difficult for a 
country to set its interest rates independently of interest rates in the rest of the 
world. Increasing financial integration also brings in certain risks for financial 
stability and macroeconomic performance. It has been recognized that the risk of
1
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volatility and abrupt reversals of capital flows in the context of highly open capital 
accounts may represent significant economic costs. For example, favorable 
shocks may attract large amounts of capital inflows and encourage consumption 
and spending at levels that are unsustainable in the long-term, forcing countries 
to over-adjust to adverse shocks as a result of abrupt capital reversals. The 
increasing capital inflows promoted by a greater financial integration can also 
have undesirable macroeconomic effects, such as disorderly monetary 
expansion due to the costs of and difficulty in managing aggressive sterilization 
policies, inflationary pressure generate by the effect of capital inflow on domestic 
spending, real exchange rate appreciation and widening of current account 
deficits. The degree of financial integration is an empirical question which needs 
to be resolved if policymakers are to know the structure of their economies and 
implement policies that will be effective in achieving their aims.
Financial integration implies increasing competitiveness in financial 
markets and economists generally argue that outcomes in competitive markets 
tend to be more efficient and equitable than otherwise. It is commonly accepted 
that greater financial integration allows firms to choose the most efficient sources 
of finance (funds) and promote a better allocation of capital. At the same time, 
financial integration allows the most productive investment opportunities to 
become available to investors, and a reallocation of funds to the most productive 
investment opportunities will take place (Heathcote, 2004, and Wright, 2005). 
Financial integration may also encourage financial development. With foreign 
funds flowing in and expansion of domestic financial markets, a well administered
2
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integration process will increase competition within less developed regions and 
thereby improve efficiency of their financial systems. Greater efficiency in the 
financial sector may stimulate economic growth through capital and technological 
accumulation in a productive way (Obstfeld, 1994, Levine and Zervos, 1998, 
Edison and Slok, 2002)1. Financial integration is also often regarded as providing 
important potential to expand investor’s opportunities for portfolio diversification 
and for achieving higher risk-adjusted rates of return. It also allows countries to 
borrow to smooth consumption in face of adverse shocks and the potential 
welfare gains from such international risk sharing can be large (Obstfeld, 1994). 
In this context, it is therefore necessary some empirical investigation to evaluate 
to what extent countries are financially integrated as to identify whether there are 
still efficiency and welfare gains to be had by liberalization and guide 
governments in the process of opening their financial markets.
The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which selected economies 
in Southeast Asia are financially integrated among themselves and 
internationally. In particular, two main empirical questions are investigated: 1) are 
Southeast Asian economies financially integrated among themselves and with 
the United States; and 2) Following the extensive financial liberalization process 
over the 1980’s and early 1990’s, have Southeast Asian financial markets 
become more integrated among themselves and with the United States.
1 There are also, of course, arguments against financial integration. They can be divided into two main 
categories. One discusses the possible costs of financial integration, such as increasing the market volatility,
market hysteresis and destabilizing flows of capital. A second claims that the overall gains from financial 
integration may be small (Krugman, 1992, Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
3
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This region is chosen as the object of analysis of financial integration for a 
number of reasons. Southeast Asia is a region of growing importance in the 
world economy but the financial markets of its members have yet to be fully 
analyzed. The region constitutes a large economic area, accounting for about a 
quarter of world income and trade in the early 2000’s, up from about 11 per cent 
in 1970. This region is also a dynamic group, with expanding intra- and extra- 
regional trade. There is a significant body of applied research on trade linkages 
in the Southeast Asia region and a growing body of literature on its 
macroeconomic structure and policies. But the literature on financial structure 
and integration is still sparse. There is scope for contributing to this literature by 
analyzing the degree of integration of financial markets in the region; financial 
integration in Southeast Asia has probably not been explored in as much detail 
as other issues since the quality and availability of data are generally lower than 
for trade and investment analysis.
There has also been substantial reform and growth in the domestic 
financial system and liberalization of the capital accounts in many of the 
Southeast Asian economies over the past two decades, and this has occurred 
concurrently with notable changes in international financial markets. Southeast 
Asian economies are, in their own right, interesting case studies on the effects of 
financial integration on domestic financial markets and the resulting implications 
for policy. More recently many of these economies have experienced a financial 
crisis, with sharp downward movements in asset and financial instrument prices 
and economic contraction. Despite the efforts of East Asian countries to open
4
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and expand their financial markets over the 1980’s and early 1990’s, it is often 
suggested, for example, that one of the culprits of the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 
is the lack of strong regional financial markets. The effects of these shocks on 
the degree to which their financial markets are linked needs to be investigated. 
The ability to better understand how economic disturbances are transmitted 
between countries is important for policy purposes. This may assist governments 
in their assessment of shocks on the regime being experienced, whether some 
feasible corrective action is desirable or not and which action would be 
appropriate.
The empirical literature investigating financial integration tends to be 
dominated by research on the financial markets of developed countries. A 
different insight or perspective may be gained from examining smaller economies 
with different regulatory regimes and which are at different stages of economic 
development. To quote Solow (1986), one “of the few good ways we have to test 
analytical ideas is to see whether they can make sense of international 
differences in outcomes by appealing to international differences in institutional 
structure and historical environment.” It is interesting to analyze a group of 
countries that underwent recent financial liberalization process but was inserted 
in an already globally financially integrated (developing countries), which are the 
suppliers of most capital resources. In this situation it is possible that de fato 
financial integration was already in place before the de jure financial integration 
(Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003). Moreover the literature cast doubts about 
regional financial integration in the area. This, although possible, goes against
5
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the concensus in the theory that international and regional financial integration 
occurs simultaneously.
Policymakers in Southeast Asian economies are interested in identifying 
how their financial markets are interrelated in order to negotiate and define an 
agenda of financial and monetary integration for the region. For example, in 
recent years, there have been discussions on how to pool accumulated 
international reserves of East Asia economies and use them to develop an East 
Asian regional bond market. After the Asian crisis, many Southeast Asian 
economies felt the existing international financial system failed to provide them 
with adequate prescriptions or aid at a time of great need. In response, 
governments are intensifying regional policy cooperation and have begun to 
develop regional institutional capacity to manage future financial disturbances 
and to stabilize the exchange rates of regional currencies (Shin and Wang, 
2003). The economic feasibility and implementation of a region-wide monetary 
integration is also under study (Bergsten and Park, 2002, Kwack 2004). The 
costs and effectiveness of these arrangements depend naturally on the extent to 
which Southeast Asian economies are financially integrated.
Similar to the research on financial markets of developed countries, most 
of the empirical literature investigating financial integration in Southeast Asia is 
based on theoretical propositions known as interest rate parities: covered interest 
parity, uncovered interest parity and real interest parity. Interest rate parity 
implies that interest rates, adjusted for difference in currencies, tend to equalize 
or to covary over time in financially integrated markets. These conditions have
6
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been investigated for the relationships between Southeast Asian developing 
economies and Japan and United States, but not for relationships among the 
Southeast Asian economies. The available results are to some extent ambiguous 
but often suggest that Southeast Asian financial markets are becoming 
increasingly integrated with U.S. financial market and that financial integration 
with respect to Japan is limited (Glick and Hutchison, 1990, Frankel, 1992, 
Montiel, 1994, Chinn and Frankel, 1994, Phylaktis, 1997, Phylaktis, 1999, 
DeBrouwer, 2000, Flood and Rose, 2001, Anoruo, Remchander, and Thiewes, 
2002). Similarly, anecdotal evidence claims that the degree of financial 
integration in Southeast (East) Asia remains still low and that the integration of 
financial markets in this region has been occurring more on a global level than a 
regional level2. Overall, these results imply that the process of financial 
integration in Southeast Asia has been biased towards international rather than 
regional financial markets; which makes it difficult to implement the current 
regional financial unification plans.
As a contribution to the debate concerning financial integration in Southeast 
Asia, this study empirically investigates whether Southeast Asian economies3 are 
financially integrated and whether the degree of financial integration has recently 
increased by analyzing the temporal covariability of monthly ex-post real interest
2 A very few studies suggest that the level of financial market integration in East Asia is relatively lower 
compared to Europe and that East Asia is integrated through global financial markets rather than through 
regional ones. Eichengreen and Park (2005) analyzed the distribution of the nationality of the lead 
managers, Japanese overseas portfolio investment, co-movement of interest rates and stock prices. They 
concluded that East Asia has developed stronger financial ties with the U.S. and Western Europe than with 
one another. Kim, Kim and Wang (2003, 2004) estimated the degree of risk sharing for East Asia by using a 
cross-country consumption correlation and formal regression analysis. They found the degree of regional 
risk sharing within East Asia is quite low.
3 The countries selected are Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand 
(and United States)
7
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rates over the period 1970-2005. While previous literature has focused 
exclusively on financial integration between Southeast Asian developing 
economies and Japan and United States, this study also examines financial 
integration among Southeast Asian economies. This study also contributes to the 
investigation of real interest rate parity and financial integration by allowing for 
non-linearities (structural breaks and discontinuous adjustments) in the 
relationship between real interest rates. Some implications of these non- 
linearities are that the long-run equilibrium of the real interest rate parity changes 
and that the adjustment towards real interest rate parity following a shock is likely to 
be dependent on the size of the shock. This insight did not arise from the linear 
tests for real interest rate parity and financial integration. Real interest parity 
also represents a building block of exchange rate models (Frankel, 1979). Therefore, 
an analysis allowing for more complex dynamics in the relationship between real 
interest rates is also important to better understand real exchange rate movements. 
Furthermore, if the relationship between real interest rates can be characterized by 
non-linear dynamics, then linear approaches to non-linear problems of monetary 
policy and integration would be inappropriate
Following the works of Meese and Rogoff (1988), this study determines 
whether countries are financially integrated based on unit-root tests applied to 
their real interest rate differentials. Countries are considered financially integrated 
if their real interest rate differential is stationary; when the one-to-one relationship 
between real interest rates is statistically stable over time. Non-linearities are 
included in this particular analysis by allowing for changes in the long-run level of
8
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the real interest rate differentials. There are many reasons to suspect that this 
assumption is more appropriated for the investigation of the relationship between 
real interest rates. For example, a number of studies in time series have 
suggested that the stochastic processes governing real interest rates have shifts 
in their means (structural breaks)4 and these shifts are caused by regime 
changes in monetary and/or fiscal policy, wars, oil price shocks, political regime 
change, etc. Given differences in the magnitudes and timing of such shocks 
among countries, these effects are likely to spill over into the real interest rate 
differentials as well as the levels of rates within the various countries. Thus, a 
monetary tightening in Japan that goes unmatched by similar policy changes 
abroad may lead to short-term increases in Japanese real interest rates and 
increases in Japanese versus foreign real interest differentials. As Stiglitz (1980) 
argues, if domestic interest rate rises it is possible that the risk premium 
associated with domestic assets, one of the determinants of the real interest rate 
differentials, also changes. Since the rise in domestic interest rate raises the debt 
service costs of domestic enterprises, it could increase the risk of bankruptcy, for 
example, and thus cause a rise in the default risk premium required by foreign 
lenders. Furthermore, as the structure of international financial markets 
determines the equilibrium level between real interest rates, it is likely that this 
equilibrium shifts in response to significant changes in financial market 
regulations or financial liberalization reforms. For example, differences in the 
degree of capital controls led by a non-coordinated process of financial
4 See, for instance, Hamilton (1989), Perron (1989), Perron and Vogeslang (1992), Evans and Lewis (1995), 
Caporale and Grier (2000), Bai and Perron (2001) and Newbold, Leybourne and Wohar (2001).
9
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liberalization would be a contributing factor to changes in the (level of) risk 
premium across countries and, consequently, changes in the equilibrium level 
between real interest rate. The recent econometric literature have shown that 
results generated by unit root tests, cointegration and VAR analysis that do not 
take into account the presence of structural breaks, methods generally used by 
the previous literature, are misleading and unreliable (Perron, 1989, Zivot and 
Andrews, 1992, Perron and Vogeslang, 1994 and Newbold and Leybourne, 
1998). Moreover, the analysis of structural breaks in real interest rates 
differentials itself is important in order to understand how the relationship 
between financial markets reacts to regional and international shocks.
To accommodate possible structural breaks in real interest rate 
differentials when testing for stationarity of the series, this study employs unit root 
tests which allow for the presence of shifts in the level (unconditional mean) of 
the real interest differentials. Final conclusions are generated by a confirmatory 
analysis, which contrasts results from Zivot and Andrews (1992), Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997) and standard unit root test with results from Bai and Perron (1998, 
2001 and 2003) multiple structural-breaks estimation procedure. The Zivot and 
Andrews (1992), Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) unit-root tests are used to 
determine whether the real interest rate differentials are regime-wise stationary 
(stationary around a shifting long-run equilibrium level). These tests, however, 
are not designed to test directly for the presence of the breaks. To confirm the 
presence of breaks and check the robustness of the unit-root tests results, the 
method developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2001, 2003) is also applied to the
10
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real interest rate differentials. By using both methods it is possible to confirm the 
presence of structural breaks and stationarity of the real interest rate differentials.
To examine whether Southeast Asian economies became more financially 
integrated following the liberalization reforms undertaken over the 1980’s and 
beginning of the 1990’s, this study develops a testing procedure based on 
discontinuous adjustments in the real interest rate differentials. The idea is that 
there is a middle regime where real interest rate differentials behaves like a 
nonstationary process due to market frictions such as impediments to capital 
flows and transaction costs, and two outer regimes where real interest rate 
differentials behaves like a stationary process5. This type of adjustment in the 
relationship between variables has been suggested by many studies as more 
appropriate to model financial (and goods) market arbitrage. For example, Balke 
and Wohar (1998) find that the adjustment towards covered interest rate parity 
(CIP) between the United Kingdom and United States is dependant on the size of 
the shock to CIP in relation to the transactions cost bandwidth. Mancuso et al. 
(2003) using TAR (threshold Autoregression) models also find that generally, the 
larger the magnitude of the shock to the real interest rate parity, the faster the 
adjustment in real interest rates to the equilibrium condition6. A similar conclusion
5 A few studies have measured this band of inaction implied by transaction costs directly from the foreign 
exchange market (see, e.g., Levich, 1975, Frenkel and Levich, 1977 and Clinton, 1988). In general, the 
results based on this methodology indicate that the transaction costs are about six to fifteen basis points. 
Using more recent econometrics techniques, Al-Awad and Grennes (2002) find that these transaction costs 
are from 0.15% (Japan-US) to 0.41% (Italy-US). Nevertheless, the procedure used to capture transaction 
costs in this study may capture a broader range of factors (opportunity costs); it includes not only simple 
transaction costs (for example, bid-ask spread, brokage fees and taxation) but also costs estimated by 
investors associated with restrictions on the movement of capital from one country to others (for example, 
contractual arrangements requiring financial assets to be held for a particular period time, liquidity in markets 
and credit limits).
6 See also Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Peel and Taylor (2001), Sarno and Chowdhury (2001), Mark and 
Moh (2004), Taylor and Branson (2004) and Baillie and Kilip (2006).
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is also suggested by Holmes and Maghrebi (2004) when analyzing the real 
interest rate parity for four Southeast Asian countries (Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand) with respect to Japan and the United States.
The arguments supporting the procedure employed in this study to test 
whether the degree of financial integration changes are as follows. Market 
regulations and the degree of financial market openness and integration can 
determine the form by which arbitrage works to eliminate profit opportunities that 
are generated by differences in return rates across markets. For example, 
transaction costs or contractual arrangements requiring financial assets to be 
held for a particular period of time make it difficult and costly to act quickly to 
eliminate profits opportunities. This suggests that the difference between real 
interest rates for two countries needs to exceed a certain threshold x before 
arbitrage activities are pursued. In such conditions, a negligible market reaction 
would occur if the size the real interest rate differential is small while quick and 
efficient movements to eliminate arbitrage possibilities would take place if the 
differentials are sufficiently large (Balke and Fomby, 1997, Michael, Nobay and 
Peel, 1997, Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997, Nakagawa, 2002). Formally, when the 
difference between two real interest rates in absolute terms is lower than x , the 
real interest rate differentials do not promptly converge to the equilibrium 
condition due to the absence of arbitrage forces operating across markets (real 
interest rate differentials behaves like a random walk). On the other hand, if the 
difference between two real interest rates in absolute terms is grater than x , 
arbitrage takes place and the real interest rate differentials tend to converge.
12
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Thus, the magnitude of x serves as a measure of the extent to which real 
interest rates are interdependent and the extent to which countries are financially 
integrated7. If financial liberalization reforms in these countries are effective in 
promoting a greater integration the magnitude of x would be expected to 
become smaller (i.e. the degree of interdependency between real interest rates 
would be expected to increase). A justification for this expected result can be 
found in Frenkel and Levich (1997). They show, in a theoretical model, that a 
reduction in the costs applied to capital inflows and outflows leads to a decrease 
in the range of values of interest rate differentials for which arbitrage is not 
profitable (x decreases). Furthermore, according to the same model, if 
liberalization of financial markets reduces the impediments to flows of capital 
and, consequently, increases the elasticities of demand and supply of funds this 
range of values also decreases. Based on the econometric technique proposed 
by Balke and Fomby (1997) and Michael, Nobay and Peel (1997) this study 
develops a procedure to test whether this threshold value indeed decreased (or 
changed).
The use of x as indicator of capital market integration is potentially of 
significant use to policy makers. The existence of an interval, [ - r , r ] ,  where real 
interest rates are not interdependent gives a country the opportunity to pursue a 
stance of monetary policy which entails a different real interest rate from 
international real interest rates. If this interval decreases, however, this stance
7 The size of the neutral bands (or the magnitude of the threshold) in this context is also suggested by 
Frankel (1993) as a measure for the degree of financial markets integration.
13
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can entail only a smaller differential, indicating that the boundaries for 
independent monetary policy have diminished.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 describes 
the interest parity conditions usually used as theoretical support to empirically 
investigate financial integration. Chapter 2 reviews the empirical literature 
investigating the real interest parity conditions in Southeast Asia. It also 
discusses some drawbacks and methodological issues of the approaches used 
in this literature. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and testing procedure 
employed in this study. The empirical results are presented in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 offers a brief summary and some concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 1
MEASURING FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: 
INTEREST RATE PARITIES
Financial integration is a circumstance where segmented financial markets 
become interdependent and operate as a single, unified market. It is usually 
associated with a situation where there are no quantitative and qualitative 
barriers, such as tariffs, taxes, restriction on trading in foreign assets or 
information costs, which impede or restrict the free flow of capital from one 
market to another. Such a situation, however, while facilitates financial 
integration does not necessarily guarantee that markets will act as a unified 
market. In fact, two open financial markets can experience insignificantly flows of 
capital between them and, therefore, be in this instance independent from each 
other8. Markets will become financially integrated if agents in each market (or one 
market) treat the available financial assets across markets as substitutes. This 
condition, together with free capital mobility, generates sufficient arbitrage force 
across the markets that prices or returns on similar financial assets/services, 
offered in different markets, become interdependent. This has considerable 
intuitive appeal: as markets become more integrated differences in rates of
8 For example, capital account restrictions in some Africa countries are relatively low but these countries 
have not experienced significant flow of capital (Prasad et al., 2003)
15
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return, for instance, should reflect only fundamental factors such as differences in 
asset quality, risk and the like.
In the literature there are numerous methods used as reference for the 
degree of financial integration between economies, ranging from simply looking 
at the various legal restrictions that operate on international finance in a country 
to using theoretical predictions of economic models. These methods can be 
placed into three broad categories. The first category refers to price conditions 
involving mainly debt flows (price-based measures). These are largely embodied 
in the interest parity conditions: covered interest rate parity (CIP), uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) and real interest rate parity (RIP). As it is discussed 
latter in this chapter, the CIP is the narrowest of measures of capital mobility per 
se, the UIP being a somewhat broader measure of financial integration, while the 
RIP is the broadest of arbitrage measures (incorporating both financial and real 
integration). The second category involves quantity based measures such as 
savings investment correlations, consumption correlations, current account 
dynamics and gross capital flows9. The third category can be broadly classified 
as regulatory or institutional factors, such as capital controls, prudential 
regulations and extent of internationalization of the banking system (or barriers to 
foreign bank entry, etc.), and non-debt flows, including stock market correlations 
(both direct correlations as well as the extent to which international CAPM holds), 
or news based measures (i.e. extent to which interest rates and other financial
9 While examination of cross-border capital flows is useful, it is probably of limited use as a measure of 
financial integration. For instance, a country that is highly integrated with international capital markets - in 
the sense of there being no significant difference in domestic and international rates of return - will 
experience little if any international portfolio capital flows (at least debt related flows).
16
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market variables are impacted by common shocks versus country specific 
ones10).
This chapter underlines the intuition of each of the price based measures 
of financial integration. While the focus of the study is only real interest parity, all 
priced based measures are discussed. In fact, to better understand the elements 
involved in the real interest parity it is important to understand the other narrower 
parity conditions. The other ways of investigating financial integration are not 
covered in this chapter.
When financial markets are “perfectly” integrated, the nonexistence of 
barriers to capital flows and the intensity of cross-border trade in financial 
instruments guarantee that arbitrage possibilities or profit opportunities can be 
quickly eliminated. Therefore, in a perfectly integrated financial market, prices of 
identical assets traded across different markets should equalize, i.e. the law of 
one price holds. Price based measures of financial integration or arbitrage 
conditions investigate whether assets generating identical cash flows command 
the same return, regardless of the domicile of the issuer and of the asset holder. 
Given this basic intuition, it is natural to examine interest parity conditions for 
evidence of greater financial integration. This section describes three common 
interest parity conditions: covered interest parity, uncovered interest parity and 
real interest rate parity11.
10 See Flood and Rose (2003) for a recent extension of the equity market integration literature using a
general intertemporal asset pricing model.
Another arbitrage condition is the closed interest parity condition which essentially states that the returns
on identical instruments of the same currency but traded in different markets (such as onshore and offshore
markets) should be equalized. Any deviation arising from this condition can be interpreted as possible
evidence of the existence of capital controls in one of the two countries or the existence of other political or
country risks that may prevent interest rate equalization. The measurement of the closed interest differential
17
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To simplify the explanation of the interest parity conditions, suppose 
there are only two financial markets and two investment options: asset d, issued 
by domestic financial institutions, and asset f  issued by foreign financial 
institutions. Assume that assets d  and /h a ve  maturity n and command nominal 
returns ifJ+n and ifJ+„ , respectively. Assume also that the two assets are perfect
substitutes, implying in particular that there is no difference in perceived riskiness 
of one asset relative to the other. Suppose, for concreteness, that an investor in 
the domestic market has a large sum M  of domestic currency ($) to invest for a 
time period n and cares only about the return in terms of the domestic currency. If 
the investor purchases the domestic asset at time t she will receive (l + i?t+n)M $  
by the end of the period t+n. If the investor purchases the foreign asset she will 
receive (1 + i f t+n)(Ftt+n/S t ]M $  by the end of the period t+n, where St and Fl l+n are
the spot and forward exchange rate of the foreign currency (its price in domestic 
currency), respectively12. Therefore, the investor exactly knows the return to her 
investment if she purchases asset d  and the return to her investment if she 
purchases asset f .  Obviously, many other economic agents make similar 
calculations as she does (possibly trying to benefit from arbitrage opportunities) 
and all of them will invest in the asset with the highest return. If the two assets 
are perfect substitutes and both are held in equilibrium (financial markets are 
integrated), the return to the two assets must therefore be the same to ensure
is difficult for developing economies as it requires that a particular asset is traded sufficiently for there to be 
a liquid offshore market for it (see e.g. Obstfeld, 1998).
12 Throughout the study, the exchange rate is quoted as the domestic price of foreign currency (it is quoted 
in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). In this case, the forward discount (premium) or 
depreciation (appreciation) of spot exchange rate is a positive (negative) numbers.
18
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that the market does not prefer one asset over the other. That is, we have the 
following equilibrium condition:
0+ o = o + i; . .fe „ /s j (1.1)
In logarithm terms,
# +» = * i+»+(/*.»«- f /) 0-2)
where: i f t+n and i [ t+n are the ^-period interest rates on domestic and the foreign
financial instruments, respectively, st is the spot exchange rate at time t and
f l t+n is the forward value of s for a contract expiring n periods in the future (both
in logs), and ( f tt+n - s t ) is the forward margin (discount on domestic currency) for
n periods into the future.
Equation (1.2), covered interest rate parity condition (CIP), states that, 
when assets have equal risk attributes (or there is no risk premium), the rate of 
return on the domestic asset equals the rate of return on the foreign asset, which 
is identical to the domestic asset except for their currency denomination, plus the 
forward discount on the domestic currency. Put differently, the CIP indicates that 
the difference between the current spot rate and the forward rate will equal the 
interest differential between similar assets measured in local currencies. 
Therefore, in the absence of capital account restrictions, market risk, risk 
premium and/or transactions costs, the covered interest differential (CID) should 
not to differ from zero. A negative differential would suggest, for instance, the 
existence of capital controls or transactions costs that restrict capital outflows.
19
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Investors would certainly not tolerate a lower domestic return in the absence of 
capital controls (Frankel, 1991).
To avoid risk, in the example above, the investor decide to hedge it on the 
forward exchange market by selling (I + ift+n)(M/St)F  to be received at t + n for a
price agreed at time t , where F is the foreign currency. In comparing the revenue 
from the two options, there was therefore no difference in riskiness involved 
since we assumed explicitly that the default and political risk of the two assets 
were the same. Hence we were justified in demanding the same return.
There are, under the circumstances described above, of course more 
options available to the investor. One of these options is not to hedge her risk on 
the forward exchange market and work with the expected revenue from investing 
in foreign bond: (1 + ifl+n)(s f+n/s t]M , where Sf+n is the expected exchange rate
to prevail in time t + n. We cannot draw immediate conclusions from comparing 
the revenues from investing in the domestic asset and this last option, because 
the investor knows the return to investing in the domestic asset for sure, but the 
return to investing in the foreign bond is uncertain. Only under the additional 
assumption of risk neutral economic agents, hypothesizing that agents just focus 
on the expected value of the return and do not care at all about the underlying 
distribution of risk, should the sure return to the domestic bond be equal to the 
expected return of the foreign bond. Under this assumption, then, and after a 
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where (sett+n -■?,) is the expected exchange rate change from period t to t + n.
Before formally testing equation (1.3), researchers need to find a measure 
for the expected future exchange rate. The following four specifications for the 
expected change in the exchange rate have typically been used for estimation: (i) 
perfect foresight, s^+n =s t+n; (ii) extrapolative expectations, setJ+n -s , =st -s ,_„; (iii)
static expectations, set t+n = st ; and (iv) survey data, set l+n = s™™y, where is the
(log of the) expected spot rate obtained from a survey of market participants, e.g. 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Currency Consensus Forecast13.
Each one of these specifications has its advantages and drawbacks. One 
way to make the leap from theory to empirical operationalization is by using ex- 
post differentials. This may be justified under the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis (REH). This hypothesis - that the actual or ex-post spot exchange 
rate equals the expected spot exchange plus an uncorrelated error term - is a 
practical way of overcoming the problem of non-observable expected exchange 
rate changes. Alternatively, the static expectations hypothesis is based on the 
idea that exchange rates follow a random walk. Or, perhaps, agents have a 
backward looking behavior. Although this is not very likely from a theoretical 
perspective, the difference in the results between using the perfect foresight 
model and extrapolative expectations is quite small when using monthly data and 
periods during which we do not observe vast exchange rate fluctuations and 
trends. Another approach is to use surveys of exchange rate expectations of 
market agents (as in Chinn and Frankel, 1992, for instance). Generally speaking,
13 For a survey of these results, see Engel (1995).
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survey data is notoriously difficult to obtain and its suitability/reliability in empirical 
investigations questioned14.
The third arbitrage condition, real interest rate parity (RIP), is a testable 
implication of financial integration that avoids the explicit use of exchange rate 
data by assuming that the (change in) real exchange rate is constant (the relative 
power purchased parity hypothesis holds). Under the assumption of zero risk 
premium, RIP may be derived by substituting the Fisher equation, 
h,t+n =rt,<+n + Kt+n - 'nto UIP condition, equation (1.3):
n U  + =  rL n  + < 4  + (< *„  -  S, ), (1.4)
Under rational expectation hypothesis and rearranging this expression,
r ,dl+ n =  r ' U  +  K-V« “  St )+ K t + n  ~  K +n ] ( 1 -5)
r,U  = nU  + (1.6)
where ndt+n and nftf+n are the domestic and foreign rates of inflation to prevail 
from rto  t+n, respectively, and Aqtt+n =[(^,+„ - st)+ 7r{l+n - Kft+n\ is the depreciation 
of the real exchange rate. Given the UIP condition (1.3), the real interest parity 
holds, rdt+n = rf'l+n, only if the relative purchasing power parity holds, A#M+n=0
(since common-currency rates of inflation should be the same).
The literature has also offered “weaker” versions of the real interest parity. 
For example, if the UIP does not hold due to a time varying risk premium and/or
14 Interestingly for the study of Asian economies, a paper by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS, 
1999) attempts to model the formation of exchange rate expectations when these can be observed from 
survey data for Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Various expectations behaviors were 
considered (extrapolative, static, and adaptive). The study concludes that “market participants focused 
mainly on recent changes in the spot rates as the basis for making projections into the future” (p.20). In fact, 
the change in the expectations actually moves in the opposite direction to recent changes in the exchange 
rate. This suggests the possibility that some sort of technical analysis is being used in the forecasting.
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the real exchange is trending due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (i.e. 
qt = a  + bt ) ,  the RIP condition has been restated as:
ri U = a + r t+» ' O '7)
where a *  0 is a constant capturing an average degree of riskiness and the 
change in the real interest rate (i.e. AqtJ+n = b ) .  An even weaker RIP condition is 
sometimes given by:
= a +fir,fl+n ■ (1-8)
where a *  0 and /? *  1.
Assuming that Aqtt+n and the risk premium are constant, the Real Interest
Rate Parity15 states that if agents make their forecasts using rational 
expectations, and arbitrage forces are free to act in the markets, then real 
interest rates between countries will equalize or, as in equation (1.7), their 
difference will be constant. While the UIP is a more exact condition to strictly test 
for financial integration, the RIP condition is useful when analyzing markets for 
which exchange rate data is not available. The RIP condition can be adequate to 
test financial integration per se if sufficiently long date sets are considered, where 
relative PPP are likely to hold. As emphasized in Chinn and Frankel (1995), 
Phylaktis (1999) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), the RIP hypothesis is also very 
important because it is based on the existence of frictionless markets. It follows 
that a test of the real interest rate parity can also be considered a test of the 
degree of market integration.
15 The RIP is sometimes referred to as a proxy for the marginal cost of capital.
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CHAPTER 2
REAL INTEREST PARITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
PREVIOUS WORK AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
This chapter is organized in three sections. Section 2.1 offers a survey of 
the recent empirical literature on financial integration which analysis is based on 
the real interest parity condition and has included some Southeast Asian 
economies. It is important to notice that the existing literature has not studied the 
interdependence between regional real interest rates, which is one of the 
objectives of the present study, but rather the relationship between regional 
interest rates and real interest rates of developed economies, mainly Japan and 
United States. This review is therefore focused exclusively on financial 
integration between Southeast Asia economies vis-a-vis Japan and United 
States.
Section 2.2 discusses a few methodological issues that may have affected 
previous inference on the status of financial integration in Southeast Asia: 
structural breaks and discontinuous adjustments in the time series data. It is 
worth noting that these shortcomings are not particular to the either the literature 
focused on Southeast Asia or the literature investigating financial integration 
under the real interest rate parity condition. In fact, most of the past literature 
investigating financial integration, using any of the interest rate parity conditions
24
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(or even employing other measures of financial integration), suffers from these 
shortcomings. Section 2.3 explains why structural breaks may appear in the real 
interest rate parity condition.
2.1. Real Interest Parity in Southeast Asia: Methods and Empirical Evidence
A number of studies of real interest rate linkages among the United States, 
Canada, and European countries exist (Mishkin, 1984, Cumby and Obstfeld, 
1984, Cumby and Mishkin, 1986) but similar studies for Southeast Asia countries 
are scant. Nevertheless, these few studies on Southeast Asia are fairly rich in terms 
of methodology and have employed practically all techniques generally used in the 
investigation of the real interest rate parity condition: OLS regression analysis, 
cointegration tests, error correction and vector autoregressive models (ECM and 
VAR) and unit root tests16.
Early studies of real interest parity for Southeast Asian economies include 
Glick (1987) and Glick and Hutchison (1990). As in Mishkin (1984) and Cumby 
and Mishkin (1986), they investigate the relationship between real interest rates 
(financial integration) across countries using classic OLS regression analysis in 
the following equation:
r f  = a  + (5 rf + st (2 .1)
16 Actually, the most recent literature investigating real interest rates linkages among developed countries 
has usually employed non-linear time series techniques (Threshold Autoregressive models, Smooth 
Transition Autoregressive model, cointegration methods and unit root methods with regime shifts, etc.) while 
the study of Southeast Asian countries rely on linear methods. An exception is the work by Holmes and 
Maghrebi (2004), which is presented at the end of this section.
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where r f  and r /  are the real interest rates in the domestic and foreign countries, 
respectively, and st is an error term. Glick (1987) investigates whether Hong
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan and Australia are financially 
integrated with United States by testing the following hypotheses: 1) equality of 
real interest rates (a  = 0 and 0  = 1); 2) real interest rates are fully linked across 
internationally (/? = 1); and 3) there is no linkage between real interest rates 
(0  = 0). Note that the first hypothesis refers to the strict form of the real interest 
parity and requires that the averages of both UIP and the change in the real 
exchange rate equal zero17. The second hypothesis states that real interest rates 
are fully interdependence allowing for the presence of risk premium and/or 
deviations of the relative PPP. Using quarterly 3-month real interest rate data for 
1974-1986, the authors rejected for all cases all three hypotheses. According to 
their author’s interpretation, rejecting both the second and third hypothesis 
suggests that Southeast Asian markets are not fully integrated with that of the 
United States (0< /?< l ) .  Glick and Hutchison (1990) examines whether 
Southeast Asian countries became more financially integrated by comparing the 
0  estimates in equation (2.1) over early and late subsamples of the data. More 
specifically, they estimate equation (2.1) for Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Taiwan versus United States in the periods 1974:4-1978:4 and 1979:1-1986:1 
and test whether changes in 0  estimates are statistically significant. In the 
authors’ interpretation, a statistically significant increase in the coefficient 0
17 This hypothesis can also holds with the averages of both UIP and the change in the real exchange rate 
different from zero but their sum equal to zero (the averages cancel out each other).
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(towards 1) across subsamples indicates that countries are more financially 
integrated. They find that, except for Taiwan, OLS estimates of p  for the latter 
period are statistically greater than those for the former period. This indicates that 
Malaysian, Japanese and Singapore financial markets became more integrated to 
that of United States over the 1980’s. These early studies, however, are unreliable 
as the OLS approach may lead to inappropriate inferences due to possible non- 
stationary behavior of the real interest rate time series data.
Subsequent studies departure from simple OLS regression analysis and 
employ time series techniques that take into account more complex dynamics in 
the real interest rates. In this new literature, financial integration does not imply 
that real interest rates necessarily moves one-to-one {p  = \ in the approach 
above) but rather that they display a common stochastic trend or have a stable 
long-run equilibrium relationship18. In this circumstance, it is possible that 
countries are fully financially integrated and still f t *  1 (and a * 0 )  in equation 
(2.1) because of risk characteristics of each country. The investigation of the 
relationship between real interest rates was then conducted using time series 
methods more appropriate to this interpretation, such as cointegration and VAR 
analysis and unit root tests. The main examples of this literature are Chinn and 
Frankel (1995), Phylaktis (1997 and 1999) and Baharumshah, Haw and Fountas 
(2005). Chinn and Frankel (1995) employs bivariate and multivariate 
cointegration testing methodology of Johansen (1988) and Johansen and
18 Note that, by examining the real interest rate parity condition (equation 1.6 in the previous chapter), this is 
true only if the real exchange rates are at most 1(1) (its first difference is stationary). If the real exchange rate 
is l(2) it is possible that markets are financially integrated but their real interest rates do not share a common 
stochastic trend due to nonstationarity of the change in the real exchange rate (relative PPP does not hold). 
Nevertheless, recent empirical studies suggest that real exchange rates are at most 1(1).
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Juselius (1990) to investigate the relative influence of U.S. and Japanese real 
interest rates in the determination of the real interest rates in Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan. Using quarterly 
data over 1982:3-1992:1, the bivariate cointegration tests indicate that Hong 
Kong, Malaysian and Taiwanese real rates are cointegrated with both US and 
Japanese real rates, the Singapore rate is solely cointegrated with the US rate 
and the Thai rates solely with Japanese rate. As for the trivariate cointegration 
test, where financial integration is analyzed for a Southeast Asian country versus 
Japan and United States simultaneously, financial integration could not be 
concluded for most of Southeast Asian economies.
Phylaktis (1997) employs Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) cointegration methodology to investigate whether countries in 
Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan) became 
more financially integrated with Japan and United States. In her approach, the 
sample data is divided into two subsamples, 1973-1980 and 1981-1993, and the 
investigation of changes in the degree of financial integration is carried out by 
comparing the results of these tests over the subsamples. The tests results 
indicate that in both periods real interest rates of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Taiwan are cointegrated with that of the United States while only the real interest 
rates of Korea and Taiwan are cointegrated with that of Japan. Hong Kong real 
interest rate is not cointegrated with either Japanese or United States real 
interest rates in the early subsample but is cointegrated with United States real 
interest rate in the latter subsample, indicating that financial integration with
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respect to United States increased. Overall, these results do not shed much light 
on the main issue of interest, namely whether there has been a change in the 
degree of financial integration. The author thus investigates this issue further using 
the speed of adjustment estimates, within the error correction representation of 
the cointegrated system, as an indicator of the degree of financial integration. In 
the error correction model, the greater the speed of adjustment of the real 
interest rates towards their equilibrium relationship the higher the degree of 
financial integration. Comparing the results over the subsamples, she showed 
that financial integration in Southeast Asia increase more with respect to the 
United States than with respect to Japan. Similarly, Phylaktis (1999) performs the 
same analysis, with the same data and subsamples, using impulse response 
functions in a multivariate VAR framework. In this case, the faster the shocks to 
the equilibrium relationship between real interest rates die out the greater the 
degree of financial integration. In contrast to Phylaktis (1997), however, the 
impulse response analysis concluded that the overall degree of financial 
integration increased more with respect to Japan than with respect to United 
States.
There are few papers in the economic literature investigating financial 
integration through unit root tests. The main examples are Meese and Rogoff 
(1988), Edison and Pauls (1993) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). In the case of 
Southeast Asia, the only work available (to my knowledge) is Baharumshah, Haw 
and Fountas (2005). Baharumshah, Haw and Fountas (2005) investigates 
whether Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
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Taiwan became more financially integrated with Japan by comparing ADF and 
panel unit root tests over the periods 1977-1984 (defined as pre-liberalization 
era) and 1985-2001 (defined as pos-liberalization era). These tests are applied to 
quarterly ex-ante real interest rates differentials (equation 2.2 below). Ex-ante 
real interest rates are constructed by subtracting expected inflation rates, 
estimated using an AR(1) model, from nominal interest rates. 
rte’d- r; J = a  + et , (2.2)
where r f  and r f  are the ex-ante real interest rates in country d (d = Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan) and country f  
(Japan), respectively. The ADF tests indicate that all Southeast Asian economies 
investigated were not integrated with Japan in the first period. In the second 
period, the results are favorable for financial integration between Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Taiwan and Japan. Results from panel unit root tests 
lead to similar conclusion.
While the above literature relies exclusively on linear methods, Flolmes 
and Maghrebi (2004) employ a non-linear time series model to explain the 
dynamics of the relationship between real interest rates. More specifically, 
Holmes and Maghrebi (2004) tests for nonlinearities in the real interest differentials 
of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand with respect to Japan and the United 
States using the logistic and exponential smooth transition regression models and 
structural break tests. These techniques are applied to monthly data over the 
sample period 1977:1-2000:3. They found that in most cases there is evidence 
of regime shifts in real interest differentials during the Asian currency crisis.
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Moreover, they concluded that large shocks to real interest differentials are more 
likely to lead to the reestablishment of the real interest parity at a faster rate than 
small shocks19. Although their results are important to understand the dynamics of 
financial/economic integration it does not show clear evidence of whether markets 
in Southeast Asia are or have become financially integrated.
Overall, the literature suggests that financial integration in Southeast Asia 
is limited. If Japan is taken as the basis for inferences regarding financial 
integration within the region, the above results indicate that only Malaysia and 
Taiwan (and Korea) are financially integrated. Evidence in favor of integration for 
Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand is weak or inexistent. It is interesting to note 
the weak evidence of financial integration in Southeast Asia is not a result 
derived solely from the real interest rate parity criterion. The literature employing 
other interest rate parities, covered and uncovered interest rate parities, also 
reach similar conclusions (see, e.g., Chin and Frankel, 1992, Montiel, 1994, and 
Flood and Rose, 2001).
2.2. Shortcomings of the Previous Literature
The literature reviewed above suffers in general from a major 
methodological problem: it ignores the presence of structural breaks in real 
interest rate series and their relationship20. Economists have been getting more 
and more concerned with possible structural instabilities in economic
19 This indicates possible influence of transaction costs in the real interest rates relationship
20 There are possibly other drawbacks in these studies. For example, in some cases the subsamples are 
constructed using only five years of data. The use of short sample data may not be appropriate to test the 
degree of interdependence between real interest rates. Real interest parity, which characterizes whether 
markets are financially integrated, is a long run condition and large sample sizes should be used.
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relationships which may invalidate conclusions obtained using conventional 
econometric tools. Most models of time series are experiencing structural 
instability when applied to real life data, and estimation and inference without 
acknowledging this fact leads to unreliable results.
Structural breaks or regime shifts are infrequent changes in a time series 
data generating process caused by the influence of “unique” events, such as oil 
price shocks, wars, modification of market regulations and changes in monetary 
and fiscal policies, etc21. When structural breaks occurs, the mean of a time 
series undergo a complete break with its past value (Perron, 1994, and Bai, 
Lumsdaine and Stock, 1998). To illustrate this, consider a variable (say, real 
interest rate in country d) simulated for 500 periods according to the model 
below:
1 + ht fo r  / < 140
rt(d)  =  ■ 3 + ht fo r  140<f<320 (2.3)
1 + ht fo r  t  > 320
where ht ~ iid N (0,1). The behavior of this series and its shifting mean (regime-
wise mean) is shown in Figure 1 below. This real interest rate series undergoes
two structural breaks: an upward mean shift in period 140 and a downward mean
shift in period 320. In this particular example, the level (mean) of the real interest 
rate returns, after the second structural break, to the same level previous to the 
first structural break. One could argue, for example, that the higher level of real 
interest rates over the period 140-320 was a market response to a tightening in 
the monetary policy over this period (Evans and Lewis, 1995).
21 These events are sometimes referred to as “exogenous" shocks.
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In general, the presence of structural breaks in the data makes the 
conclusions derived from OLS regression analysis, cointegration and VAR 
techniques and unit root tests misleading or incorrect. The reason for the poor 
performance of these methods is that the form they treat the data does not 
always distinguish the presence of structural breaks (exogenous shocks) in the 
series from the effects of endogenous shocks in the behavior of the series. This 
distinction is particularly relevant for time series analysis. If structural breaks are 
not taken into account, for example, these methods may interpret a single shift in 
mean as permanent instability in the stochastic process governing the series. 
That is, what is an adjustment in the level of the series to a new economic regime 
may instead be interpreted as explosive behavior in the series. For example, 
when testing whether markets are financially integrated, Chinn and Frankel 
(1995) and Phylaktis (1997) employ cointegration techniques that do not allow for 
the presence of structural breaks. In the cointegration context, markets are 
considered financially integrated if their real interest rates share a common
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stochastic trend. Thus, cointegration of real interest rates is considered evidence 
in favor of financial integration. However, in a situation where real interest rates 
share a common stochastic trend (financial markets are integrated) and only one 
of the series has structural break(s), standard tests of cointegration, such as 
Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juscelius (1990), 
may indicate that the series are not cointegrated. To illustrate this consider the 
following example. Suppose markets d  and/ are integrated, the real interest rate in 
market d [ r t ( f ) ]  is generated according to equation (2.3) and the real interest rate
in market /  [ r , ( / ) ]  is generated by 1.2 times the same stochastic process 
generating rt (d )  without the structural breaks (e.g. it is generated by 1 + 1.2ht ). 
Figure 2 below shows the series rt {d)  and rt ( f ). It can be observed that during 
the period 140-320 the values of rt (d)  become considerably higher than those of 
rt (J )  simply due to the mean shift in rt (d) .  Nevertheless, cointegration tests that 
do not treat this shift in mean may read this behavior as statistical 
disconnectedness between rt (d)  and rt ( f )  ■ That is, they may conclude that rt (d )
and rt ( f )  do not share a common stochastic trend (Campos, Ericsson and
Hendry, 1996, Gregory and Hansen, 1996, Johansen, Mosconi and Nielsen, 
2000, and Hansen, 2003). Therefore, financial integration between d  and /  may 
be mistakenly rejected by these tests22.
22 The literature investigating the effects of structural breaks in VAR and ECM models is still very limited. Ng 
and Vogeslang (2002) shows that inference based on the estimates of the VAR is invalid when mean shifts 
are omitted (for example, Granger causality tests over-reject in finite samples when mean shifts are ignored) 
and suggests removing the shifts before or simultaneously with the VAR estimation (see also Hansen 2003).
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Similar reasoning applies to time series analyses using conventional unit 
root tests. As Meese and Rogoff (1988), Baharumshah et al. (2005) investigated 
whether markets are financially integrated by unit root tests applied to the 
difference between real interest rates. Financial integration, in this case, implies 
that the differential of real interest rates is stationary. Generally, standard unit 
root tests are applied to investigate whether a series is stationary around a 
deterministic mean (or trend). However, if a series is stationary around a 
deterministic mean with structural breaks these tests are likely to not reject 
(reject) the null of non-stationarity (the null of stationarity) (see, e.g. Perron,, 
1989, Perron and Vogeslang, 1992, Zivot and Andrews, 1992, Lumsdaine and 
Papell, 1997). Therefore, standard unit root test applied to real interest rate 
differentials may fail to detect financial integration if structural breaks are not 
taken into account. To illustrate this, consider the real interest rate differential 
RID,id., f )  -  rt{d) - rt( / )  constructed from two supposedly integrated financial
markets. Standard Unit root tests analyze the stationarity of R ID ,(d ,f) by fitting
the series around a constant (the average of the series).
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R ID ,(d ,f)  = a  + DRIDt(d , / )  , (2.4)
where D R ID ,(d ,f) is the differential subtracted from a  (the demeaned real 
interest rate differential). The series D R ID ,(d ,f) for a  equal to 1.48 is shown in 
Figure 2.3 below23. If countries d  and /  are financially integrated then the 
hypothesis of unit root in D R ID ,(d ,f)  should be rejected. But the series
D R ID ,(d , f ) , as shown in Figure 2.3, displays large deviations due to structural
breaks, at periods 140 and 320, and unit root tests read these deviations as non- 
stationarity behavior of the series. Therefore, the hypothesis that markets are 
financially integrated is likely to be rejected.
Figure 2 .3 -  Demeaned Real Interest Rate Differential ( r , ( d ) - r t( f ) - 1.48)
 Demeaned R lD (d,f 1)
The discussion above suggests that the presence of structural breaks 
often bias the results from standard cointegration and unit root methods towards 
rejection of financial integration. Nevertheless, the opposite seems also to be 
possible. Leybourne and Newbold (2003) shows that spurious cointegration can 
appear when breaks in the level of series are ignored in the analysis. This is the
23 The value 1.48 is the sample average of the R ID(d, f )  series.
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case when the timing of structural breaks in two independent series are 
sufficiently close. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below, where two 
hypothetical variables are statistically independent (generated by independent 
stochastic processes) but have a positive shift in mean over the period 320-340. 
According to Leybourne and Newbold (2003), cointegration tests applied to such 
situation may interpret these shifts as a common stochastic trend (financial 
integration could be empirically supported). This type of bias may create the 
illusion that markets become more financially integrated. For example, if these 
hypothetical variables are interest rates and cointegration tests are applied over 
two subsamples, say 1-230 (with no breaks) and 231-500 (with structural 
breaks), the results may indicate that interest rates become cointegrated over the 
second period. That is, the presence of a structural break in period 231-500 may 
lead to spurious cointegration and, therefore, lead to the conclusion that markets 
become financially integrated.












The main message from the discussion above is that any procedure that 
does not take into account the possibility of structural breaks in the series can
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produce badly misleading results. As Southeast Asian economies experienced 
several events in the last three decades that are likely to generate structural 
breaks in their real interest rates or the relationship between domestic and 
international real interest rates, such as liberalization reforms and financial and 
political crises, the analysis of financial integration between these countries 
should definitely allow for structural breaks.
Despite possible measurement problems created by structural breaks, 
there are other methodological issues that may have biased the results of the 
previous literature. In particular, the methods adopted to test whether financial 
integration changes may suffer from measurement problems or their results are 
ambiguous or uninformative. For example, a common procedure to test whether 
markets in a specific region become more integrated is to compare the number of 
results favorable to financial integration over two time periods. In this literature, 
unit-root and cointegration tests are applied to two subsamples of real interest 
rate data, say Dx and D2. Considering all pairs of countries, if the number of test 
results supporting financial integration in D2 is greater than that in Dx increasing 
financial integration is concluded. The main problem with this approach is that it 
is not very informative about changes in the degree of financial integration for 
countries financially integrated in both subsamples. For example, when real 
interest rates are cointegrated in both Dx and D2, it is not possible to extract 
information regarding whether the degree of financial integration increased 
(changed).
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To overcome this problem, the literature has investigated the degree of 
financial integration by examining measures of interdependence between real 
interest rates. The idea is that a greater the degree of financial integration implies 
a greater influence of foreign interest rates on the behavior of domestic interest 
rates. Put differently, the degree of financial integration is inversely proportional 
to the degree of interdependence between real interest rates. Glick and 
Hutchison (1990) and Phylaktis (1997, 1999) are examples adopting this 
reasoning when testing whether financial integration in Southeast Asia increased. 
Their approach to measure the interdependence between real interest rates, 
however, may lead to mistaken inference. For example, Glick and Hutchison 
(1990) investigate whether financial integration increases by OLS regression 
analysis applied to linear relationship between real interest rates (equation 2.1, 
Chapter 2). In their formulation, the extent to which changes in domestic real 
interest rate are dependent on changes in foreign real interest rates is given by 
/3 in the equation below24:
r f - r ^ = p { r f - r tf_x) .  (2.5)
where r f  - r f_ x and rtf  - r /_ x are the changes in domestic and foreign real interest 
rates, respectively. An increase in /? from 0 to 1 across sample periods indicates 
that markets become more financially integrated. It is, however, difficult to 
interpret the results when the values of /? increase above 1. For example, if /? 
increases from 0.9 to 1.5 it seems that real interest rates becomes actually more
24 This equation is just the first difference of equation (2.1) in Section 2.1.
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disconnected from each other and therefore markets can be considered less 
financially integrated.
Phylaktis (1997, 1999) investigates whether markets become more 
financially integrated by looking at the speed of adjustment of real interest rates 
in an error correction model (X in the system below):
The error correction model is estimated for two sample periods, say 
Sx ={t0,...,Tx -1} and S2 ={TX,...,T} . In this model real interest rate changes in
country d (/) have an immediate effect on real interest rates in country /  (d). Any 
deviation from the equilibrium condition triggers arbitrage forces and real interest 
rates converge back to this equilibrium. The value X in equation (2.6) measures 
how fast real interest rates adjusts towards the equilibrium condition ( r f  - p r f )  
and, therefore, can be used to measure the degree of financial integration. In this 
instance, an increase in the degree of financial integration from Sx to S2 implies 
an increase in the speed of adjustment in real interest rates (i.e. an increase in X 
across subsamples). This approach may be misleading because they ignore the 
effects of restrictions to financial integration and transaction costs on the 
adjustments of interest rates (Goodwin and Grennes, 1994, Balke and Wohar, 
1998, Peel and Taylor, 2002, and Taylor and Branson, 2004). If restrictions on 
financial integration and transaction costs are present it is possible that changes 
in real interest rate of one country will not be continuously transmitted to real 
interest rates of countries, even if agents consider similar financial assets across
(2 .6)
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markets as substitutes. That is, the operation of the adjustment factor X 
(determined by arbitrage forces) or the real interest rate convergence towards 
the equilibrium condition is limited to only certain periods of time. Indeed, a 
number of recent studies have recognized that market imperfections such as 
transaction and information costs, market regulations, etc., imply the existence of 
a neutral band that inhibits continuous adjustments in financial time series. For 
the particular case of real interest rates, barriers to financial integration or 
financial market regulations imply that moving capital from country d to country /  
is costly and, because of such costs, rtdl+n and r / t+n adjust to each other only
when their difference is sufficiently large to make the reallocation of capital 
profitable. Put differently, adjustments in real interest rates toward the equilibrium 
condition occurs only when their difference is large enough to compensate for the 
costs involves in reallocating capital across countries. If the differential is small, 
real interest rates display no tendency towards the equilibrium condition (real 
interest rate differential behaves like a unit-root process). In more recent 
empirical literature, there is increasing evidence that supports the view that the 
relationship between real interest rate is characterized by this type of dynamics. 
For example, Sarantis (1999), Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2000) and Mark and Moh 
(2005) found significant nonlinearities in exchange rates, which have significant 
impact on real interest rate differentials. Tsay (1998), Peel and Taylor (2002) and 
Nakaga (2002) found that discontinuous adjustment processes brought about by 
transaction costs and sticky prices lead to mean reverting behavior in interest 
rate differentials only when the difference between interest rates is sufficiently
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large. This type of dynamics is also supported by Holmes and Magharebi (2004) 
in their analysis of real interest rate parity for Southeast Asian economies.
2.3. Structural Breaks in Real Interest Parity
The previous section discusses possible methodological problems when 
applying standard cointegration and unit root tests to analyze the relationship 
between time series that have structural breaks. It is shown that when the 
relationship between interdependent real interest rates that have structural 
breaks these tests may be biased towards concluding that countries are not 
financially integrated. But how do structural changes in the real interest rate 
relationship between financially integrated markets arise? To answer this 
question we need first to identify the elements involved in the real interest rate 
parity condition. Consider the ex post real interest rate differential between 
countries d and f.
The ex post real interest rate differential is given by the difference between the n- 
period nominal interest rate differential, zf(+„ -  z//+„ , and the inflation rate
differential in n-periods, ndt^ n- n Jul+n. Adding and subtracting the exchange rate 
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4,I+„ = £ +„ -  ' i +„ - fc+„ - ^) (2.10)
4 , « + n  = “ k U  -  *£ +» -  fe+» -  ^  )] (2-11)
where ex post depreciation is given by ( st+n -  st ) and st is the spot exchange rate 
between monies in the two economies expressed in logarithm form. Note that the 
first term on the right hand side of equation (2.9), AlJ+n, is the uncovered interest
differential and the second term, Btt+n, is the change in real exchange rate
(relative PPP differential) between the countries d  and f  from period t to t+n  and 
u, represents an error term.
The term Att+n in equation (2.9) pertains to financial integration driven by 
arbitrage between money and foreign exchange markets -  that is how desirable 
currencies are viewed and how free money is to move -  while Btl+n pertains to
how easily goods and services are arbitraged. Therefore, real interest parity 
condition involves both financial and real market integration (Frankel 1991 )25. 
One could argue that real interest rate differential may be non-stationary, which 
would indicate that markets are not financially integrated, because the term 
5M+„is not stationary while financial integration still occurs. Nevertheless, the 
literature has generally suggested that the real exchange rate is at most 1(1) and 
therefore Bt t+n, the first difference of the real exchange rate, is likely to be 
stationary. There is actually increasing evidence that PPP may hold in an
25 The condition in which real interest rate parity holds is sometimes termed real capital mobility. That is, real 
interest rates are equalized when “real” capital is free to move. To see why some observers make this 
equivalence, consider the basic microeconomic theory. An optimizing firm sets the marginal product of 
capital equal to the user cost of capital. Absent taxes (and ignoring depreciation), the user cost of capital is 
nominal interest rate, adjusted by the rate of inflation of its output. Hence real interest parity is taken as a 
signal of the equalization of the marginal product of capital.
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equilibrium sense over longer term horizons, i.e., real exchange rates are mean 
reverting or stationary around a deterministic trend (Frankel and Meese, 1987; 
Diebold et al., 1991; Cheung and Lai, 1993, Phylaktis and Kasimmatis, 1994, 
Luintel, 2000, Liew, Baharumshah and Chong, 2004). This suggests that Btt+n is
indeed mean stationary26: Therefore, the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between real interest rates is expected to be determined mainly by the 
uncovered interest rate differentials (Alt+n).
As mentioned before, the standard procedure to test for financial integration 
using the real interest rate parity is to test whether RID?;f+n is stationary27. The
common assumption in this test that the level of RID?;{n (i.e. the level of
Att+nJrBtun) is constant but due to possible changes in the structure of the
goods and financial markets both 4  t+n and Bt t+n can in reality undergo structural
breaks. Structural breaks in the real exchange rate change Bt t+n, for example,
may appear due to technological changes in the tradable sector compared to 
non-tradable sector (or vice versa)28. To illustrate this idea, consider the Balassa- 
Samulelson effect modeled in Froot and Rogoff (1995). In Froot and Rogoff 
(1995) model, an open economy uses capital and labor to produce tradables 
priced in the world markets and nontradables priced at home. Assuming that all 
factor inputs are mobile across sectors but only capital is mobile internationally
26 Note that if the real exchange rate is stationary around a deterministic level (mean) changes in the real 
exchange rate (5 ,„„)  are stationary around a zero equilibrium level.
27 This is similar to test cointegration of real interest rates under the assumption that the cointegration vector 
js O r1)-
The allowance for structural breaks in testing for PPP is not entirely new. Studies by Culver and Papell 
(1995) and Perron and Vogelsang (1992) have reported that some historical series of real exchange rates 
can be captured by trend- or level-shift models with no unit root.
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and perfect competition, the equilibrium dynamics of the real exchange rate 
derived from profit maximization conditions have the following form29: 
q = (f i /a )aT- a N , (2.12)
where a  and p  measure the labor intensity in the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, respectively, and q, aT and aN represent the changes in the real
exchange rate and technology in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, 
respectively. In discrete time, equation (2.12) can be rewritten as:
q, = c+ [(fi/ a)aT -  aN^ . (2.13)
Hence, differential productivity growth between sectors, aT - a N , leads to trending 
behavior in the real exchange rate. Note that this trending behavior occurs even 
when aT = aN because capital intensity in production normally differs across 
sectors (i.e. /? * « ) .  In this context, shifts (structural breaks) in the trend of real 
exchange rates may be caused by changes in the relative productivity growth 
between tradables and nontradables (aT/aN). A reallocation of capital and labor
across the tradable and non-tradable sectors may lead to changes in the relative 
capital intensities between these sectors ( a / f t )  and consequently cause 
structural breaks in the trending behavior of the real exchange rates. If real 
exchange rates have shifts (structural breaks) in its trend, then real exchange 
rate changes qt - q t_x (i.e. Bt ) will have shifts in its level.
According to Froot and Rogoff (1995), the above analysis should be 
particularly relevant to fast-growth countries, which have typically experienced
29 A rise in q implies a real appreciation, and a fall in q implies a real depreciation.
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significant changes in the relative price of nontradables. Rogoff (1996) also 
argues that in countries undergoing dramatic income growth from a low level, 
substantial changes in the relative price structure between tradables and 
nontradables can often occur. An implication is that real exchange rates for these 
countries are likely afflicted by trend shifts and their temporal change, 
consequently, afflicted by level shifts. To the extent that the dynamics of growth 
in Southeast Asian countries over the last three decades are similar to those 
mentioned above, their real exchange rates are likely to have trend shifts. 
Indeed, Cheung and Lai (1998) analyzing the trend stationarity property real 
exchange rates for several fast-growing Asian countries find considerable 
evidence to support the trend-shift hypothesis (and reject the unit-root 
hypothesis)30.
The term Atl+n incorporates what is sometimes referred to as country or
political risk premium, given by the covered interest rate differential31, and the 
currency risk premium32:
A,t+n = fcU  -(/!,»+» “ Jf)]+ [ft,t+n “  5»+J< (2‘14)
where f tt+n is the forward exchange rate. The complete absence of risk 
premium, All+n=0 ,  constitutes a condition denominated by Dooley and Isard 
(1980) as ‘perfect capital substitutability’. This condition arises when financial
30 See also Chinn, Papell and Prodan (2005).
31 The covered interest differential is sometimes termed political risk, associated with capital controls or the 
threat of their imposition. See Aliber (1973) and Dooley and Isard (1980) for applications.
32 Ideally, in assessing the nature of the factors preventing parity conditions from holding, one would like to 
discriminate between covered interest differentials and the exchange risk premium. However, data 
limitations preclude me from doing so in this study. Hence, I will conduct the analysis keeping in mind that I 
impound the covered interest differential and the exchange risk premium into the term Aum
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assets, denominated in differing currencies, are treated as perfect substitutes. 
Investors will act this way either when they are risk neutral and financial assets 
are actually identical in all important aspects. This is, however, an occurrence 
implausible in international financial markets. When agents are risk averse, the 
existence of capital controls, or the threat of their imposition, different instances 
of monetary and fiscal policy, political and macroeconomic environment, 
exchange rate variability, etc. across countries are likely to generate risk premia 
associated with each domestic financial asset. That is, agents in the international 
financial market may require additional compensation for investing in a particular 
asset, compared to the U.S. Treasury bill, for example, due different market 
structures, regulations and risk attributes associated with the jurisdiction that 
issued this asset. In this instance, therefore, financial assets across countries are 
imperfect substitutes (financial markets are still linked) and consequently a non­
zero differential in both terms of At t+n is likely to prevail. For example, Dooley
and Isard (1980 and 1986) shows in a theoretical framework that the magnitude 
of the interest rate differential due to political risk, given the possibility that future 
capital controls may be imposed, depends on the gross supplies of debt 
outstanding against different governments and the distribution of world wealth 
among residents of different political jurisdictions. Similarly, Frankel and 
MacArthur (1988) argues that long-run deviations from the covered interest rate 
parity in financially integrated markets, the term [z^+n -  i{t+n -  (ftJ+n -  st)] in
equation (2.14), are likely to exist because of the presence of capital controls or 
other similar governmental interferences. They argue that international investors
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require additional compensation to lend to a country with increasing international 
indebtedness because they are aware that, historically, the governments of 
countries that go substantially into debt to foreigners have a tendency to renege 
that debt through some combination of capital controls, taxation or outright 
default.
A vast literature in international finance has also associated the existence 
of a non-zero differential in the term 4 (+n with the presence of an exchange rate 
risk premium. The first of these explanations was pioneered by Fama (1984). 
Fama (1984) suggests that if agents are risk averse, deviations in the term At t+n
(or, more specifically, the term f , tt+n- s l+n) are generated by a time-varying risk
premium caused by exchange rate volatility33. Similarly, Mackinnon (1990) 
discusses that international arbitrage in financially integrated countries, although 
continues to function, is hampered by the uncertainty generated by frequent and 
substantial changes in exchange rates. The flow of capital from one country to 
another according to this argument is decreased which, in turn, results in 
widened cross-country uncovered interest differentials (All+n). Stultz (1984) and
Engel (1992, 1999) shows in two-country intertemporal-optimizing general 
equilibrium models that a exchange risk premium arises from the correlation of 
the exchange rate with consumption generated by the correlation of monetary 
and output supply shocks. Assuming sticky-price adjustments, Engel (1999) 
demonstrated in such models that the size of the risk premium depends on the
33 On the other hand, Frankel and Froot (1987) and Froot and Frankel (1989) show, using various measure 
of exchange rate expectations on survey data, that deviations in f t+n -  st+n are mainly due to systematic 
forecast errors and not exchange rate risk premia.
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conduction of monetary policy (or monetary variability), the form of the money 
demand function, exchange rate volatility and how prices in the domestic and 
international markets are set (in producer’s currencies or consumer’s 
currencies)34.
The brief discussion above shows that the level of the term A, t+n depends
on several factors related to the structure of the economy and financial markets, 
government policy and the degree of risk aversion and perception of risk of 
international investors. It is clear that structural breaks in the terms At t+n may
appear if any of the factors determining its level changes. For example, 
diminution in financial constraints (such as margin requirements with forward 
transactions, liquidity in market and credit limits) and reduction of government 
regulation (such as taxation, market access controls, exchange controls, interest 
rate ceilings, etc.) across countries are likely to change the way international 
agents interact in international financial markets, their assessment of risk and the 
degree of substitutability between financial assets and consequently cause Att+n
to exhibit structural changes35. For example, Dooley and Isard (1980) shows that 
the covered interest rate differential between Zurich and Frankfurt fluctuated from 
near zero in 1970 to an annual rate of more than 10 percent during 1970-1973, 
when Germany imposed a series of controls on capital inflows, and then return 
back to the zero level after the controls were effectively removed in late 1973.
34 See also, e.g., Svesson (2000).
35 While part of the literature suggests that the term At t+n is time-varying, this study assumes that it is
either non-stationary or stationary with occasional structural changes in its level (or variance) in response to 
the factors discussed in this section.
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Discrete changes in exchange rate policy36 and monetary policy (objectives) of 
different countries and exogenous shocks to the decision rule of monetary 
authority (such as wars, political crises and oil price shocks) may also generated 
structural breaks in \ t+„. For example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) consider
three different measures of shocks caused by changes in monetary policy. 
Applying VAR analysis, they find that contractionary shocks to U.S. monetary 
policy result in persistent increase in U.S. interest rates and persistent decreases 
in the spread between foreign and U.S. interest rates37. Similarly, Sakoulis and 
Zivot (2001) and Choi and Zivot (2005) find evidence for structural breaks in the 
mean and variance of the forward discount ( f u+n- s t+n), and argue that these
breaks are caused by events like discrete changes in policy and changes in 
interest rates due to business cycles. Belongia and Ott (1989) demonstrate that 
the target variable for U.S. monetary policy has different implications for the risk 
premium on the dollar’s exchange rate and its relation to interest differentials. 
According to their results, the risk premium level is lower under a regime of 
interest rate targeting than one of money stock target s in which the interest rate 
is market determined. They argue further that differences in interest rates are 
more significantly influenced when they reflect solely market differences, or 
differences in asset attributes, rather than policy manipulations (which may 
subsequently be reversed). In terms of the effects of fiscal policy on the level of
36 Many of the countries analyzed in this study adopted a pegged (to US Dollar) exchange rate policy before 
the Asian crisis. During the Asian crisis they all changed the exchange rate policy to floating or managed 
floating regime.
37 Cushman and Zha (1997) reaches similar conclusion when applying different monetary policy shock 
measures to the foreign policy maker’s decision rule.
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A,t+n, Giorgianni (1997) shows that the size of the risk premium, constructed
using survey data to measure exchange rate expectations, depends on whether 
the fiscal policy is contractionary or agents are uncertain about the future path of 
fiscal policy. He finds that anticipated fiscal contractions and lower uncertainty 
about the future path of fiscal policy are associated with lower risk-premium on 
domestic denominated assets.
Given that Southeast Asian economies underwent substantial political 
changes, reorganization of their production sector, reforms and crisis in their 
financial sectors as well as changes in their monetary policy over the sample 
analyzed in this study, it is important to take into account, when analyzing 
financial integration, the possibility that their real interest rate differentials have 
structural breaks.




This chapter presents the empirical strategy and tests employed to 
analyze financial integration in Southeast Asian economies. The chapter is 
organized in two main sections. Section 3.1 describes the testing procedure used 
to investigate whether Southeast Asian economies are financially integrated. 
Countries are considered financially integrated if their real interest rate 
differentials are stationary around a constant or “regime-wise” long-run 
equilibrium level. The testing procedure is based on the combined application of 
standard unit root tests (ADF, KPSS and Ng and Perron (2001)) and modified 
ADF unit-root tests that allows for structural (e.g. Zivot and Andrews, 1992, and 
Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997) with Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003) 
methodology to test for stationarity and level shifts in the real interest differential 
series. Section 3.2 discusses an alternative measure and testing procedure for 
changes in the degree of financial integration. The first part Section 3.2 proposes 
an alternative measure of financial integration based the relationship between 
real interest rates in a Band-Threshold Autoregressive model (Balke and Fomby, 
1997, and David, Peel and Taylor, 1997). This measure is used to test whether 
the degree of financial integration in Southeast Asia changed following the 
process of financial liberalization in the region over the 1980’s and early 1990’s.
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3.1. Testing for Financial Integration: Structural Breaks and Confirmatory 
Analysis
The investigation of whether countries in Southeast Asia are financially 
integrated is conducted by testing for a stable long-run relationship between their 
real interest rates. As in Meese and Rogoff (1988) and Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2002), the testing procedure is based on the concept of mean stationarity of real 
interest rate differentials:
= (3.1)
where r f t+n and r f t+n are the rc-period real interest rates (n is the maturity of the
debt instrument) in the countries d and f  respectively. Assuming that the long run 
equilibrium level of the real interest rate differential for countries d and /  is a , 
e {r id ?/+„ )=  E(rtdt+n- r / t+n) = a ,  these countries are considered financially
integrated if the deviations of the real interest rates from a  are only transitory 
and stationary. Put differently, if the real interest rate differential for countries d 
and /  displays a stationary (stable) behavior around a  these countries can be 
regarded as financially integrated. The argument follows from the real interest 
rate parity condition and the property of a stationary time series -  a stationary 
time series tends to revert back to its long-run equilibrium value after being 
disturbed by external shocks. The real interest parity condition implies that in 
integrated markets profit opportunities (in terms of physical goods) generated by 
deviations from a  are eliminated by arbitrage forces. In integrated financial 
markets, thus, there exists a mechanism that restores the long-run equilibrium
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level between the two real interest rates in case they deviate from each other. 
The problem is then to verify whether shocks to the series of dissipate
and the series returns to its long-run equilibrium mean level. This objective can 
be accomplished by performing standard unit root tests, such as the ADF, 
Phillips and Perron and KPSS test, on the series of real interest rate differentials 
(RIDf;{n)3S. In this case, rejection (non-rejection) of the unit root (mean-reverting)
null hypothesis for the series RID?;{n implies that countries d and / are financially
integrated. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, real interest rate differentials for 
financially integrated countries may have structural breaks (shifts in the long-run 
equilibrium level) and, in this circumstance, these unit-root tests are not 
appropriate to test whether RID?'/+n is stationary or mean reverting.
To overcome the inference problems generated by structural breaks, I 
employ two unit root tests that allow for shifts in the unconditional mean of real 
interest rates differentials: Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell 
(1997). These tests are based on the ADF-test procedure and the main 
difference between them is the number of structural breaks included in the 
testing equation. Zivot and Andrews test (henceforth ZA) allows for only one 
structural break while Lumsdaine and Papell test (henceforth LP) allows for two 
structural breaks. These tests are chosen because of several reasons: 1) their 
treatment of structural break is relatively simple to understand; 2) since they are 
based on the ADF-test and has been extensively employed in time series
38 A long run stable relationship between two variables can also be investigated by cointegration techniques, 
VAR and error correction models. Note that testing the stationarity of the real interest differentials is similar, 
in some sense, to testing if the real interest rates are cointegrated, with cointegration vector (1,-1), using 
Engle and Granger (1987) methodology.
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literature their properties are well understood; 3) the timing of the structural break 
is determined endogenously, which avoid ad hoc choices of date for structural 
breaks; and 4) their computational implementation is fairly simple.
Structural breaks are modeled in ZA and LP tests through shifts in the 
intercept and deterministic trend terms of the ADF unit root test. As there is no 
reason to suspect that real interest rates or their differential have a deterministic 
trend (i.e., that they continuously increase or decrease over time), this study 
consider versions of the ZA and LP tests that include only shifts in the intercept 
term39. To illustrate how changes in the intercept in these tests capture structural 
breaks in the real interest rate differentials consider the following example40. 
Chapter 2 shows that structural breaks in the real interest rates differentials are 
generated by structural breaks in the uncovered interest rate differentials or in 
the real exchange rate changes, the terms At t+n and Bt t+n in the equation below 
(this is the same as equation (2.8) in Chapter 2):
where RID?;{n, Al t+n and Bt l+n represent the real interest differential, uncovered 
interest differential and change in real exchange rate between the economies d  
and f  from period rto  t+n. Structural breaks in the terms Ai t+n and Bt t+n can be 
modeled in the following manner:
(3.2)
A,,+»=A(sJ) + aA,l (3.3)
B,J+« =  B (Sh) +  ®fl,r (3.4)
39 This model is denominated by Perron (1989) as the crash model.
40 A detailed explanation of how these tests are estimated and performed is presented in later in this section.
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where A (s j) and B(sh) are regime wise mean levels, Sj and sh represents 
possible states of the economy determining the magnitude of A (s j) and B(sh) , 
and coBt and coBl are error terms with zero mean. Substituting (3.3) and (3.4) into
(3.2) yields
where a(sl.) = ^ ( jy) + JB(5,A) is a regime wise mean level, and ut =coAt+coBt is a
error term. Structural breaks in the real interest differential series are represented 
by shifts in a ^ ,.)41. In this case, st indicates the state (sample period) in which
a (s t) determines the mean of the real interest rate differential (assuming 
£(d,) = 0). For instance, if the RID?'/+n has a structural break at a time TB then 
«($,) is the mean of interest rate differential over the first state = { t0,...,TB -1} 
and a(s2) is the mean of interest rate differential over the second state 
s2 - { T B,...,T }, where T  is the sample size. Assuming the real interest rate 
differentials can be described by a AR(1) process, ZA test is performed based on 
the following equation:
where c(,s,) and c(s2) are intercepts prevailing in regimes 1 and 2, respectively, 
Tb is the time the structure break occurs (time regime 1 ends and regime 2 
begins) and e, is a zero mean error term. The sifting-mean level of the real
41 Note that in this specification, it is possible that the terms Aim  and Butn have structural breaks but they 
do not show in a(s)
(3.5)
fo r  t < Tb 
fo r  t > Tb
(3.6)
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interest rate differential, a(sx), is determined by solving the difference equation
above:
RIDf/+n =
cjs .K l-p ')  
(1 - p )  
c(s2) ( \ - p ‘)
t - k
+ p‘RIDdJ + Y . £'-k f ° r t< T s
k =0
t - k (3.7)
(1 -p )
+ p lR ID dTlfjB+n^ t-k M  t > T B
k =0
where RIDfl and RIDBf TB+n are initial conditions in each regime. Allowing t in 
each regime to increase to infinity and assuming | p |< 1, we have that:
E (R ID fj{n) =
«(*.) = M  t < T B
(1 - P )
a (si ) = ,C^ S2\  far { ^ t b 
(1~P)
(3-8)
As for the LP test, assuming the real interest rate differentials can be described 
by a AR(1) process, the testing procedure is based on the following equation:
r id ;, d , f  _
c(s,) + p R ID f:{ x + st fo r  t < Tl,si
c(s2) + pRID?:(t+n_ \+ £ t fo r  Tm < t < T tB2 (3-9)
c(s3) + pR ID ?:{ x + £t fo r  t > f B 2
where c(st) is the intercept prevailing in regime i , i = 1,2,3, and TBj is the time the 










fo r  Tm < t < T hB 2 (3.10)
f o r t > T ,B 2
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In ZA and LP tests the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is given by 
|p |< l and the time of the breaks, TB’s, are determined endogenously. The unit 
root test statistic is generated by estimating equations (3.6) and (3.9) as to 
minimize the t-statistic associated with the coefficient p (the Dickey-Fuller t- 
statistic). As in the ADF-test, the unit-root null hypothesis is rejected when the 
estimated t-statistic is greater, in absolute terms, than a specified asymptotic 
critical value. Flowever, instead of using asymptotic critical values to access the 
validity of the null hypothesis I use bootstrapped finite-sample critical values. This 
procedure is recommended by the authors of the tests as a way to improve the 
power of the tests and take into to account short-run dynamics of the series (the 
value of using bootstrapped finite-sample critical values in a related context is 
demonstrated by Diebold and Chen (1996).
In general, unit root tests that allows for structural breaks in the series are 
designed to test stationarity of the series and not the presence of structural 
breaks. This creates two possible methodological problems. First, when the 
structural breaks captured by these tests are not valid (statistically insignificant) 
they may suffer from size distortions problems. It is possible that the test reject 
the null hypothesis of unit root by (incorrectly) fitting shifts in the deterministic 
part of the series. A possible solution to this problem, suggested by Perron and 
Vogeslang (1998), is to generate the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic by choosing the 
break date that maximizes (or minimizes) a statistic that tests the significance of 
the intercept (or trend) break coefficient. Such procedure, however, is difficult to 
implement when the series investigated has more than one structural break
58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and/or both intercept and trend are allowed to change. Second, if the researcher 
does not have prior information regarding the presence of structural breaks in the 
series, which unit root test should she use? Using a unit root test that allows for 
one (two) break(s) when the series has no (one) structural break leads to the 
same size distortion problems. On the other hand, using a unit root test that 
allows for no (one) break when the series has one (two) structural break(s) leads 
to low power problems. This issue, to my knowledge, has not been addressed in 
the literature.
To confirm the validity and the presence of structural breaks detected by 
ZA and LP tests and to assist the choice of the appropriate unit root test to 
investigate stationarity of the series, this study employs the method developed in 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003). Based on a procedure that involves the 
application of several tests, Bai and Perron method (henceforth BP) estimate 
consistently multiple structural changes in the series, their magnitude and the 
time of the breaks42. This estimation procedure is applied to equation (3.5). An 
advantage of BP is that the error term in equation (3.5), vt , is allowed to exhibit
general dynamics (serial correlation, heterogeneity across regimes, etc.). The 
consistency of the tests used to detect the number of structural breaks in the 
series, on the downside of BP method, depends on the assumption that series 
are regime-wise stationary. That is, breaks and break dates estimates in BP are 
statistically reliable only when the series is stationary around a constant or a 
shifting level.
42 A detailed explanation of how these tests are estimated and performed is presented in later in this section.
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A methodological drawback of BP procedure is that to detect the presence 
and time of structural breaks reliably we need the stationarity of the series 
around a regime-wise level. If the series is non-stationary BP procedure may 
indicate that the series has structural breaks. On the other hand, to determine 
reliably whether a series is stationary, considering the possibility of structural 
breaks in the series, it is necessary to have some prior information about the 
presence of breaks and the number of breaks in the series. Without knowing the 
number and presence of breaks the researcher could, for example, adopt a 
specific-to-general approach to determine the stationarity property of the series. 
That is, the series is initially analyzed by unit-root tests with no break and, if the 
non-stationarity hypothesis is not rejected, it would be analyzed by unit-root tests 
assuming one break and, if the non-stationarity hypothesis is not rejected, it 
would be analyzed by unit-root tests assuming two breaks and so on. As 
discussed above, the problem with such approach is that the deliberate inclusion 
of breaks in unit-root tests would definitely lead to the rejection the null of non- 
stationarity when the series is in fact a unit root process.
This study proposes the use of the unit-root test and BP procedure jointly, 
in a sort of “confirmatory analysis,” to determine whether the real interest rate 
differentials are stationary (whether markets are financially integrated). How does 
this confirmatory analysis work? The scheme of the confirmatory analysis is 
presented in Figure 3.1 below. First, for each pair of real interest rates (for 
countries d and f), the BP procedure is applied to estimate the number and the 
timing of structural breaks. Note that the results at this stage are provisional and
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does not imply the series necessarily has structural breaks because the series 
may be non-stationary. These results are analyzed under the assumption that the 
series are stationary. For example, if BP procedure indicates that the series has 
two structural breaks occurring at Ti and T2 one should interpret this as: if the 
series is stationary then it has two structural breaks around Ti and T2. Second, 
unit root tests that allows at most the number of breaks estimated in BP is used 
to determine whether the series is stationary. In the example above, if LP test 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of unit root the series is concluded to be 
stationary with two structural breaks. In this fashion, one can confirm the validity 
of BP procedure with unit-root tests and choose the appropriate unit-root test as 
well as check the consistency of the test chosen with BP procedure. To reduce 
the computational costs involved in the application of unit-root tests with more 
than two structural breaks, the confirmatory analysis considers initially only three 
possible results from the BP procedure: 1) BP detects no break in the series; 2) 
BP detects one structural break in the series; and 3) BP detects more than one 
break in the series. In the first case, if BP procedure indicates no structural break 
in real interest differential for countries d and / i t  is more adequate to test for 
stationarity in this series by standard unit root series. For this purpose, this study 
employs the ADF, KPSS and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests. If these tests 
indicate that this series is non stationary then financial integration between 
countries d a n d /is  not supported by the RIP criterion. In the second case, when 
BP indicates that the real interest rate differential has one structural break the ZA
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Figure 3.1 -  Confirmatory Analysis Procedure
N o break More than 
one breakOne break
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If BP detected more 
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62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
test is used to examine stationary of the series. If the hypothesis of non- 
stationarity is rejected by ZA test financial integration is not supported. One could 
argue that, in this case, the structural break estimated by BP procedure is not 
reliable and, therefore, standard unit root test may be more appropriate to 
investigate stationary of the real interest rate differential. Nevertheless, there is 
no motive to expect that non-stationarity is not rejected by standard unit root 
tests when this hypothesis is rejected by unit root tests that allow for breaks. In 
the third case, LP is used to test for stationary of the interest rate differential 
and, in similar fashion to the second case, to determine whether markets are 
financially integrated. Inference in this last case, however, may be biased 
towards concluding markets are not financially integrated if BP indicates the 
presence of more than two breaks. As discussed in Lumsdaine and Pappel 
(1997), if the series contains more than two structural breaks unit root tests which 
allows for only two structural breaks (e.g. LP) have low power and tend to 
suggest the series is non-stationary. Nevertheless, if more than two breaks are 
detected and LP indicates the series is non-stationary inference is attempted 
based on an extension of the ZA (and LP) test to include more than two breaks 
or, more specifically, as many breaks as BP procedure indicates.
One last issue that needs to be discussed regards the applicability of the 
theoretical real interest rate parity condition to empirical investigation. Strictly 
speaking, real interest parity is an ex ante concept defined by expectations rather 
than realized real interest rates. However, due to the lack of data on expectations 
this study works with the operational version based on ex post differentials,
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equation 3.1. One way to justify the use of the ex-post real interest rate 
differential is that, under the rational expectations hypothesis, the ex post 
realizations of this series are unbiased predictors of the ex ante counterparts. In 
other words, the subjective market expectations is equated with the conditional 
expectations in a steady state such that I n,)= f , . where £
are a true innovations.
The remaining of this section presents in more technical details all tests 
and procedures employed, the specifications assumed for their estimation, and 
the bootstrapping procedure to construct the finite-sample critical values for the 
unit-root tests that allows for structural breaks.
3.1.1. Unit Root Tests
This section describes standard unit-root tests employed in case BP 
procedure detects no structural breaks is the real interest rate differential. 
Throughout the explanation let {x,}(r=0 represents the realization of a stochastic 
process (real interest rate differential), where T denotes the sample size. The 
stochastic process {x,}(r=0 is regarded as non-stationary (it contains a unit-root) if 
any of the roots of its AR(p) representation, xt = a }xt_i + a 2x,_2 + ... + a pxl_p lies 
outside the unit circle. That is, if any root of the polynomial 
l - a ,Z - a 2Z2- . . . - a p_xLp~x- a pLp is greater than 1, where a, are the coefficients
of the AR(p) process, the series is said to be non-stationary (it contains a unit- 
root).
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (henceforth ADF) is (derived from) 
constructed based on the AR(p) representation of {x,fl=0\
Axt = c  + J3t + yxt_i +a,Ax(_j + a2Axt_2 +. . .  -  ap_{Axt_p - a pAxt_p+l + s , , (3.11)
where, y  = and st is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed with zero mean and variance a 2.
The equation above is used to test the null hypothesis of one unit root, 
H 0 : y  = 0. As the equation is represented in first differences, if y = 0 then the
series contains at least one unit-root. Note that the statistic used in the test 
depends on the deterministic part of (3.11), c + f i t ,  which changes with the 
structure of the process assumed (we may assume that (3 = 0 or that c = {3 = 0).
As well documented in the literature, The ADF test suffers from both 
theoretical and practical problems43. These problems are in general related to the 
fact that the researcher does not known the true data generating processes 
governing {x,},r=0. In order to perform the ADF test one needs first to assume a
plausible and estimable form of DGP. Model misspecification may then arise 
from inaccurate number of AR and MA terms (appropriated lag selection of the 
terms and order and magnitude of the MA terms) and the deterministic 
components in the assumed DGP form. Regarding the latter, this study uses the 
procedure recommended by Campbell and Perron (1991). The test is initially
43 A detailed discussion of the size and power properties of the ADF test can be found in Walter Enders 
(2001) and Maddala and Kim (1998).
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performed with both the drift and trend coefficients. If one is not significant, the 
test is redone without it. However, due to the nature of the series analyzed in this 
study, if the conclusions of the test do not change significantly, the results 
presented are based only on the presence of a deterministic drift.
The number of lags selected in (3.11) should be such that the interference 
of serial correlation in the disturbances is eliminated as to preserve the white 
noise properties of the residuals in (3.11). The standard approach in the literature 
is the use of some information criterion, such as Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SIC or BIC). Nevertheless, lag selection 
based on information criteria leads in some cases to over or under­
parameterization of the model, which affects considerably the power properties of 
the test44.
The ADF test conducted in this study make use of the general-to-specific 
method (GTS). This approach, suggested by Hall (1994), selects the lag length 
based on the statistical significance of the coefficients at in (3.11). Starting from
a lag length k , where £ = int{l2(77100)1/4}, the coefficients at are eliminated from
(3.11) until a coefficient a ,, corresponding to the lag length k *< k  , has significant
t-statistic45.
44 If there are error with large MA roots (close to -1), for instance, a high order of AR processes is needed to 
ensure that unit root tests have good size.
45 This procedure is explained in more details in subsection 3.1.2.
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Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) Test (KPSS)
The common characteristic of the most traditional unit-root tests is the 
specification of the null hypothesis as non-stationarity of the series against the 
alternative as the sationarity of the series. The KPSS test does otherwise, 
establishing the null hypothesis as stationarity of the series. The KPSS test has 
in general been used in the literature to confirm or in search of support for the 
conclusions of ADF tests.
The KPSS specification is a special case {oot =1) of the model discussed
by Nabeya and Tanaka (1988):
where st is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero 
mean and variance a ] .
The null hypothesis of the test is parameter constancy, H 0:6l = 0  or 
equivalently H 0:a 2e = 0, while the alternative is that 6; follows a random walk. 
The original test statistic is given by
KPSS modified the above test statistic, because as they argued, the above test
statistic is valid only if the errors V; are I ID. KPSS consider the general case and 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
using the error variance, they suggest using the Newey-West HAC estimator of 
long run variance . The KPSS test statistic, then, is:
r j \ 2
(3-14)
(s! )where the Newey-West HAC estimator v ’ is given as:
Z v - V r  w d =1_7T7 (3-15)
*  t =  1 *  T = \ t = T + \ \
It is often suggested that KPSS, in which the null is that of stationarity, can 
be used to ‘confirm’ results from the ADF test. But, as Maddalla and Kim (1998) 
showed, the KPSS test is plagued by the same poor power and size distortion 
problem encountered in the ADF test. Moreover, the test is also sensitive to the 
lag length (/)  used in the estimation of the HAC variance.
Ng and Perron (2001) Tests
Perron and Ng (1996) proposed a modification of the Z tests, originally 
proposed by Perron (1988)46, to correct for their poor size problem: MSB , MZp
and MZt . Unlike the original Z tests, Perron and Ng did not use the Newey-West
HAC estimator for the long-run variance (autoregressive spectral density 
estimator at frequency zero), which according to them was the source of 
inefficiency in the Philips-Perron test, and, in its place, suggested the use of an
46 Although Philips-Perron test is most popular in its non-parametric modification to the DF f-statistic, Perron 
(1988) proposed three tests, Z  , Zt and MSB whose properties they found both numerically and 
theoretically similar. See appendix for full description of the test.
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estimator based on the autoregression similar to (3.11) with the original series xt
substituted for xt (demeaned data if only a drift term is assumed and detrended if
drift and trend terms are assumed). They then demonstrate that the modified Z 
statistic is able to maintain good power while correcting for size problems in 
Philips-Perron47.
M-tests of Ng and Perron (2001) are an extension of the ERS to the 
modified Z tests (MSB , MZp and MZt discussed above) developed in Perron
and Ng (1996). Ng and Perron (2001) show that by detrending (or demeaning) 
the data though GLS, as in the ERS test, and using the MAIC (modified Akaike 
information criterion) in the issue of lag-selection, the sized adjusted power 
properties of the MZ test increase significantly. Their Monte Carlo simulations 
concluded that even the ERS DF-GLS test with lags selected by the MAIC has 
power improvements, especially if the underlying DGP contains large negative 
MA terms. Moreover, for most ‘pratical’ ARMA cases while the DF-GLS outscore 
MZ on power (when lags selected by MAIC), on the size criterion is the reverse.
Without going into the details, MAIC is basically a modification of AIC48 
which depends upon the sample value of the parameter (y )  tested under null 
and the sample size. For lag k and sample size T and the value of the coefficient 
on xt_x (y), MAIC is given as:
MAIC{k) = ln(.y2) + 2 t -  (3.16)
47 Now the lag selection problem appears in the estimation of the long-run variance (which depends in a 
formulation similar to (3.11) but due to the construction of the final statistic (construction of the statistic) this 
is a less serious problem.
48 They also modify the BIC (Bayesian or Schwartz Information Criterion) but show that AIC has superior 
theoretical properties.
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Where x{k)~—t 'Y .x ^  with lag length k, sample size T, y is the estimated
s ,=k+1
1 Tcoefficient on r. ,, and s2 = ------= V sJ with e obtained from the GLS detrended
T  — k  -1 t = k +1
data x .
Ng and Perron (2001) find that the theoretical and numerical properties of 
the three M-tests (M S B , M Z p and M Z ,) are quite similar and they illustrate using
M Zp .
3.1.2. Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks
The effects of structural breaks in the performance of unit root tests has 
been extensively documented and debated in the literature. The pioneering 
article of Perron (1989) showed that the presence of a break in the deterministic 
portion of a stochastic process, if not taken into account, may lead to conclusions 
in favor of non-stationarity of the series analyzed49. More specifically, the ability 
to reject the unit root hypothesis would decrease (loss of power) when the 
stationary alternative is true and an existing structural break is ignored. Based on 
this finding, Perron (1989) developed a modified version of the ADF test by 
including one exogenous structural break under both the null and alternative 
hypothesis. When Perron applied his technique to the same data base used by 
Nelson and Plosser (1982) he concluded that most of the series analyzed (11 out 
of 14) were in fact stationary with break points in the years of the great
49 The presence of structural breaks causes overestimation of the parameter y  in equation (3.11) 
(increasing directly with the magnitude of the shift) and incorrect inference based on its ADF t-statistic (see 
Perron 1989)
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depression, for some cases, or the first oil price crises, for the case of quarterly 
GNP.50
The work of Perron has been the foundation for several other unit-root 
tests allowing for the presence of structural breaks (in the deterministic part of 
the DGP). Works like Christiano (1992), Banerjee at al. (1992), Zivot and 
Andrews (1992), Perron (1994), Vogeslang (1994) and Lee and Strazicich 
(2001), all developed modified tests by including one exogenous structural break. 
Subsequently, works such as Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), among others, 
extended these types of tests to include more then one break.
Zivot and Andrews (1992) questioned the exogeneity assumption of Peron 
(1989)’s approach and extended his unit-root test by permitting the choice of 
breakpoint to be data dependent51. The idea behind ZA test procedure is to 
determine endogenously a structural break by searching for the date (breakpoint) 
that gives the least favorable result for the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
using the ADF test statistic52. The alternative hypothesis specifies that the series 
can be represented by a trend stationary process with a one time break in the 
trend occurring at unknown point in time.
The ZA test procedure considered in this study consist in testing the null 
hypothesis that the series investigated has a unit root versus the alternative that 
the series is stationary around a deterministic trend with an endogenous drift shift 
occurring at (an unknown) time TB. This parameterization of the structural break
50 Nelson and Plosser (1982) showed, using the techniques developed by Dickey and Fuller (1980, 1981), 
that current shocks have a permanent effect on the long run dynamics of most macroeconomic and financial 
aggregates for the USA.
5 Zivot and Andrwes (1992) argues that Perron’s “choices of breakpoints are based on prior observation of 
the data and hence problems associated with ‘pre-testing’ are applicable to his methodology.”
52 The break date is chosen to minimize the one side statistic to test y  =  1.
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under the alternative hypothesis is similar to what Perron (1989) define as the 
“crash” model (only the level of the series is passive of shifts). Following the 
notation in the literature, the null and alternative hypotheses in the “crash” model 
are:
\H 0 :x t = c + xt_} + et 
:x t = c + f i t  + dDt + st
where Dt =1 for t> T B+ 1 and 0 otherwise; TB is the date corresponding to the 
break point (mean shift), and A (L )e t = B ( L ) r i t with rjt ~ i id (o ,a ^ )  and A (L) and
B(L) p-th and g-th polynomials in the lag operator.
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) essentially extended the ZA endogenous 
break methodology to allow for a two-break alternative. They argue that a series 
for which ZA test (or other unit-root test allowing for a single break under the 
alternative) cannot reject non-stationarity may in fact be stationary if more than 
one break in the deterministic trend function were allowed. Following the 
arguments of Perron (1989), if a second structural break is ignored, loss of power 
may also occur when testing unit-roots assuming only one break in the DGP.
The model considered in this study to test the presence of unit-root with 
LP test is the same as the one used in ZA test (crash model) but allowing for two 
breaks in the mean. The LP “crash-model” test can be specified as:
l H 0 :x,=c + x,_l+ e „
17/j \ xt — c + f i t  + d^Dy + ^ 2 1
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Where Dit =1 for t > Tm + 1 and 0 otherwise, Dlt =1 for t > TB2 + 1 and 0 
otherwise and Tm and TB2 are the dates corresponding to the break points (mean 
shifts).
The testing strategy employed in ZA and LP is similar to the strategy 
employed in the ADF test. ZA and LP tests used in this study involve the 
following augmented regression equations:
^TB
Axt =c + fit + dDt + yxt_x + ' j^ aiAxt_i + et (3.19)
i=i
7^'B
Axt = c + fit + dxDu + d2D2t + jcct_x + aiAxt_i + et (3.20)
<=i
where, y = - [ a> = ~Y?j=la j anc* et 's assumed to be independent and
identically distributed with zero mean and variance a ] .  As discussed earlier, a
unit-root test based on extensions of the ZA test would be applied if a unit-root 
test with more than two breaks is needed. As in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), 
this test is constructed by including more dummy terms in equations (3.20). Note 
that the logic of the testing procedure is the same as those of ZA and LP.
As in the ADF test, the kTB extra repressors are used to correct for the 
problem of temporal dependence in the error terms. In the estimation procedure, 
kTB is chosen for each tentative choice of breakpoint by the general-to-specific 
rule (as in Hall (1994))53. To illustrate this procedure consider the following 
example for the case of one structural break. Suppose {Tm,TB2,...,TBN} is the set
53 Hall (1994) suggests that for moderate to large samples a GTS approach performs better than the 
traditional information criteria, such as AIC, SIC and H-QIC.
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of all possible breakpoints. Equation (3.19) is estimated for all 
Tm e{Tm,TB2,...,TBN] and for each Tm a kTBi is chosen by the GTS method. That
is, for a fixed Tm equation (3.19) is estimated with k lags. If the coefficient 
associated with the &-th is not significant, then equation (3.19) is reestimated 
with k - 1 lags. The process is repeated until a significant coefficient is found, say 
associated with the lag kTBi (while the coefficient for the lag km +1 is not
significant). Following the works of Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine 
and Papell (1997), this study uses the 10% (two tailed) critical value of the t- 
student distribution, 1.64, in the GTS lag-selection method.
In the case of ZA test, the t-statistics for y  in equation (3.19), is
computed for each point Tm in the interval [0.1T,0.9T] and chosen km , where Tm 
is an integer number corresponding to the z'-th breakpoint tentative. For the LP 
test, a t-statistic tf (TBi,TBJ) is computed for each pair of non-successive points
(:TBi,TBJ) in [0.1T.0.9T] and chosen kTBi. ZA and LP procedures generate a final t- 
statistic 7f which is the greatest in absolute value (the most favorable to reject 
the null hypothesis). Consequently, the estimated breakpoint(s) TB (Tm and TB2 
in the LP test) is the one corresponding to this minimum f-statistic54
7 ^ {T B) = in f (3.21)
r  Tbi4 0 . 1 T ,0 .9 T ]  '
7,LF(Tm,TB2) = in f 7(TBj,TBi) (3.22)
y  V B l  B 2 J  (TBIJ Sj) e [0 . lT ,0 .9 T ]  Y 1
54 These statistics depends not only on the location of the break but also on the sample size. The notation 
used here was to simplify the exposition of the tests. For more details refer to Zivot and Andrews (1992).
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Bootstrapping Finite-Sample Critical Values forZA and LP Tests
Instead of using critical values in the hypothesis testing, this study uses 
adjusted finite-sample distributions for ZA and LP tests computed by Monte Carlo 
methods. As recommended by Zivot and Andrews (1992), these distributions are 
computed under the assumption that innovations are generated by a normal 
autoregressive moving average process particular to each series. The main 
advantage of this approach, relative to using asymptotic critical values, is that 
differences in sample size and temporal dependence of errors (or specific 
distributional assumptions) across series are taken in to account. Using the 
appropriated finite-sample critical values for each series makes the test probably 
more restrictive than using the asymptotic critical values.
The procedure to compute the finite sample distributions of the ZA and LP 
minimum t-statistics is the same one as describe in Zivot and Andrews (1992), 
section 5. To illustrate their bootstrapping procedure consider a series {jt,}f=1 
generated by an unknown ARIMA(p,q) DGP. First, given the assumption of 
normal ARMA(p,q) errors, a ARMA(p,q) model for {Axr}f=2 is estimated with p  and q 
determined by A IC  and SIC starting from a maximum lag length of 
int{l2(77100)I/4}55. This estimated model is reserved as the true DGP driving the 
errors for each series (optimal model). Second, this optimal model ARMAx(p*,q*) 
is used to simulate samples of the series with T observations, {x,}f=1, assuming
innovations are i id  jv(o,<x^), where <j ]  is the estimated error variance of
55 In case contradictory results were found I opt for the SIC (as long as AIC do not vary considerably)
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ARMAx(p*,q*). Third, the ZA and LP test are applied to each simulated series and 
the minimum t-statistics are computed56. Fourth, this process is repeated 2,000 
times for the ZA test and 1,000 times for the LP test. Finally, the finite-sample 
critical values are computed from the sorted vector of replicated statistics (finite- 
sample distributions).
The estimated optimal ARMA model for each real interest rate differential 
series is presented in Tables A4 and A5 in Appendix A. The respective finite- 
sample distributions of the minimum t-statistic for ZA and LP tests under the 
assumption of normal ARMA(p,q) errors are presented in Tables A6-A9. 
Compared to the computed asymptotic critical values reported in Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), the critical values computed 
in this study are generally larger and vary considerably across the series 
analyzed. The cases which presented large values are generally associated with 
optimal ARMA model which contains large MA terms. This result goes in some 
sense against the findings of Zivot and Andrews (1992), for instance, in which 
similar finite-sample critical values were found independent of the optimal ARMA 
model employed in the Monte Carlo experiment. The possible reason is that in 
their simulations, due to the nature of the data used, simple form of ARMA 
processes were estimated/assumed, such as AR(1), MA(1), ARMA(1,1), whereas 
in this study the optimal ARMA models estimated are more complex.
56 The lag length selected by ZA and LP tests in these simulations are also based on the GTS method.
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3.1.3. Bai and Perron’s Tests for Structural Breaks
This section reviews the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998, 2001, 
2003) for estimation and inference in a simple multiple mean break models. Bai 
and Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003) considers several test for the estimation of 
multiple structural breaks in dynamic linear regression models. They estimate the 
unknown break points given T observations by the least squares principle, and 
provide general consistency and asymptotic distribution results under fairly weak 
conditions allowing for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
The model considered in this study is the pure structural change model 
with shifts in the mean of the time series57. The pure structural change model is 
defined as
xt =Cj+et , t = tj_x +1 ,...,tj (3.23)
for y = l,... ,m + 1, t0 = 0 and tm+x = T . The process {x,}70 is subject to m breaks and 
Cj is the mean of the series rt for each regime j . The model allows for general serial 
correlation and heterogeneity of the residuals across segments; see Bai and Perron 
(1998) for details. In case a break is detected at t j , then cy - c M  is a estimative of
the level shift in rt across t j .
The pure structural change model can be estimated as follows. For each 
m-partition {Tx,...,Tm}, TJ={tJ_l + 1 , . the least squares estimate of c, is
obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals
57 In this model the variance is also allowed to change (to have structural changes) provided that it changes 
at the same time the mean changes.
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m  + 1 l j  . .
■ S r(j;,.-.0  = Z  I k . - c j  (3-24)
y=u=rJ._l +l
giving c = {cx,...,cm) = c{{ri,...,Tm}) as the mean estimates associated with the 
given m-partition that minimizes ^ ( 7;,...,7 ;). The estimated breakpoints are 
defined by
where minimization occurs over all possible m-partitions. Using the estimated 
breakpoints ( z j t h e  regression parameter estimates are
computed.
BP show that the estimator for break fractions, = Tj/ t  , converge to the 
true values at rate T under very general conditions, but that the estimated 
break dates f } are not consistent. They presented a method to construct
approximate confidence intervals for the break dates based on a novel 
asymptotic theory that assumes the magnitudes of the structural changes in the 
mean of the series decrease as the sample size increases.
Alternative methods to select the number of breaks, m, are suggested by 
BP based on a sequential procedure or the use of information criteria such as 
BIC and LWZ. BP argues the latter two, especially BIC, leads to 
over/underestimation of the true number of breakpoints58. The sequential 
procedure works by dividing the whole sample into sub-samples in a sequential
58 BIC works well when breaks are present (try avoid serial correlation if no break) .LWZ works better (even 
in the presence of serial correlation). Model selection procedure based on information criterion cannot take 
into account potential heterogeneity across segments unlike the sequential method.
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fashion as breakpoints are identified though F  type tests. Starting from the whole 
sample, tests for the existence of breaks and parameter constancy are applied to 
identify the first break. The sample is then divided into two sub-samples and 
parameter constancy tests are applied for the two sub-samples and if a new 
break point is detected for one of the sub-samples, this sub-sample is further 
divided into two more sub-samples (making a total of three sub-samples in which 
a search for a new break point will be made). The procedure progress in this 
fashion until no significant break point is detected. BP shows that this sequential 
procedure together with the tests for parameter constancy can yield consistent 
estimates for the true number of breaks. Asymptotically, such procedure 
generate a number of breaks that is consistent but, as BP argues (shows in 
Monte Carlo simulations), it has the tendency to underestimate them.
To overcome the underestimation problem, BP suggests some rules to 
conduct break points estimation (which is adopted in this study). Allowing for a 
maximum of m breaks the model is estimated and a SupF test, SupFr (0 \r i) ,  is 
used to test the hypothesis of no break in the series against n breaks, with n = 1, 
2, ..., m. Together with the SupFr (0 \n )  test, the presence of breaks is also verified 
through the UDmax (double maximum statistic) and WDmax tests (weighted 
double maximum statistic)59, which test the hypothesis of no structural breaks 
against an unknown number of breaks given the upper bound m.
UDmax = max0inimSupF(0\n) (3.26)
59 Although they are based on the same principle UDmax, due to its construction, may have low power if the 
number of breaks is “large.” WDmax is a modification of UDmax correcting for this problem (for more details 
see Bai and Perron (1998)).
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WDmax = max0Sn£m con • SupF(0 1«) (3.27)
where the weights for the individual SupF(o \ n) are such that marginal p- 
values are equal across different values of n. If the presence of breaks is 
indicated by these tests, the SupF il \ I + 1) is used to determine the number of 
breaks. The S u p F {l\ l + \) test has as the null hypothesis I breaks against the 
alternative of 1 + 1 breaks. Critical values for these tests can be found in Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003). Based on Monte Carlo experiments, Bai and Perron (2001, 
2003) find that this procedure to select the number of breaks is more reliable 
than the sequential procedure and the use of information criteria (BIC and LWZ).
In all models estimated the residuals are allowed to have a quite general 
structure, exhibiting for instance “substantial” correlation and heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, the distribution of cy and the residuals can be different across
subsamples (the partitions)60. As a particularity of these models, the dynamic 
effects are left on the error terms and are corrected, in a non-parametric fashion, 
for proper asymptotic inference.
3.2. Testing Whether Financial Integration Increased
This section presents the testing procedure developed to investigate 
whether the degree of financial integration in Southeast Asia changed. The test is 
based on modifications of the Band-Threshold Autoregressive model (Balke and
60 When serial correlation and/or heteroskedasticity is present, a consistent estimate of the var-cov matrix 
can be construct by the method developed by Andrews (1991), either assuming identical distribution across 
segments or allowing the distributions of both regressors and the errors to differ. In all cases where 
covariance matrix robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation is needed, Andrews’s (1991) data 
dependent method with Quadratic Spectral kernel and an AR(1) approximation to select the bandwidth (HAC 
estimator) is used. Pre-whitening is also allowed as suggested in Andrews and Monahan (1992).
80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Fomby 1997 and Peel, David and Taylor 1997). While the unit root tests 
described in the previous section deals the simple long run stability of the 
relationship between two real interest rates, what Balke and Fomby (1997) 
classifies as global behavior of time series, the method presented in this section 
explores how real interest rates adjusts to each other in the long-run stable 
relationship (local behavior). The main arguments are based on the idea that 
barriers to capital flows influence how financial markets respond to differences in 
returns across markets. Agents in financially integrated countries may not react 
to all differences between interest rates because some of these differences are 
not large enough to cover the costs involved in moving capital across countries. 
Therefore, the presence of effective barriers to capital flows or impediments to 
financial integration in general suggests that real interest rates are free to deviate 
from each other, inside a certain band, without influence of arbitrage forces. In 
this context, the extent to which markets are financially integrated is inversely 
proportional to the size of these bands. This study employs modifications of the 
Band-TAR model extract the size of these bands and to test whether it changes.
The approach is different from the literature employing Band-TAR models 
in two aspects. First, although adjustments to the neutral bands are non-linear 
the hypothesis that the long-run equilibrium level between real interest rates is 
constant is not maintained. Instead, based on the arguments presented 
previously, this value is allowed to shift to capture structural changes in the real 
interest rate parity condition. Second, a modified version of the Band-TAR model 
where the value of the threshold r  is allowed to change (decrease or increase) is
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estimated. Note that if t increases (decreases) it means that the 
interdependence between the real interest rates decrease (increase), or that 
financial integration weakened (strengthened). This study designs a test 
procedure, with the null hypothesis that the constraints for financial integration 
decrease (or increase)61, based on the likelihood test which compares the validity 
of modified Band-TAR model against the standard Band-TAR model.
The remaining of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 3.2.1 
discusses the formal model used to measure the degree of interdependence 
between real interest rates. Subsection 3.2.2 presents the Band-TAR model 
where the threshold is allowed to change, how its estimation is conducted and 
testing procedure for changing financial integration.
3.2.1. Modeling the Degree of Financial Integration: An Alternative
Approach
When financial markets are perfectly integrated; when they function as a 
single market, real interest rate changes in one country are expected to have an 
immediate effect on real interest rates in other countries. However, if barriers to 
integration and transaction costs are present it is possible that real interest rate 
changes in one country will not be continuously transmitted to other countries. In 
this situation, there is a certain range of values in which domestic real interest 
rates can move freely, independent of influence from international real interest 
rates. This range of values, denominated neutral bands, is used in this study to 
define the extent to which financial markets are integrated.
61 The change of the threshold parameter is allowed to be positive or negative. Therefore, the modified 
Band-TAR model may capture a increase in the threshold parameter (financial integration weakened).
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In this study, the neutral bands are derived from a Band-TAR framework 
which allows for the presence of structural breaks. To illustrate the intuition of this 
framework consider two similar financial assets Ad and Af  issued in countries d
and f, respectively. Suppose the real interest rates obtained from holding assets 
Ad and A f  for a certain period of time are r f  and r f , respectively. Suppose
additionally that the mean of the differential r f  - r f  is given by «($■,■). If structural 
breaks in the differential series are present, a {s f )  changes. In this case, s, 
indicates the state (sample period) in which a (s t ) is the mean of r f  - r f . For 
instance, if the r f  -  r f  series has a structural break at a time TB then a (jj)  is the 
mean of interest rate differential over the first state j, ={t0,...,TB -1} and a (s 2) is 
the mean of interest rate differential over the second state s2 = {TB,...,T} , where T 
is the sample size. To simplify the explanation of how real interest rates adjust to 
each other (or how the neutral bands are created) suppose <2(5,) = 0 so that
r f  —r f  — a (s ,)  = r f  - r f  for all t. When the difference between r f  and r f , | r f  - r f  
does not exceed the costs involved in reallocating funds from A f  to Ad (or vice
versa), there is no motive for arbitrage. For instance, transaction costs or 
contractual arrangements requiring assets to be held for a particular period of 
time make it difficult and costly to act quickly to eliminate profit opportunities. This 
suggests that the difference r f  - r f  needs to exceed a certain threshold r ,  
before arbitrage activities are pursued62. Therefore, when the difference between
62 The threshold value may represent a broader range of factors, from simple transaction and information
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real interest rates is relatively small, the differential {rd - r f )  behaves like a 
random walk. On the other hand, when | rd - r f \ is large enough to exceed costs
involved in the transference of funds from country/to  d  (or vice versa), a quick 
and efficient market reaction would take place to eliminate arbitrage possibilities. 
In the latter case, the real interest rate differential, in absolute terms, mean- 
reverts to a level less than or equal to r  , where arbitrage opportunities no longer 
exist (Balke and Fomby 1997, Michael, Nobay and Peel 1997, Obstfeld and 
Taylor 1997 and Nakagawa 2002). This model, denominated B-TAR  model, 
can be formalized as follows:
where et ~ i i d N ( 0 , a 2£) and 77, ~ i i d N ( 0 , a 2) ,  t  is the threshold parameter and h is
a delay parameter63.
In the context of equation (3.29), the degree of interdependence between 
real interest rates is determined by the magnitude of the interval [ - r , r ]  (neutral 
bands)64. It determines how much real interest rates can deviate from each other 
without triggering intense flows of capital between markets. Put differently, it 
defines the range of values for which country <f s real interest rate can move
costs to preferences of the investors.
63 The delay parameter h determines how long it takes from the time a profit opportunity (a sufficiently large 
real interest rate differential) appears and the time the markets start to operate to eliminate this profit 
opportunity.
The magnitude of h is also a reference for the degree of interdependence between real interest rates or 
how financial markets are integrated. However, due to the increasing complexity in estimating h in the test I 
am proposing, I assume that the delay parameter is 1 in all cases.
(3.28)
'S{zt_h - r ) + s t i f  zt_h > r
Az, rjt i f  - t  < zt_h <  r
A z>-h+T) + £ t i f  z, -h < ~ T
(3.29)
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freely from and does not depend upon country / s real interest rate. Therefore, 
the smaller r  the greater the interdependence between r f  and r f  (or the 
greater the interdependence between financial markets d  and j ) .
Transaction costs, restrictions on capital and foreign exchange rate 
markets and banking system regulations imply (in the B -TAR)  that the 
difference between real interest rates behaves like a random walk process within 
the neutral bands and a mean-reverting process outside them. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the Southeast Asian economies have passed through an 
intense process of financial liberalization over the 80’s and early 90’s, where 
many of these market restrictions were reduced or abolished. If the reduction of 
the financial market restrictions were effective in promoting a greater financial 
integration in the region, the sizes of the neutral bands are expected to narrow 
over time (following the beginning of the 90’s, for instance). To examine whether 
this is the case for the integration of Southeast Asian economies, among 
themselves and with respect to Japan and United States, the model above and a 
modified version of it, where the value of the threshold t is allowed to change65, 
are estimated and compared through a likelihood ratio test, with the null 
hypothesis that the threshold is constant (the true model is B-TAR).  This 
modified model is denominated changing-band threshold autoregression 
(CB -  TAR). A change in the degree of financial integration (i.e. a change in r ) is 
concluded if the likelihood ratio test indicates that the CB-TAR  model is
65 Note that if t  increases (decreases) it means that the interdependence between the variables decrease 
(increase), or that financial integration weakened (strengthened)
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statistically more appropriated for explaining the relationship between the real 
interest rates.
The use of r  (together with a(s)) as an indicator of capital market 
integration is of great use for policy makers. The existence of a neutral band in 
the real interest rates differential gives a country the opportunity to pursue a 
monetary policy which entails a different real interest rate from international real 
interest rates. For example, suppose a (s )  = l% ,  r f  = 2%  and r  = 0.25% . In this
case, country d  can pursue a stance of monetary policy where r f  is independent 
of r f  if 2.75% < r f  < 3.25% . If r  decreases, however, the neutral bands will 
narrow, indicating that the space for independent monetary policy has 
decreased.
3.2.2. The CB -  TAR Model and Testing Procedure
The B -  TAR model above is modified by relaxing the assumption that the 
threshold value is fixed over time. In order to capture the effects of the financial 
liberalization process on the degree of interdependence between real interest 
rates, the threshold is allowed to exhibit one discrete shift. The CB -TAR model 
can be described as follows:
z, = r f  —r f  - c d s f )  (3 .30)
Az, =
8 {zt_x- T J) + £ l i f  Z t_x > T j
V, f  J = 1’2 (3 -31)
S ( z ^ + T ^ + S t  i f  zt_x < —Tj
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f = l,2 ,...,rfl(r) for y = l and t = Tb(t) + 1,Tb(t) + 2,...,T for j  = 2 
where z, is the demeaned real interest rate differential, st ~iidN(0,cr£2) and 
rjt ~ iidN(0,<7^ ) , the threshold values are ry, with j  defining the periods of time 
before and after the threshold change (i.e. threshold-regimes 1 and 2) and r B(r) 
is the time of change in the threshold value. Note that when rx = r2 the CB -TAR 
model reduces to the B -  TAR model.
As in the B-TAR  model, z, exhibits two types of behavior here. Inside
the neutral bands [ - r15r,] and [ - r2,r2], when |z,|<r, for t < T B{r) and |z,|<r2 for 
t > Tb{t) , arbitrage does not operate because it is not profitable and z, behaves 
like a random walk. Outside the neutral bands, when |z;|> r, for t<Tm  and 
|z,| > r2 for t > TB(t) , arbitrage operates because the difference between real 
interest rates is large enough to make a profit and zt behaves as a mean 
reverting process to the threshold. As a new feature of the model, the threshold 
is allowed to have one discrete shift at TB{V). For example, consider two time
periods, {1,2,...,TB{t)} and {TB(t) +1,Tb(t) +2,...,T} . In the former, there are
considerable restrictions on the capital account and strong regulation of foreign 
exchange markets, in either country d o r /o r  in both. Suppose that significant 
financial liberalization reforms occur over the end of this period (close to TB{t)). If
the liberalization process was effective in reducing the constraints on financial 
integration or, put differently, effective in promoting a greater financial integration 
in the subsequent period {Tm +\,Tm  + 2,...,T}\ it is expected that r2< r , .
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To illustrate what this model implies, a CB-TAR process is simulated 
according to (3.30) and (3.31) for 500 periods with the following parameters: 
a(sl) = 3 with s1 = {1,...,139}, a(s2) = 1 with ={140,...,319}, a(s^) = 2 with
s3 ={320,...,500}, a £ =crn= 0.6, S = -0.6, r ,= l  for t = {1,...,299} and r2=0.5 for 
t = {300,...,500}. The result is shown in graph below (figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 also 
shows the mean of the series with two structural breaks, occurring at r = 140 and 
t = 320. The series z, is constructed by subtracting the original series from its
regime-wise mean. The result is shown below (Figure 3.3). The neutral bands, 
shown in Figure 3.3, start at [ - 1,1] and narrow to [-0.5,0.5] at r = 300. This
means that the magnitude of shocks to the series z, needed to trigger its mean
reverting behavior are smaller after t=300 than before. If z, represents a
demeaned real interest rate differential, as in equation (3.31), the narrowing 
bands imply that the real interest rates of country d and /becam e more tightly 
dependent on (or less independent of) each other.
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The first stage of both B-TAR  and CB-TAR  estimation consists of 
constructing the series zt , the real interest rate differential demeaned by cc(s,). 
The parameter a(s t) and the number of breaks are estimated using the method
of Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003), subjected to the following criteria: 1) a 
maximum of 6 breaks are allowed; 2) the distance between two breaks is at least 
as large as 15% of the sample size; and 3) heterokedasticity and serial 
correlation are corrected non-parametrically. These are the same criteria 
employed in the investigation of the stationarity of the series66.
The completion of the CB -  TAR estimation can be described as follows. 
Let Lb(S,<j 2,<72-,tv t2,Tb(t)) be the estimated log-likelihood function of the
CB -  TAR model for a given r x, r 2 and Tr :
Lcb ~ L>cb (d ’ (7£’ <Jri’ T\ ’ T2’ ) =
66 If a real interest rate differential is non-stationary then two cases are investigated: one assuming that 
regime wise level estimated through Bai and Perron method and the other assuming the level is constant 
(the sample average).
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17 lH 2
ln(2;r) -  ln(cr£ ) + —y (3.33)
where /, (z,_,) — l ( z x >| zl_l \,t < TB(r)), I 2 (z,_,) — l ( z 2 >| z(_, \,t > TB(r)),
/,“ (*,_.) = 4  <1 z,-, l.< s r ,w) and /2“ (V,) = 4 ;  <1V, U > V ,)-
The estimation of the CB-TAR  model proceeds via a grid search on r , , r2 and
rB(r) which maximizes LCB. Given r,, r2 and Tb(t), the sample is partitioned into
observations inside and outside the band for t = 1,2,...,Tb{t) (the first threshold-
regime) and t = Tb(t) +\,TB{t) + 2,...,T {\he second threshold-regime) and LCB is
computed by maximum likelihood or equivalently by OLS in the partitioned 
sample. LCB is computed for all possible combinations of zx, z2 and Tb(t) and
estimates for zx, z2 and Tm  are the values which maximize the log-likelihood
function:
f 2> TB{t) ) = arg max(r| >rj ^  LB (r,,z2, TB(t) ) . (3.34)
The parameter space of zx, z2 and TB{t) is defined according to the 
following criteria:
i. The combinations of zx, z2 and Tb(t) have to be such that each partition of 
the data (defined by I x (zt_x) ,  I 2 {zt_x) ,  I xu\ z t_x) and r 2ul(zt_x) )  has at least 
30% of the whole sample;
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ii. The lower bound of possible values for TB(t) is set to January of 1988 the
upper bound to December 199367;
iii. tj is changed by increments of 0.05 in the interval [/■,«■] where and u}
are the minimum and the maximum of \z, \  respectively, inside each 
threshold-regime j .
In the same fashion, the estimation of the B-TAR  model proceeds via grid 
search on t  (as r  = r, = r 2), with space is defined according to criteria i and iii, 
which maximizes the log-likelihood function LB:
l b =  L CB( 5 , c r 2E , c x 2n ; T  = r, = t2,Tt = 0) =
S
, ) = i  •
ln(2^-) -  ln(cr^) + V, + ln(27r) -  ln (a 2) + (3.35)
where I in{zt_x) = /( r  >| z(_, |) and 7°"(z(_,) = /( r  <| zr_, |)
A likelihood ratio test is used to examine whether z, follows the B -TAR
model or CB-TAR  model, or put differently, to examine whether financial 
integration increased. The log-likelihood ratio test can be computed as 
LLR = 2(Lcb- L b). However, because LLR statistic contains nuisance 
parameters, even asymptotically in the present case, LLR does not follow the 
standard / 2 distribution and thus its empirical distribution needs to be calculated.
67 The choice of 1988-1993 is mainly based on the observation that the financial liberalization process in 
Southeast Asia was considerably intensified over the late 1980’s and early 1990’s for most of the countries 
in the sample. This choice was also made as to preserve reasonable sample sizes in the two threshold- 
regimes to improve the estimation of model parameters.
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For each pair of real interest rates the empirical distribution for LLR is 
computed as follows. First, a B-TAR  model is estimated on the actual data 
{z,}Tt=] - Second, 1,000 simulations of this model are generated. Each simulation 
starts with z0 = 0 and ends at zr+50, and the first 50 values is discarded in order to
avoid any initial values bias. For each simulation i, B -TAR  and CB-TAR  
models are estimated, and a LLRi is computed. Third, the empirical distribution
of LLRl is calculated from the sorted vector of replicated statistics. The critical 
values extracted from this distribution are used as the basis of the likelihood ratio 
test for the B-TAR  null hypothesis against the CB-TAR  alternative68.
68 The programs to estimate the models and simulate the empirical distribution were written by the author. 
All computations are performed using Gauss 5.0.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The purpose of this study is to assess the extent to which selected 
economies in Southeast Asia are financially integrated among themselves and 
internationally. In particular, two main empirical questions are investigated: 1) are 
Southeast Asian economies financially integrated among themselves and with 
the United States; and 2) following the extensive financial liberalization process 
over the 1980’s and early 1990’s, have Southeast Asian financial markets 
become more integrated among themselves and with the United States. These 
questions are analyzed by examining the temporal covariability of monthly ex-post 
real interest rates through non-linear time series techniques. The analysis is 
divided into two parts. In the first part, unit root tests, with and without structural 
breaks, and the procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) are applied to the real 
interest rate differentials to examine whether countries in Southeast Asia are 
financially integrated (among themselves and with United States). The empirical 
results from these methodologies are presented in sections 2 and 3 of this 
chapter. In the second part, the relationship between Southeast Asian real 
interest rates is modeled in a modified Band-TAR framework to examine whether
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regional and international financial integration increased. The empirical results for 
this part of the analysis are presented in section 4.
4.1. Data Description
Seven Southeast Asian countries -  Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan -  and United States were chosen 
for the empirical analysis because each possesses a market-influenced interest 
rate with a sufficiently long-enough time series. The sample consists of monthly 
data and varies for each country according to the availability of data. For 
Indonesia the sample period is 1986:01 to 2005:01; for Japan and United States 
1970:01 to 2005:01; for Malaysia 1976:02 to 2005:01; for Philippines 1976:02 to 
2005:01; for Singapore 1972:04 to 2005:01; for Thailand 1978:02 to 2005:01; 
and for Taiwan 1980:11 to 2005:01. The money market interest rates used were 
as follows: the three-month interbank interest rates for Indonesia, Singapore and 
Thailand; the overnight uncollaterised call money rate for Japan; the three-month 
time deposit rates for Malaysia, Philippines and Taiwan; and 90-day Treasury Bill 
rate for the United States. Except for Japan, these nominal interest rates are the 
series commonly used in the literature investigating interest rate parities in the 
region. The reason for the choice of the Japanese nominal interest rate is that 
the series overnight uncollaterised call money rate is the longest series available 
and mimics very closely other series commonly used in the literature, such as the 
three-month interbank nominal interest rate and three-month gensaki rate. This 
can be observed in Figure 4.1 below, where ocmrJp is the overnight
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uncollaterised call money rate, 3mibJp is the three-month interbank nominal 
interest rate and gskJp is the three-month gensaki rate. This apparent common 
variability of these series is also examined by Johansen (1990) cointegration test. 
Using the 1% level of significance, test results indicate that ocm rjp  and 3m ib jp  
are cointegrated with cointegration vector (-1 0.872), and ocm rjp  and g sk jp  are 
cointegrated with cointegration vector (-1 0.985). The likelihood statistics for the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration in these two cases are 95.67 and 31.58, 
respectively1. All nominal interest rate series are end of month data for a three- 
month maturity period2.












0 .0 0 0
As mentioned previously, this study investigates financial integration 
based on the theoretical result known as real interest rate parity. Strictly 
speaking, real interest parity is an ex ante concept defined by expectations rather 
than realized real interest rates. However, due to the lack of data on expectations 
this study works with the operational version based on the relationship between 
ex post real interest rates. The critical assumption to justify the use of ex post
1 The 1% critical value is 25.32.
2 These interest rate data are transformed into a three-month basis from an annual basis.
95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
real interest rates is the rationality of expectations in the money markets, which 
yields the condition that the forecast error of inflation is unforecastable and hence 
rll+n = E (rt l+n | Qr). That is, the ex post realizations of the real interest rate are
unbiased predictors of the ex ante counterpart. In this case, tests for ex-post or 
ex-ante differentials are equivalent (Mishkin, 1992). The ex post real interest rate 
series are calculated by subtracting the percentage changes in the consumer 
price index for a three-month period from the three-month nominal interest rates
C P I — CPI
U,/+3)' Kt,t+3 = ----- —-------- L 3- The ex post real interest rate differential series are
where rtdl+3 and r ' l+3 are the ex post real interest rates for countries d  and f
respectively. Because of the three-month period needed to compute the ex post 
real interest rates, the sample period for the real interest rate differentials ends at 
2004:10. A description of all real interest rate differential series and their sample 
periods are presented in tables A2 and A3 in Appendix A. The names of all 
series are in the following form: RDDFF. The two letters following the letter R 
identifies country d  and the next two letters identify country/in equation (4.1). For 
example, RTWJP is the difference between Taiwanese and Japanese ex post 
real interest rates4:
3 Except for the United States, the nominal interest rate and CPI series were obtained from the Global 
Financial Database. The data for United States were obtained from the IMF "International Financial 
Statistics."
4 The two-letter codes for the countries are: ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; MY = Malaysia; PH = Philippines; 
SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TW = Taiwan; and US = United States.
then computed for each month from the following equation:
(4.1)
RTWJP = r, (4.2)
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Some preliminary qualifications regarding the mean of the real interest rate 
differentials are appropriate before presenting the results. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the mean (or level) of the real interest rate differentials, which reflects 
systematic differences in asset characteristics, country (or political) and exchange 
risk and changes in the real exchange rate, may not be zero and may have 
changed over time. In order to examine the temporal behavior of the mean of the 
real interest rate differentials, the sample is divided into five sub-periods. The first 
period ends in December 1979 and represents the period of substantial 
financial regulation. The second sub-period covers January 1980 to 
December 1989 and represents a period in which most of the countries enacted 
several financial liberalization reforms. The third period covers January 1990 to 
December 1996 and represents a period of substantial increase in flows of capital 
in the region and where most of the financial liberalization process in the region 
ended. The fourth covers January 1997 to December 1998 and represents the 
period when the Asian crisis occurred. The last period, January 1999 to October 
2004, represents the period subsequent to Asian crisis.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 (below) show the changes in the mean of the real 
interest rate differentials for the group of countries Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan (hereafter ASEAN5+1) across all five 
sub-periods. Figure 4.4 and 4.5 (below) shows the changes in the mean of the real 
interest rate differentials for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan and United States,
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respectively, across all five sub-periods5. Each illustration in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
shows the mean of the difference between the real interest rate of a base country 
and real interest rates of other countries in ASEAN5+1 group6. Similarly, the 
illustrations of Figure 4.4 and 4.5 show the mean of the difference between the real 
interest rates of ASEAN5+1 countries and real interest rates of Japan and United 
States. A few points can be observed. The upper illustration of Figure 4.2 
shows that the means of all real interest rate differentials for Indonesia 
against the others ASEAN5+1 countries increased considerably in the sub­
period 1997:01-1998:12. The same pattern can be observed in Figures 4.4 
and 4.5 (the bottom illustrations) for the real interest rate differentials of 
Indonesia against Japan and United States, respectively. As shown in 
Tables A4 and A5 in Appendix A, Indonesian real interest rates was on 
average more than 4% higher than the other ASEAN5+1, Japanese and 
United States real interest rates during the Asian crisis. This well-defined 
change is mainly due to a substantial increase in Indonesian nominal 
interest rates led by its central bank policy over the crisis period. With 
Indonesian economic stability questioned and huge capital outflows over the 
Asian crisis period, the Indonesian central bank tried to stop the increasing 
(accelerating) depreciation of the Rupiah by issuing central bank certificates
5 The mean (p) and standard deviation (s.d.) of the real interest rate differentials for ASEAN5+1 and 
ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan and United States are also presented in tables A4 and A5 in Appendix A, 
respectively.
6 For example, the upper illustration in Figure 4.2 (Indonesia vis-a-vis ASEAN5+1) shows the changes in the 
mean of the real interest rate differentials for Indonesia versus Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Taiwan. An increase (decrease) in these means across sub-periods implies that the real interest rate of 
Indonesia, on average, increase (decrease) with respect to the real interest rates of these other countries.
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(SBI), which in turn drove nominal interest rate to higher level7. Similar policy was 
also adopted in Thailand during the Asian crisis. As the center illustration of 
Figure 4.3 shows, the real interest rate of Thailand increases with respect to 
other ASEAN5+1 (excluding Indonesia) real interest rates during the Asian crisis. 
This change, however, is considerably smaller when compared to mean changes 
in the real interest rate differentials including Indonesian real interest rates.
During 1990-2005, the means of several interest rate differentials 
increased, in absolute terms, over 1997-1998 and then decreased to levels that 
are lower than or similar to the means observed in the period before Asian crisis. 
It is interesting to note that the opposite pattern occurred for most of the real 
interest rate differentials involving Philippines and Singapore (RMYPH, RMYSG, 
RPHSG, RTWPH, RTWSG, RPHUS and RSGUS)8. The mean of these 
differentials decreased (in absolute terms) over 1997-1998 and, after 1998, either 
increased or remain in similar levels. What was different in these two countries? 
The literature suggests these countries possessed stronger macroeconomic 
fundamentals and implemented more effective policies to counter the adverse 
effects of the crisis, relative the other ASEAN economies. Singapore withstood 
the financial storm caused by Asian crisis and even managed to maintain a 
relative favorable economic performance at that time (Jin, 2000). As the crisis 
prolonged, for example, Singapore opted not to tinker with the nominal exchange 
rate, but instead worked towards cost-cutting measures to restore its
7 The Indonesian exchange rate (Rupiah per U.S. dollar) increased (depreciated) from 2,800 in August 1997 
to 4,908 in December 1997 and to 13,535 in June 1998. The pronounced increase in Indonesian real 
interest rate over the Asian crisis can be observed in the upper illustration of Figure B1 in Appendix B.
8 This can be observed more clearly in Tables A4 and A5 of Appendix A.
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competitiveness. At the same time, Singapore authorities pressed ahead with 
further financial reforms and liberalization to ensure its long-run international 
competitiveness and consolidate its position as a financial center in the region 
(Jin, 2000). The Philippines also performed exceptionally over the crisis. The 
Philippines was in an IMF program at the start of the crisis and, as the economy 
came under pressure, IMF financing for it was considerably increased. The 
country also benefit from the composition of its trade, which is more weighted 
towards the United States than that of the more severely affected Asian 
countries. This may have helped to maintain a comparatively low risk associated 
with investments in these countries and, consequently, lower real interest rates 
(returns) relative to other countries. However, since the magnitude (or the mean) 
of the real interest rate differential depends on several factors (changes in real 
exchange rate and diverse risk premiums), it is difficult to determine exactly what 
caused these differentials to exhibit a different behavior over the Asian crisis.
For most of Southeast Asian countries, financial liberalization started in 
the second half of the 1970’s and was significantly intensified over the 1980’s. It 
is commonly expected that after financial liberalization reforms the mean real 
interest rate differentials become smaller (or tend towards to zero). However, for 
some of the Southeast Asian countries the mean real interest rate differential 
deviates further from zero following period of financial liberalization. This can be 
observed mainly in the graphics for Philippines and Singapore (the center right 
and left graphics of Figure 4.2). For example, the mean of the real interest rate 
differential between Singapore and Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan
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increases, in absolute terms, from the period 1980:01-1989:12 to 1990:01- 
1996:12 (and from 1970:01-1979:12 to 1990:01-1989:12). Similarly, the mean of 
the real interest rate differentials for Philippines and Malaysia versus Japan and 
United Stated was approximately zero in the 1970’s and increased from the 
1970’s to the 1980’s and from the 1980’s to the period 1990-1996 (see the top 
and center right graphics of Figure 4.3). If the financial liberalization process in 
the region was effective in promoting a greater financial integration, this result 
shows that increasing financial integration does not necessarily imply 
convergence towards a zero mean real interest rate differential (strict form of the 
real interest rate parity hypothesis). Based on the discussion above and from the 
previous paragraph, it seems that the financial markets of both Singapore and 
Philippines exhibit a different dynamic compared to its neighbors. One possible 
reason for this is that these two countries were the first ones in the region to 
implement policies and reforms to open and improve their financial markets.
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Note: only the top graphic includes Indonesian real interest rates
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The illustrations for Indonesia and Thailand (top illustration in Figure 4.2 
and center illustration in Figure 4.3) reveals that their real interest rates tend to be 
consistently greater than the real interest rates of other countries in the 
ASEAN5+1. The opposite situation occurs in the case of Singaporean, Japanese 
and United States9 real interest rate differentials (top illustration of Figure 4.2 and 
illustrations of Figures 4.4 and 4.5, below). As the real interest rate differential 
includes many elements such as political and exchange risk premium and changes 
in the real exchange rate, it is not possible to infer the reasons for the persistent 
differentials in these countries.
Figure 4.4 -  Changes in the Mean of Real Interest Differentials 
for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan
RSGJP
R T K JP
RIDJP
9 Note that for the case of Japan and United States the mean of the differentials are, in most cases, 
persistently negative if we consider, for example, RJPID or RUSPH instead of RIDJP and RPHUS, as shown 
in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
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Figure 4.5 -  Changes in the Mean of Real Interest Differentials for 














The illustrations in Figure 4.4 show that the mean of the real interest rate 
differential for all countries in ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan shifts upward during the 
Asian crisis. This implies that the Asian crisis may not have affected the Japanese 
financial market as strongly as other Southeast Asian financial markets. On the 
other hand, the illustrations in Figure 4.5 show that the mean of the real interest 
rate differential for all countries in ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis United States does not 
increase or slightly increase during the Asian crisis. Compared to the Japanese
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case, the absence of significant shifts in the mean of real interest rates differentials 
between ASEAN5+1 with respect to United States during 1997-1998 suggests that 
the effects of Asian crisis were felt more intensely in United States than in Japan10. 
Such behavior of the real interest rate differential means between ASEAN5+1 vis- 
a-vis Japan and United States may suggest, as the previous literature; that 
Southeast Asian countries are more financially integrated with United States than 
Japan (see, e.g., Chinn and Frankel 1995). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the equilibrium level of real interest rate differentials adjusts to exogenous shocks, 
such as a financial crisis, in different forms depending on the degree of risk 
associated with the financial assets of each country and the behavior of their real 
exchange rates. Therefore, in terms of country risk premium, for instance, if the 
Asian crisis affected more United States than Japan, one should expect less 
pronounced changes in the means of the real interest rates differentials between 
ASEAN5+1 and United States than in the ones between ASEAN5+1 and Japan. 
But this does not necessarily imply that ASEAN5+1 real interest rates are not 
related, in terms of long-run covariation, to Japanese real interest rate.
Figure 4.6 -  Changes in the Mean of Real Interest Differentials
between Japan and United States
10 This can be confirmed by the change in the mean of the real interest rate differentials between Japan and 
United States during the Asian crisis (Figure 4.6).
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4.2. Structural Breaks: Results from Bai and Perron Method
The changes in the mean of the real interest rate differentials presented 
above are only illustrative as they are not based on formal statistical tests. Many 
of the shifts may be statistically insignificant and/or may not have occurred 
across the sub-periods considered. The formal estimation of the changes and 
date of the changes in the mean of the real interest rate differentials are 
performed using the methods developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 and 
2003) under the following specification:
R ID f’tU ~ a(Sj) + ut , j  < m  (4.3)
where R ID fj{3 is the real interest rate differential, a {s t)  is the mean of RIDf/+i for 
the regime sJt j  is the index for the number of regimes, m is the maximum 
number of breaks allowed in the estimation process and ut is an error term.
Following the recommendations of Bai and Perron (2001, 2003), the 
implementation of BP procedure considers the following criteria: (i) the distance 
between the dates of the breaks is at least equal to 10% of the sample size; (ii) 
the error term is allowed to be serially correlated; (iii) regressors are allowed to 
have different distributions across segments; and (iv) residuals are allowed to 
have heterogeneous variances across segments11. Given the sample size of the 
data investigated in this study, the 10% minimum distance between breaks is 
chosen because it guarantees enough data to generate more robust statistics for
11 Serial correlation and heterokedasticity of the error terms are corrected non-parametrically in BP 
estimation procedure using the method developed by Andrews (1991).
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the break dates. As Bai and Perron (2001) demonstrated in their computational 
analysis, when the sample between breaks is above 25 observations the power 
of the power of the tests included in their procedure increase considerably. With 
the 10% criterion, the minimum sample allowed between breaks includes 26 
observations (this is the case for the real interest rate differentials involving 
Indonesia). Due to the structure of the algorithm employed to estimate the model 
with structural breaks, the use of the 10% criterion restricts the maximum number 
of breaks allowed in the estimation process to six, that is, j  < 6 . Bai and Perron 
(2001) also show that criteria (ii), (iii) and (iv) increase the power and improve the 
performance of the tests used to determine the number of breaks in the series 
and, therefore, recommended their use in the analysis of multiple structural 
breaks.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the number of breaks in the mean of the series 
is determined according to a strategy suggested by Bai and Perron (2001, 2003). 
First, the tests UDmax and WDmax are used to see if at least one break is 
present. Second, if they indicate the presence of a break(s), the number of 
breaks are decided based upon an examination of the Sup F ( l+ l\ l)  tests12. To 
illustrate this strategy consider the following examples (usually found in the 
results):
i. If UDmax and WDmax and F(0\1) are not statistically significant then no 
break is present in the series;
12 The performance of the SupF tests depends on whether the series analyzed are stationarity and, 
therefore, the structure breaks detected by BP procedure may not be valid. Their legitimacy of the breaks 
detected by BP is going to be confirmed only in the next section, based on the results from the unit root 
tests. As explained in Chapter 3, if appropriate unit root tests, chosen according to what BP indicates, shows 
that the series is stationary than the structural breaks detected by BP are reliable.
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ii. If UDmax and WDmax, F(0\1) and F(0\2) statistics are statistically significant 
but F ( l\2 )  is not significant then one break is present in the series;
iii. If UDmax and WDmax, F(0\1), F(0\2), F(0\3) and F ( l\2 )  statistics are 
statistically significant but F(2\3) is not significant then two breaks are 
present in the series;
iv. If UDmax and WDmax, F(0\1), F(0\2), F(0\3), F(0\4), F ( l\2 )  and F(2\3) 
statistics are statistically significant but F(3\4) are not significant then three 
breaks are present in the series;
v. If UDmax and WDmax, F(0\1), F(0\2), F(0\3), F(0\4) and F(2\3) statistics are 
statistically significant but F (l\2 )  and F(3\4) are not significant then three 
breaks are present in the series;
For all real interest rate differentials series, the use of the UDmax, WDmax and 
Sup F ( l+ l\ l)  tests through this strategy leads to no more than 3 structural breaks. 
An exception is the case of RMYJP (real interest rate differential between 
Malaysia and Japan); where UDmax and WDmax, F(0\1), F(0\2), F(0\3), F(0\4), 
F(0\5), F(4\5) statistics are statistically significant but F (l\2 ), F(2\3) and F(3\4) are 
not significant. This can suggest that RMYJP has 5 breaks. However, this study 
adopts a more conservative perspective, assuming only one break in this series 
and investigating the stationarity property of RMYJP with the ZA test (which 
allows for only one structural break in the series)13. If stationarity of RMYJP 
cannot be supported by ZA test, tests allowing for more than one break will be 
employed.
13 BP estimation results assuming 5 breaks are also shown in Table 4,2 (below).
109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A summary of the results is presented in two tables of this section. Table 
4.1 (below) presents the results for the real interest rate differentials for the 
ASEAN5+1 group and Table 4.2 (below) presents the results for the real interest 
rate differentials for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan and United States. More detailed 
results of BP estimation, including the tests statistics and confidence interval for 
the break dates, are presented in tables A18 and A19 in Appendix A14. The 
estimation results for all series, except RIDSG and RTWSG, are based on the 
number of breaks determined using the 5% level of significance for UDmax, 
WDmax and Sup F ( l+ l\ l)  tests. For the series RIDSG and RTWSG, breaks are 
detected only at the 10% level of significance. In these cases, Tables 4.1 shows 
the estimation results with the breaks detected at the 10% level of significance 
(RIDSG1 and RTWSG1), for illustrative purpose, and without breaks. When no 
break is detected only the average of the real interest rate differential is 
presented.
14 A graphic for each series together with the BP estimation results are also presented in figures B1 though 
B8 in Appendix B.
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Table 4.1 -  Bai and Perron Estimates of a(s j )  for ASEAN5+1
Variables a(st) a(s2) «(J3) a(sA)
RIDMY 1.20* 5.76* 1.27*
Jut 97 Jun 99
RIDPH -0.09* 1.31* 5.27* 0.77*
Sep-94 Jul-97 Jun-99














RTHSG 0.27 1.04* 0.13
Feb-81 Apr-99
RTWMY 1.34* -0.70* 0.16
Nov-83 Aug-86
RTWPH -0.42t
RTWSG 1 1.17* -0.09 0.70* 0.20
Nov-83 Mar-89 Feb-01
RTWSG2 0.51*
RTWTH 0.07 -1.47* -0.39* 0.24*
Sep-83 Aug-86 Sep-98
Note: The dates below the estimated coefficients indicate the timing of the
structural break (or shift in the coefficient a(sO).
* indicates that the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level of significance.
* There are no structural breaks in these cases. a(Si) is the simple average 
of the series.
As expected, most of the real interest rate differentials involving Indonesia 
have structural breaks around the beginning and end of the Asian crisis. These 
breaks represent a substantial rise in Indonesian real interest rates during the 
Asian crisis relative to the real interest rates of other countries examined. 
According to BP estimatives of a(sj),  Indonesian real interest rates deviated on
average from Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Japan and United States real
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interest rates about 3.9 to 4.9 percentage points. After the Asian crisis these real 
interest rate differentials returned to levels equal or below the level in the pre­
crisis period. As discussed previously, this temporary positive shift in the real 
interest rate differentials of Indonesia is due to a large depreciation of the Rupiah 
over the Asian crisis and, given that capital controls in this country was relatively 
low at that time, an increase in the risk premium. Note that for the real interest 
rate differentials between Indonesia and Thailand and Taiwan no break is 
detected. Given that the dynamics of all real interest rate differentials including 
Indonesia are very similar (see Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B), the possible 
reasons for the failure of BP method to detect structural breaks in RIDTH and 
RIDTW are: (a) the breaks could not be detected using the criterion of 10% 
minimum distance between breaks (about two years in this case) because 
differences in level between the real interest rates of these countries were 
relatively shorter in time; or/and (b) the performance of the UDmax, WDmax and 
Sup F(l+l\l) tests are affected because two years of data defined by the criterion 
of 10% minimum distance between breaks may not be enough to correct for 
serial correlation in the errors during this period15. In fact, if the assumption of no 
serial correlation in the error term is maintained and a criterion of 5% minimum 
distance between breaks is used, BP method indicates that RIDTH and RIDTW 
also have structural breaks around the beginning and end of Asian crisis16. It is 
also worth noticing that Indonesia real interest rate is the only real interest rate 
that is, throughout the whole sample, greater than all other real interest rates
15 Bai and Perron (2001) reports that the size properties of the UDmax, WDmax and Sup F(l+1\l) tests may 
be affected if serial correlation is not corrected properly.
16 These results are not showed in this study (they may be included latter)
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considered. This suggests that Indonesian financial assets carry a risk premium 
relative to other Southeast Asian financial assets or/and that Indonesian real 
exchange rates with respect to other Southeast Asian countries have a positive 
trend. Indeed, as shown in Table A26 in Appendix A, Indonesian real exchange 
rates have been, on average, depreciating against all other countries since the 
1980’s. Nevertheless, the average depreciation rate is relatively small, except for 
the Asian crisis period (see row 7, Table A26, Appendix A), and that does not 
justify the magnitude of Indonesian real interest rate differentials. Most of the real 
interest rate differential is due to deviations from the uncovered interest rate 
parity and, therefore, Indonesia asset generally requires a premium over the 
assets of other countries in the data17.
Structural breaks apparently related to the Asian crisis also appear in 
several other real interest rate differentials that do not include Indonesia: 
RTHMY, RTHSG, RTWSG, RTWTH, RTHJP, RTWJP, RTHUS and RJPUS. 
While for real interest rate differentials including Indonesia the estimated breaks 
clearly show a temporary rise in the mean of the differentials over the Asian 
crisis, for these other cases only a single structural break is detected; generally a 
decrease in the mean interest rate differential (in absolute terms) over the period 
1998-2001. After (or during) the Asian crisis, several structural reforms in the 
economies and financial sectors of the region were implemented18. These events 
may have led to asymmetric adjustments in the level of real interest rates across
17 Investigating the UIP condition for 10 Asian countries from 1982 to 1994, DeBrower (2000) finds that the 
average deviation from the UIP was the largest for Indonesia. He argues that several episodes of currency 
and financially instability in Indonesia may be responsible for that.
18 For example, after (during) Asian crisis Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan abandoned their 
pegged currency regime adopted before 1998.
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Southeast Asian countries and consequently generate structural breaks in the 
real interest rate differentials. Note that except for RTHMY these structural 
breaks show a shift in the mean of the real interest rate differential to a level 
close to zero. As Cook and Devereux (2003) argues, these reforms seems to 
have decreased the degree of uncertainty about the recovery of many Southeast 
Asian financial markets and, therefore, decreased the (real) interest rate 
differential via a reduction in risk premia.
All real interest rate differentials between ASEAN5+1 and Japan have 
structural breaks. The mean of the differentials RMYJP and RSGJP shifts 
upward in 1992 and 1994, respectively. The mean of the differentials RIDJP, 
RTHJP and RTWJP have a positive shift around 1995 and a negative shift (in 
general to a level similar to that of 1970’ and 1980’s) around the end of 1998. 
The structural break around 1992-1995 coincides with the period where 
Japanese nominal interest rates sharply declined, from 8% aa in 1992 to 
approximately 0.2% aa in 1995. A near zero level of Japanese real interest rates 
remained after 1995. In fact, Bank of Japan acted to further decrease the level of 
its interest rate by implementing the zero interest rate policy in 1999 (Oda and 
Ueda, 2005)19. However, it is difficult to justify this positive shift in the level of the 
real interest rate differentials between ASEAN5+1 and Japan as a consequence 
of (only) the change in Japanese monetary policy. In fact, it seems that the main 
factor driving this shift in the differentials is the rise in the level of ASEAN5+1 real
19 The targeting rate was raised to around 0.25% between September 2000 and March 2001 based on the 
decision by the Bank of Japan policy board that the economy was out of the deflationary situation. However, 
the zero interest rate policy resumed in March 2001 as the economy appeared to have begun to slow down 
again.
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interest rates during Asian crisis. As Figure B5 and B6 (Appendix B) show, the 
real interest rate differentials for ASEAN5+1 against Japan increase over 1992- 
1994, probably in response to the new Japanese interest rate policy, tend or start 
to decrease over 1994-1996 and rise considerably over 1996-1998, due to the 
Asian crisis. The proximity of these two events may generate a structural break in 
the real interest rate differentials that seems to have occurred around 1992-1995. 
Have the Asian crisis not occurred, it is possible that Japanese interest rate 
policy would have caused only a brief deviation in the real interest rate 
differentials and no structural break would be present. Indeed, after the Asian 
crisis, most of the real interest rate differentials decreased to similar levels of the 
period before 1992.
The real interest rate differentials between Philippines and Singapore, 
Thailand, Taiwan, Japan and United States have a single structural break that 
occurred over 1984. As discussed in Chapter 2, a real exchange rate may have a 
trend because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect and a reorganization of the 
exporting sector can cause this trend to shift. If the real exchange rate trend 
shifts, the rate of change in the real exchange rate shifts (a shift in the term B,
discussed in Chapter 2) and, consequently, the level of the real interest rates 
differential may change (a structural break in the real interest rate differential 
appears). This seems to be the case for the real interest rate differentials 
including Philippines. Starting in 1972, Philippines’s government has developed 
the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) and provided many incentives for 
export production. Export production in Philippines grew steadily for the first ten
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years, but then significantly declined throughout the crisis period 1982-1984. For 
Example, exports from BEPZ fell from 159.6 million dollars in 1982 to a low point 
of 57.6 million dollars in 1984. As a part of the extensive program to recover 
Philippines economy from the 1983-1984 crises, Philippines’s government has 
reinforced considerably the export-oriented industrialization strategy (EOI) 
adopted in the past decade. At this time, there were huge incentives to the 
manufacturing sectors and, consequently, the structure of Philippine exports shift 
from traditional agricultural exports to nontraditional, labor-intensive 
manufacturing exports, particularly in garments and electronics (Malin, 1985). By 
the early 1990s, over 70 percent of total exports were in these nontraditional 
manufacturers20. During 1983-1984, Philippines government also implemented 
substantial changes in the exchange rate policy, which caused the Philippine 
peso to devaluate (against the U.S. dollar) 24% in October 1983 and 24% in 
October 1984 (Wong and Leung, 2005). This reorganization in the exporting 
sector of Philippines in the middle 1980’s, together with the changes in its 
exchange rate policy, seems to have caused a shift in the trend of its real 
exchange rates, as shown in Figure B16 of Appendix B, and thus cause 
structural breaks in real interest rate differentials involving Philippines.
20 This has supposedly been the key to Philippine economic development over the late 1980’s and 1990’s.
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Table 4.2 -  Bai and Perron Estimates of a(sj )  for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis 
__________ Japan and United States__________
Variables « 0 i) a (s 2) a (s 3) « 0 4)




RMYJP** -0.26* 0.52* -0.26* 0.49*
May-81 Fev-87 Dec-91






RTHJP 0.91* 2.12* 0.44*
Aug-95 Sep-98
RTWJP 1.49* 0.22 1.23* 0.34*
Oct-83 Jun-94 May-01










RJPUS -0.06* -0.89* -0.12
Jan-95 May-01
Note: The dates below the estimated coefficients indicate thetiming of the
structural break (or shift in the coefficient a(si).
*  indicates that the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 5%  
level of significance.
*  There are no structural breaks in these cases. a(Sj) is the simple average 
of the series.
“ Estimation results for RM YJP with 5 structural breaks
It is an understatement to say that Southeast Asian economies have 
experienced substantial transformation and tumult in the last three decades. 
They have changed their status from closed to financially open markets over the 
1980’s, underwent several structural reforms over the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
experienced the stimulating days of “Asian fever” in the first half of the 1990’s, 
collapsed in 1997-1998 and recovered in the late 1990's and early 2000’s. These
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events cannot but have an effect on the regional and international long-run 
relationship between real interest rates for Southeast Asia. It is probably fair to 
say that these events have affected the mechanisms of price formation, intensity 
of capital flows and asset arbitrage across the region. While financial markets 
may be still integrated, these events influence international investors to 
reevaluate any political (or country) and exchange rate risk premia or extra 
compensation required to invest in these economies. As a result, structural 
breaks in interest rate parity conditions are likely to appear.
The dynamics of the long-run relationship between real interest rates are 
therefore more complex than what are usually described by linear models. In 
fact, in a world where the structure of the markets are generally affected by 
exogenous shocks, reforms or discrete changes in government policy, the 
assumption of linearity in the relationship between economic variables is clearly 
inappropriate. Considering the traditional models of international 
macroeconomics, the existence of structural breaks in the relationship between 
real interest rates also reveals that the behavior of the real exchange rates may 
also undergo structural breaks. In this circumstance, it may be extremely useful 
for government officials to consider the possibility that not only their domestic 
markets may be linked to international markets but also that such linkage may 
change over time.
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4.3. Stationarity of the Real Interest Rate Differentials: Unit Root tests and 
Confirmatory analysis
This section examines the question of whether Southeast Asian countries 
are financially integrated among themselves and with respect to Japan and 
United States. The analysis is conducted by investigating the real interest rate 
parity condition for each possible pair of countries in the data. Real interest rate 
parity implies that when two countries are financial integrated their real interest 
rates have a stable long-run relationship. This issue is investigated in this section 
by testing whether real interest rate differentials are stationary.
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible that financially integrated 
countries have stationary real interest rate differentials with structural breaks 
(shifts in the level or mean of the real interest rates differentials). In this case, the 
use of unit root tests that do not take into account structural breaks may lead to 
erroneous conclusions. For example, if a stationary real interest rate differential 
has one structural break unit root tests such as ADF may indicate that this series 
is non-stationary (financial integration is not supported). The same problem {low 
power) appears when the series have m structural breaks and the researcher 
uses unit root tests that allow for a number of breaks less than m. On the other 
hand, when the series has no structural break the use of unit root tests that 
allows for structural breaks may also lead to incorrect inference due to size 
distortions (the difference between the nominal level of the test and its actual 
rejection probability). Similarly, size distortions may appear when the series has 
m structural breaks and its stationarity property is investigated by unit root tests
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that allows for more than m structural breaks. Therefore, in order to generate 
more accurate inference regarding stationarity of the real interest rate 
differentials it is important that the analysis be conducted by appropriate unit root 
tests. This is actually essential in this study given the evidence, presented in the 
previous section, that the real interest rate differentials for Southeast Asian 
countries have diverse structural breaks in terms of number, location and 
magnitude.
The problem of low power and size distortion related to structural breaks 
appears because unit root tests that allows for structural breaks are not designed 
to test jointly the unit root hypothesis and the presence or the validity of their 
estimated structural breaks. In ZA (Zivot and Andrews, 1992) and LP (Lumsdaine 
and Papell, 1997) tests, for example, the dates of the structural breaks are 
estimated by choosing the break point (date) which supports the alternative 
hypothesis the most, i.e., supports the null hypothesis the least. Thus, in the 
estimation process of ZA and LP tests, structural breaks are estimated 
independent of whether they are significant or actually exist. That is, even if the 
series has no structural breaks, one and two structural breaks are always 
generated by the estimation of ZA and LP tests, respectively. In general, the 
literature applying these tests justify significance of their estimated structural 
breaks by looking into possible historical events that may have caused the level 
(or trend) of the series to change. Nevertheless, the question of whether these 
structural breaks are statistically significant still remains. Structural breaks are 
caused by “unique” historical events but these events may not necessarily cause
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structural breaks. This is particularly relevant when analyzing the temporal 
relationship between two series that may have structural breaks (as the present 
study). For example, Asian crisis may have caused changes in the level of real 
interest rates in two Asia countries but, if these breaks are similar in terms of 
location and magnitude, the level of their real interest rate differential may not 
change (noticeably). To overcome this methodological problem the conclusions 
derived in this section are based on the comparison between BP and unit root 
test results. The main objective of the structural breaks estimated by BP method 
is to guide the choice of the appropriate unit root test to investigate whether the 
real interest rate differentials are stationary (confirmatory analysis).
As explained in Chapter 3, if BP results indicate that a real interest rate 
differential series have one (two) structural break(s) then stationarity is 
investigated using ZA (LP) unit root test (or more than 2 structural breaks if 
needed). Note, however, that the breaks estimated by BP method are robust 
(reliable) only when the series is stationary. Therefore, confirmatory results from 
BP and unit root test results are needed for correct inference. That is, if BP 
indicates that the series have one structural break at time TB and ZA test 
indicates that the series is non-stationary with an estimated structural break 
around (dose to) TB then it is possible that the break detected by BP method is 
not valid. In this case, the use of standard unit root tests seems to be more 
appropriate. Nevertheless, when the series have no structural break ZA test is 
biased towards concluding the series is stationary and, for that reason, the non 
rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root by ZA in this situation indicates that
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the series may indeed be non-stationary. Similar reasoning applies for the case 
of a series with two structural breaks, determined by BP method, and LP unit root 
test indicates that the series is non-stationary.
A summary of the unit root test results for the real interest rate differentials 
involving only ASEAN5+1 countries and ASEAN5+1 countries vis-a-vis Japan 
and United States are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 (below), respectively21. 
Each table shows the conclusions of the unit root tests, the break dates 
estimated by the ZA and LP unit root tests and the break dates and their 
respective 5% confidence interval estimated by BP method. The conclusions of 
the unit root tests are based on the respective 5% asymptotic critical values for 
the ADF, KPSS and NP tests and the finite-sample 5% critical values for the ZA 
and LP tests (reported in tables A8-A11 in Appendix A). Considering the ADF 
test, only 8 (out of 28) real interest rate differentials are found to be stationary: 
RMYPH, RTHPH and RTWPH in the ASEAN5+1 group; and RPHUS, RPHJP, 
RMYUS, RSGUS and RJPUS in the case ASEAN5+1 versus Japan and United 
States. Extending the analysis to the other unit root tests, stationarity is found in 
11 series for the KPSS test (RIDMY, RIDSG, RIDTW, RMYPH and RTWPH in 
the ASEAN5+1 group, and RIDJP, RPHJP, RTWJP, RIDUS, RSGUS and 
RJPUS in the case ASEAN5+1 versus Japan and United States) and 10 series 
for the NP test (RIDMY, RIDSG, RIDTW, RMYPH and RTWPH in the ASEAN5+1
21 Tables A12 through A17 in Appendix A present the unit root test results in more details. For a better 
visualization of the structural breaks estimated by BP method and ZA and LP unit root tests see Figures B1 
through B8 in Appendix B. The critical values for ZA and LP tests are presented in tables A6 through A9 in 
Appendix A.
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group, and RPHUS, RPHJP, RMYUS, RSGUS and RJPUS in the case 
ASEAN5+1 versus Japan and United States).
The results of the three tests agree on stationarity for only 5 series: 
RMYPH, RTWPH, RPHJP, RSGUS and RJPUS. It is interesting to note that 
financial integration between Japan and United States is supported by all three 
tests (without taking into account structural breaks). Such result is usually 
rejected in the previous literature investigating the real interest rate parity 
between these countries, indicating that the possible reason for that is the size of 
the sample employed in the investigation. Note also that the ADF and NP tests, 
both with the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, have the same conclusion in the 
investigation of real interest rate differentials for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan and 
United States but, in most cases, have contradictory results regarding the 
stationarity property of the differentials between ASEAN5+1 economies. The 
opposite situation occurs in the case of KPSS and NP test results. As reported in 
the econometrics literature, the disagreement between unit root tests may be a 
result of short sample size, which seems not to be the case in the current study, 
and/or the presence of non-linearity in the data. It is, therefore, expected that, 
after selecting the appropriate unit root test based on the results of previous 
section, the conflicting results disappear once structural breaks are taken into 
account.
Overall, evidence in favor of financial integration in Southeast Asia is very 
limited if stationarity is supported only under the agreement among the three unit 
root tests is considered. Using only one unit root test or requiring the agreement
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between only two tests, the evidence in favor of financial integration is improved 
(10/11 real interest rate differentials are stationary). Based on this more flexible 
criterion, it seems that the only group of financially integrated countries is 
Philippines, Japan and United States.
Table 4.3 -  Unit Root Test Results for Real Interest Rate Differentials
among ASEAN5+1 Countries
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(i) ADF, KPSS and NP (Ng and Perron 2001) are unit root tests that do not allow for structural breaks;
(ii) ZA and LP are the Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) tests. Respectively;
(iii) The intervals below the break dates estimated by BP method are the 5% confidence intervals;
(iv) NS indicates that the series is non-stationary;
(v) S indicates that the series is stationary using the 5% significance level;
(vi) The estimated break dates in ZA and LP are presented below their tests results;
(vii) Conclusions from more appropriated unit root tests, according to the number of breaks estimated in BP, are shown in bolded NS and S. 
These breaks were detected using the 10% significance level for the UDmax, WDmax and SupF  test in BP method.
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The results from BP procedure, presented in previous section, indicate 
that RTHPH, RPHSG, RPHUS, RPHJP, RMYUS, RMYJP, RSGJP and RTHUS 
have a single structural break. While the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test is more 
appropriate to investigate these series, stationarity in the real interest rate 
differentials RTHPH, RPHUS, RPHJP and RMYUS was confirmed by all three 
standard unit root tests (ADF, KPSS and NP). This result is, naturally, also 
supported by ZA test. For the other real interest rate differentials that have a 
single break, RPHSG, RMYJP, RSGJP and RTHUS, the standard unit root tests 
could not reject the hypothesis that the series are non-stationarity. In these 
cases, ZA test results indicate that RPHSG and RMYJP are stationary while 
RSGJP and RTHUS are not stationary. In fact, stationarity of RSGJP and 
RTHUS cannot be supported even if unit root test that allows for two structural 
breaks (LP test) is employed.
For the series which BP procedure indicated the presence of two 
structural breaks (RIDMY, RTHMY, RTHSG, RTWMY, RTHJP, RIDUS and 
RJPUS), LP unit root test rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for only 
RIDMY, RIDUS and RJPUS, using the 5% level of significance. Evidence that 
RTHMY, RTHSG, RTWMY and RTHJP are non-stationary is considerable 
strong, as all unit-root tests agree with respect to this conclusion. Considering the 
7 series that, according to BP results, have 3 structural breaks, LP test reject the 
null of non-stationarity for 6 of them: RIDPH, RIDSG, RTWSG, RIDJP and 
RTWJP. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is possible that the LP test capture the
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most significant structural breaks in the stationary series with more than 2 
structural breaks and still be able to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.
Table 4.4 -  Unit Root Test Results for Real Interest Rate Differentials 
between ASEAN5+1 and Japan and United States

























































































(i) ADF, KPSS and NP (Ng and Perron 2001) are unit root tests that do not allow for structural breaks;
(ii) ZA and LP are the Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) tests. Respectively;
(iii) The intervals below the break dates estimated by BP method are the 5% confidence intervals;
(iv) NS indicates that the series is non-stationary;
(v) S indicates that the series is stationary using the 5% significance level;
(vi) The estimated break dates in ZA and LP are presented below their tests results;
(vii) Conclusions from more appropriated unit root tests, according to the number of breaks estimated in BP, are shown in bolded NS and S. 
These breaks were detected using the 10% significance level for the UDmax, WDmax and SupF  test in BP method.
Since it would not be appropriate to derive final conclusion regarding the
stationarity property of RTWTH based on the LP test, due to low power
problems, this series is investigated through a modification of ZA (or LP) test to
account for 3 structural breaks. The estimated statistic of this test for RTWTH,
not reported in the tables, is -7.19. Based on the 5% finite-sample critical value
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for this case, - 8.39, the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for 
RTWTH22.
Compared to BP results, the ZA and LP tests performed reasonable well 
in the estimation of the structural break dates. Most of the break dates estimated 
by ZA and LP are very close to the ones determined by BP method. In a few 
cases (RTHMY, RTWTH, RTHJP and RJPUS) the break dates estimated by ZA 
and LP are located outside the confidence intervals for the break dates estimated 
by BP method. For example, BP results indicate that structural breaks in RTHMY 
occurred in June 1991 and December 2001 (with confidence intervals 1990:03- 
1996:04 and 2000:02-2002:12, respectively) but both ZA and LP tests estimate a 
break in August 1987. Note that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be 
rejected by either ZA or LP for RTHMY. That means that if the 1987 structural 
break in ZA and LP tests were moved towards 1991 their A D F - r  statistics 
would reduce (in absolute terms) and, therefore, strengthen the rejection of non- 
stationarity even more. In other example, the BP estimated structural breaks for 
RJPUS occurred in January 1995 and May 2001 while the break dates estimated 
by LP, the adequate unit root test for this situation, are September 1980 and 
December 1994. Despite this discrepancy regarding the date of the breaks, the 
LP test indicates that the RJPUS is stationary. However, it is possible that the 
1980 structural break estimated by LP is not valid and, consequently, the 
conclusions of the test may be biased23. To check the robustness of its result, the
22 For the case RTWTH, the finite sample critical values for the unit root tests allowing three structural 
breaks are: - 7.45 (10% ); -8.39 (5%) and -9.65 (1%).
23 Note that if RJPUS is stationary, as all but ZA test suggest, BP method determines the time (and number) 
of structural breaks consistently.
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LP test is applied to series RJPUS restricting the search for structural breaks to 
the period after 1990. The resulting ADF - r  statistic is -6.13 and break dates 
are November 1994 and December 2000. Using the critical values of Table A9 
(Appendix A) the null unit root hypothesis can still be rejected at 1% significance 
level and RJPUS can be considered stationary.
When the confirmatory analysis is therefore applied, 19 real interest rate 
differential series are found to be stationary (using the 5% level of significance24). 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity could not be rejected for RIDTH, RTHMY, 
RTHSG, RTWMY, RTWTH, RSGJP, RTHJP, RTHUS and RTWUS. Coincidently, 
most of the real interest rate differentials for which non-stationarity cannot be 
rejected include Thailand. The possible reason for this finding is that Thailand 
started opening (or liberalizing) its financial markets the latest and that its capital 
account restrictions and financial market controls are stronger relative to other 
Southeast Asian countries. Overall, the results from the confirmatory analysis 
show that, excluding Thailand, ASEAN5+1 countries are financially integrated 
among themselves. Evidence in favor of integration is also found for the financial 
markets of Japan and United States, except for the cases RTHUS, RTHJP, 
RSGJP and RTWUS.
This study shows the importance of taking into account the possibility of 
structural breaks in the investigation of the real interest rate parity and financial 
integration. Extant studies focused on Southeast Asian countries that have not 
admitted the possibility of structural breaks in the interest rate parity have
24 If the 10% significance level is used, the confirmatory analysis indicates that 21 out of 28 series are 
stationary.
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generally come to the conclusion that financial integration in the region is limited. 
As the BP results indicate, many of the real interest rate differentials between 
Southeast Asian countries have structural breaks around the middle 1980’s and 
early and middle 1990’s. Since the sample data usually investigated by previous 
literature include these periods, structural breaks may be the reason for the lack 
of evidence in favor of financial integration in Southeast Asia.
Despite the power improvement when testing for (real) interest rate parity 
condition, allowing structural breaks also gives a better understand of 
international linkages and how economic disturbances are transmitted between 
countries. Exogenous shocks, such as Asia crisis, reforms in their foreign 
exchange and financial markets, may have caused changes in the long-rung 
relationship between Southeast Asian real interest rates but do not seem to 
jeopardize de support for financial integration. These changes in the real interest 
rate condition reveal that international investors actually revaluate their required 
returns to invest in these countries in case exogenous shocks alter substantially 
the structure of their economies.
In one way, the evidence that the real interest rates in Southeast Asia are 
interconnected reflects the substitutability of the financial assets and the intensity 
of the capital flows across their economies, which are conductive of financial 
integration and economic convergence in the region. In another way, it indicates 
that monetary autonomy in the region is limited, meaning that domestic interest 
rates and aggregate price levels in a Southeast Asian country would be 
influenced by external factors, originating at both regional and international
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levels. Consequently, this could have narrowed domestic policy options and 
constraint national choices over monetary and fiscal policies, which may facilitate 
excessive borrowing. Integration of Southeast Asian financial markets could 
immediately confront national authorities with a dilemma over controlling either 
interest rates or exchange rates (Obstfeld, 1998).
In summary, the findings of this section are supportive of financial 
integration for Southeast Asian economies at regional and international spheres. 
Regional financial integration has particularly important policy implications 
regarding the future of exchange rate regime and financially stability in the 
region. It is well known that countries financially (and economically) integrated 
with each other are likely to constitute an Optimum Currency Area (Frankel and 
rose, 1998). During Asian crisis of 1997-1998, the affected countries were in 
financial trouble and did not have enough foreign exchange reserves to finance 
their imports. A move to a unified financial market or single currency, with the 
Japanese Yen taken as a benchmark, for example, would help countries to 
improve their balance of payment and create better mechanisms to hedge 
against exchange rate risk. Similarly, stronger linkages of their financial markets 
can be a force to promote stability and convergence and provide a collective 
defense mechanism against systematic failures and monetary instability. 
Furthermore, regional risk sharing through regional financial integration can 
insure against country specific income/consumption risks. The findings provide 
support for the current political will in the region to the formation of a single 
currency area. Nevertheless, the results also indicate that Thailand, a key
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member of ASEAN group, may not be ready for plans of regional unification and 
needs to make a greater effort to promote financial openness and integration 
within Southeast Asia.
4.4. Changes in the Degree of Financial Integration
This section investigates the empirical question of whether financial 
integration in Southeast Asia increased following the process of financial 
liberalization in the region over the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The investigation is 
based on the following hypothesis: when countries become more financially 
integrated the degree of interdependence between their real interest rate 
increases. As discussed in Chapter 3, this degree of interdependence is 
measured, in a Band-TAR framework, by the magnitude of the deviations from 
the long-run equilibrium level between real interest rates necessary to cause the 
real interest rates to mean revert towards this equilibrium level. In this context, if 
financial integration between two countries increases then their real interest rates 
would adjust towards their long-run equilibrium level for relatively smaller 
deviations. The analysis is conducted by testing the statistical significance of the 
CB-TAR model, which allows the degree of interdependence between real 
interest rates to change, relative to the B -  TAR, which assumes that the degree 
of interdependence is constant. For this purpose a log-likelihood ratio test (LLR) 
is employed. A sufficiently large log-likelihood ratio statistic implies that the 
CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B -TAR model and, 
as a result, the degree of financial integration changed. A negative change in the
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threshold of the CB -  TAR model indicates that the magnitude of the deviations 
necessary to cause the real interest rate differential to mean revert decrease. 
Thus, increasing financial integration is concluded only if the CB-TAR  model is 
significant and the change in the threshold ( r ) estimated by the CB-TAR  model 
is negative (i.e. the threshold decreases, > t2 ).
As discussed in Chapter 3, the date of the threshold change in the 
CB-TAR model is determined endogenously by grid search over the period 
1988:01 to 1993:12. This time interval was chosen for two main reasons. First, it 
improves the accuracy of the CB -  TAR estimates by restricting a reasonable 
minimum number of observations in each partition of data used in the CB-TAR 
model estimation procedure. Second, since significant financial liberalization 
reforms have been enacted in most of Southeast Asian countries only over the 
second half of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, the period 1988:01 to 1993:12 is 
enough to capture change in the degree of financial integration in the region. To 
see this, consider Figure 4.7 (below). Figure 4.7 shows a (average) financial 
market liberalization index for the ASEAN5+1 group (with values 1, 2 and 3 
indicating closed, intermediate and open financial markets, respectively) and the 
time period used in the grid search method. Note that the average index for the 
region increases substantially from 1987-1993. This suggests that changes in the 
degree of interdependence between real interest rates in the region caused by 
more liberalized financial markets, if any, are likely to occur over or after this 
period.
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Figure 4.7 -  Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) Index on Restrictions to
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Note: Kaminsky and Schmukler {1999)’s Index is an average of three indexes: (i) controls on capital outflows; 
(ii) restrictions on capital inflows; and (iii) domestic financial repression. Each index can take 3 values, 3 if 
there are no restrictions, 2 if restrictions are limited, and 1 if restrictions are widespread or there are outright 
prohibitions. The index for ASEAN5+1 is the average of Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999)’s index for each 
ASEAN5+1 country. Source: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/sschmukler.
A summary of the B-TAR  and CB-TAR  estimation results are presented 
in Tables 4.5 through 4.7 (below)25. Table 4.5 shows the results for the real 
interest rate differentials involving only ASEAN5+1 economies, Table 4.6 shows 
the results for the real interest rate differentials between ASEAN5+1 and Japan 
and Table 4.7 shows the results for the real interest rate differentials between 
ASEAN5+1 and United States. The critical values for the log-likelihood ratio test 
are presented in tables A20 through A21 in Appendix A.
Restricting the analysis to the 5% level of significance, evidence in favor of 
an increase in the degree of financial integration among ASEAN5+1 countries is 
limited. According to the log-likelihood ratio test, the B-TARnu\\ hypothesis is
25 Tables A22 through A24 in Appendix A present the B-TAR and CB-TAR estimation results in more details. 
The final results regarding the change in the threshold (or whether financial integration changed) using the 
5% level of significance are presented in figures B9 through B15 in Appendix B.
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rejected in favor of the CB-TAR  alternative for only four real interest rate 
differentials in the ASEAN5+1 group: RIDTW, RMYSG and RTWPH. The 
threshold change estimated in the CB-TAR  model indicates that the degree of 
interdependence between the real interest rates increased for RIDTW and 
RTWPH. That is, financial integration between Indonesia and Taiwan and Taiwan 
and Philippines strengthened after the early 1990’s. As for RMYSG, the 
CB-TAR model suggests that the real interest rates of Malaysia and Singapore 
became slightly more independent of each other after the early 1990’s. As shown 
in the left bottom illustration of Figure B2 (Appendix B), the deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium level between Malaysian and Singapore real interest rates 
are not only greater, on average, but also longer after 1992. This result is 
probably caused by restrictions on the foreign exchange transactions and capital 
controls implemented by Singapore government over the first half of the 1990’s.
From the LLR statistics in tables 4.6 (below), it is found that except for 
Malaysia the B-TAR  is rejected for all real interest rates differentials with 
respect to Japan at the 5% significance level. For the real interest rates 
differentials with respect to United States, the B-TAR  null hypothesis is rejected 
in favor of the CB-TAR alternative for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand. For all series, except for the Singapore-Japan real interest rate 
differential, the CB-TAR estimates indicate a decrease in the threshold around 
the period 1988-1993. For the case of Singapore-Japan, the CB-TAR  model is 
significant compared to the B-TAR  model and the threshold increases from 
0.27 to 0.48, around the end of 1991. Similar to the case Malaysia-Singapore,
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this result suggests that, after 1991, the financial markets of Singapore and 
Japan actually became more independent of each other. Overall, the results 
indicate that financial markets of Indonesia, Philipines and Thailand became 
more integrated with those of Japan and United States, the financial market of 
Taiwan became more integrated with that of Japan and the financial market of 
Malaysia became more integrated with that of the United States.
Table 4.5 -  Results from B -  TAR and CB -  TAR Models for ASEAN5+1
Variables
B -  TAR Model CB-TAR  Model LLR
StatisticT S l b T1 B(t) r t ^2 s L(:b
R ID M Y 1J- 0.97 -0 .8 -336 Dec-93 1.12 0.41 -0 .73 -330 12.71**
R ID PH 1-1- 0.78 -0 .7 -353 Dec-90 1.36 0.65 -0.71 -348 9.28**
R ID S G iJ- 0.5 -0 .64 -363 Mar-91 0.79 0.36 -0 .62 -358 1.03
R ID S G 2-*- 1.84 -0 .26 -348 D ec-93 1.57 2.49 -0 .29 -3.48 0.01
R ID TH 2-1- 1- 0.42 -0 .32 -389 Mar-91 0.49 0.48 -0 .32 -389 0.03
R IDTW 2-1- 1.21 -0 .28 -421 Sep-90 1.45 1.2 -0 .28 -399 42 .56*
r m y p h 2-l 0.51 -0 .15 -281 Jan-89 0.98 0.35 -0 .16 -279 5.75
R M Y S G 1-1- 0 .17 -0 .3 -95 Aug-90 0.17 0.24 -0 .32 -91 8.32*
R P H S G 1-1- 0.42 -0 .22 -320 Jan-89 0.78 0.4 -0 .25 -318 4.27
R TH M Y 1 0.24 -0 .4 -214 Sep-90 0.31 0.19 -0 .43 -212 5.25**
R TH PH 1J- 0.37 -0 .25 -364 Dec-88 0.42 0.34 -0 .24 -364 0.00
R TH S G 1 0.21 -0 .47 -214 Jun-91 0.4 0.15 -0 .54 -212 4.52**
R TW M Y 1 0.31 -0 .52 -264 Feb-89 0.48 0.32 -0 .56 -263 1.70
R TW P H 2-1- 0 .43 -0.2 -361 Nov-88 2.16 0.35 -0 .35 -357 6.47*
R TW S G 1J- 0.25 -0 .58 -248 Feb-89 0.61 0.22 -0 .68 -246 4.55**
R TW S G 2 0.34 -0.31 -265 May-90 0.32 0.36 -0 .3 -265 0.36
R TW TH 1 0.24 -0 .62 -271 Feb-89 0.45 0.25 -0 .67 -269 3.31**
Notes: t  is the estimated threshold in the B-TAR model; t i  and x2 are the estimated thresholds in the CB-TAR model before and after the 
change, respectively; 7b(t> is the date of the threshold change in the CB-TAR model; Lb and Lcb are the maximized values of the empirical 
likelihood functions for the B-TAR and CB-TAR, respectively; and LLR is the likelihood ratio statistic.
1 B-TAR and CB-TAR models were estimated for these real interest rate differentials demeaned by BP a(s) estimate.
2 B-TAR and CB-TAR models were estimated for these real interest rate differentials demeaned by its simple average.
* indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 5% significance level
** indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 10% significance level 
-1- indicates the series is stationary at 5% level of significance 
-d -  indicates the series is stationary at 10% level of significance
Considering the relationships between ASEAN5+1 financial markets, most
of the estimated thresholds range from 0.21-0.51%, indicating that their real
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interest rates26 would have to differ by this amount in order to trigger the mean 
reverting behavior implied by the out-of-band parameters. The real interest rate 
differentials involving Indonesia have in general the largest threshold, ranging 
from 0.42-1.2%. As for the relationship between the real interest rates of 
ASEAN5+1 versus Japan and United States, the estimated thresholds range 
from 0.21-0.45%. Previous research has employed a variety of methods to 
evaluate these thresholds associated with interest rate parity conditions. Frenkel 
and Levich (1975) estimated these costs using triangular arbitrage in the foreign 
exchange market and found that the threshold associated with the covered 
interest rate parity was about 0.038% in the Eurodollar market and 0.1175% for 
the Europound market. Clinton (1988) used bid-ask spreads for swaps to obtain 
a measure of transactions costs and found that the threshold in Eurocurrency 
markets were about 0.0625%. Using bid and ask prices for spot and forward 
exchange rates, Al-Awad (1997) found that transactions costs thresholds in 
Eurocurrency markets varied from about 0.049% for Japan to 0.19% for Italy. In 
the spot, forward, and swap exchange markets, Al-Awad (1997) found thresholds 
of about 0.05%, 0.13%, and 0.085%, respectively. In every case, the thresholds 
implied by using triangular arbitrage or swap data are much smaller than the 
thresholds revealed in the present study. Of course, the threshold estimated in a 
band-TAR framework measure a broader range of transactions costs, such as 
other implicit and intangible factors associated with exchange. Furthermore, the 
real interest rate parity involves more cost factors than the covered interest rate
25 Except for Thailand that, according to the results from previous section, is not financially integrated with 
the other members of ASEAN5+1.
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parity and, therefore, generates greater thresholds. Al-Awad and Greenes 
(2002), for example, estimate the transaction costs associated with the real 
interest rate parity for 10 developed countries and find estimate thresholds 
varying from 0.02% (UK-Germany) to 1.51% (Belgium-ltaly).
Table 4.6- Results from B -  TAR and CB -  TAR Models (ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis
Japan)
B -TAR Model CB-TAR  Model LLRVariables
T S L b TB(x) h ^2 8 L cb Statistic
r i d j p '-l 0.4 -0 .66 -377 D ec-93 0.93 0.32 -0 .67 -363 28.40*
r m y j p 'J- 0.24 -0.31 -219 Jan-89 0.34 0.22 -0 .32 -217 3.36
R P HJP 1-L 0 41 -0 .26 -366 Sep-94 0.47 0 27 -0 .27 -363 5.64*
R S G JP 1 0.23 -0 .49 -312 Oct-91 0.27 0.48 -0 .54 -303 19.02*
R TH JP1-!-1- 0.27 -0.31 -203 M ar-89 0.79 0.24 -0 .46 192 10.49*
R TW JP ’-1- 0 .22 -0 .52 -237 May-90 0.67 0.2 -0 .65 -233 6.84*
Table 4.7 - Results from B-TAR  and CB-TAR  Models, (ASEAN5+1 vis-a-
vis United States)
B - TAR Model CB -  TAR Model LLRVariables
T 8 L b L b (t) h ^2 8 L qb Statistic
R ID U S 1-1- 0 45 -0 .68 -369 Feb-93 0 .79 0.45 -0 .69 -356 25 .79*
R JP U S 1-*- 0 .18 -0 .27 -194 Dec-88 0.24 0.15 -0 .28 -194 0.01
R M Y U S 1J- 0.24 -0 .24 -104 Nov-89 0.42 0 .24 -0 .29 -93 20.97*
R P H U S 1-*- 0 .39 -0 .2 -328 Dec-88 1.17 0.38 -0 .25 -324 7.21*
R SG U S-1- 0 .2 -0 .32 -210 M ar-90 0.25 0.16 -0 .33 -210 0.04
R TH U S1-1- 1- 0.23 -0 .47 -239 Dec-91 0.74 0.18 -0 .64 -204 6.47*
R TW U S 2 0.21 -0 .35 -163 Apr-89 0.52 0.18 -0  43 -164 2.54
Notes: x is the estimated threshold in the B-TAR model; Ti and t 2 are the estimated thresholds in the CB-TAR model before and after the 
change, respectively; Tbw is the date of the threshold change in the CB-TAR model; i B and Lce are the maximized values of the empirical 
likelihood functions for the B-TAR and CB-TAR, respectively; and LLR is the likelihood ratio statistic.
1 B-TAR and CB-TAR models were estimated for these real interest rate differentials demeaned by BP a(s) estimate.
2 B-TAR and CB-TAR models were estimated for these real interest rate differentials demeaned by its simple average.
* indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 5% significance level
** indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 10% significance level 
-I- indicates the series is stationary at 5% level of significance 
-1- 1- indicates the series is stationary at 10% level of significance
It is interesting to note that, for the period after 1993 and the statistically 
relevant band-Threshold models, the estimated thresholds for ASEAN5+1 versus
Japan and for ASEAN5+1 versus United States are, on average, about the same,
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0.28%. The previous literature investigating financial integration of Southeast 
Asia has often claimed that United States interest rate has a greater influence in 
the interest rates of the region relative to that of Japan (Chinn and Frankel, 
1994). Nevertheless, after the financial liberalization reforms of the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, these averages thresholds seems to suggest that, in the last 
decade, Japan and United States real interest rates have similar influence in 
Southeast Asia real interest rates.
In short, the results provide significant evidence of increasing capital 
market integration between ASEAN5+1 and Japan and United States after the 
early 1990’s. Nevertheless, the evidence in favor of increasing financial 
integration between ASEAN5+1 economies is limited. These results have 
important policy implications. The financial reform and liberalization process 
followed in most Southeast Asian nations was initiated in the hope of increasing 
the efficiency of the domestic financial sector and the domestic real economy. 
The results of this study indicate, however, that one side effect of financial 
liberalization is that domestic real interest rates become more closely linked with 
international rates. The implication of this is that domestic stabilization policy 
measures, to the extent that they work through real interest rate changes and are 
pursued independently of worldwide economic conditions, are likely to be less 
effective in financially open economies. Nevertheless, the view that financial 
liberalization necessarily leads to greater international financial integration and 
linkage of domestic and international real interest rates is not supported.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study assesses the extent to which selected economies in Southeast 
Asia are financially integrated among themselves and internationally. In 
particular, two main empirical questions are investigated: 1) are Southeast Asian 
economies financially integrated among themselves and with the United States; 
and 2) following the extensive financial liberalization process over the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, have Southeast Asian financial markets become more integrated 
among themselves and with the United States. These questions are analyzed by 
examining the real interest rate parity condition for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan and United States, over the 
period 1970-2005.
Previous literature investigating real (covered or uncovered) interest rate 
parity for Southeast Asian economies has considered only the relationships 
between their financial markets and either Japan or United States or both, but not 
for relationships among their financial markets. The available results are to some 
extent ambiguous but often suggest that Southeast Asian financial markets are 
becoming increasingly integrated with U.S. financial market and that financial 
integration with respect to Japan is limited (Glick and Hutchison, 1990, Frankel, 
1992, Montiel, 1994, Chinn and Frankel, 1994, Phylaktis, 1997, Phylaktis, 1999,
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DeBrouwer, 2000, Flood and Rose, 2001, Anoruo, Remchander, and Thiewes, 
2002). Similarly, anecdotal evidence claims that the degree of financial 
integration in Southeast (East) Asia remains still low and that the integration of 
financial markets in this region has been occurring more on a global level than a 
regional level.
This study contributes to the investigation of real interest rate parity and 
financial integration by allowing for non-linearities in the relationship between real 
interest rates. Some implications of these non-linearities are that the long-run 
equilibrium of the real interest rate parity changes and that the adjustment 
towards real interest rate parity following a shock is likely to be dependent on the 
size of the shock. This insight did not arise from the linear tests for real 
interest rate parity and financial integration. Real interest parity also represents 
a building block of exchange rate models (Frankel, 1979). Therefore, an analysis 
allowing for more complex dynamics in the relationship between real interest rates is 
also important to better understand real exchange rate movements. Furthermore, if 
the relationship between real interest rates can be characterized by non-linear 
dynamics, then linear approaches to non-linear problems of monetary policy and 
integration would be inappropriate. As a contribution to the debate concerning 
financial integration in Southeast Asia, this study investigates financial integration 
not only between Southeast Asian developing economies and Japan and United 
States but also among Southeast Asian economies.
Following the works of Meese and Rogoff (1988), this study determines 
whether countries are financially integrated based on unit-root tests applied to
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their real interest rate differentials. Countries are considered financially integrated 
if their real interest rate differential is stationary. Non-linearities are included in 
this particular analysis by allowing for structural breaks in the long-run equilibrium 
level of the real interest rate differentials. More specifically, when testing for 
stationarity of the series, this study employs unit root tests which allow for the 
presence of shifts in the unconditional mean of the real interest differentials. Final 
conclusions are drawn from a confirmatory analysis, which contrasts results from 
extensions of Zivot and Andrews (1992) test and standard unit root test with 
results from Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003) multiple structural-breaks 
estimation procedure. Allowing for the presence of structural breaks seems to be 
more appropriate to the analysis of the relationship between real interest rates 
because its long-run equilibrium level is likely to change in response to 
modifications in the economic structure of countries, caused by events such as 
discrete shifts in monetary and/or fiscal policy, wars, oil price shocks, political 
regime change, financial crisis and financial liberalization reforms. Furthermore, 
as the recent econometric literature have shown, results generated by time 
series analysis that do not take into account the presence of structural breaks, 
methods generally used by the previous literature, are misleading and unreliable 
(Perron, 1989, Zivot and Andrews, 1992, Perron and Vogeslang, 1994 and 
Newbold and Leybourne, 1998).
To examine whether Southeast Asian economies became more financially 
integrated following the liberalization reforms undertaken over the 1980’s and 
beginning of the 1990’s, this study develops a testing procedure based on
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discontinuous adjustments in the real interest rate differentials. The degree of 
financial integration is determined using a framework that evaluates the extent to 
which domestic real interest rates can move freely without influence from 
international real interest rates. The idea is that market regulations and the 
degree of financial market openness and integration can determine the form by 
which arbitrage works to eliminate profit opportunities that are generated by 
differences in return rates across markets. For example, transaction costs or 
contractual arrangements requiring financial assets to be held for a particular 
period of time make it difficult and costly to act quickly to eliminate profits 
opportunities. This suggests that the difference between real interest rates for 
two countries needs to exceed a certain threshold x before arbitrage activities 
are pursued. In such conditions, when the difference between two real interest 
rates in absolute terms is lower than x , the real interest rate differentials do not 
promptly converge to the equilibrium condition due to the absence of arbitrage 
forces operating across markets (real interest rate differentials behaves like a 
random walk). On the other hand, if the difference between two real interest rates 
in absolute terms is grater than x , arbitrage takes place and the real interest rate 
differentials tend to converge (see, e. g., Balke and Fomby, 1997, Michael, 
Nobay and Peel, 1997, Balke and Wohar, 1998, Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997, 
Nakagawa, 2002). Thus, the magnitude of x serves as a measure of the extent 
to which real interest rates are interdependent and the extent to which countries 
are financially integrated. If financial liberalization reforms in these countries are 
effective in promoting a greater integration the magnitude of x would be
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expected to become smaller (i.e. the degree of interdependency between real 
interest rates would be expected to increase). Based on the econometric 
technique proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997) and Michael, Nobay and Peel 
(1997) this study develops a procedure to test whether this threshold value 
indeed decreased (or changed).
The following main conclusions have been derived from this study:
First, the majority of the real interest rate differentials for Southeast Asia 
have structural breaks. Estimates from Bai and Perron (1998) procedure 
indicates that these breaks occurred mainly over the 1980’s, when Southeast 
Asian economies enacted several reforms in their financial markets, at the 
beginning of the Asian crisis and in the following two years after this crisis.
It is an understatement to say that Southeast Asian economies have 
experienced substantial transformation and tumult in the last three decades. 
They have changed their status from closed to financially open markets over the 
1980’s, underwent several structural reforms over the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
experienced the stimulating days of “Asian fever” in the first half of the 1990’s, 
collapsed in 1997-1998 and recovered in the late 1990's and early 2000’s. These 
events cannot but have an effect on the regional and international long-run 
relationship between real interest rates for Southeast Asia. It is probably fair to 
say that these events have affected the mechanisms of price formation, intensity 
of capital flows and asset arbitrage across the region. While financial markets 
may be still integrated, these events influence international investors to 
reevaluate any political (or country) and exchange rate risk premia or extra
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compensation required to invest in these economies. As a result, structural 
breaks in interest rate parity conditions are likely to appear.
Second, empirical support for real interest parity for Southeast Asia based 
on standard unit root tests, ADF, KPSS and Ng and Perron (2001), is somewhat 
weak and mixed. The results from unit root tests that do not allow for structural 
breaks indicate that 8/10 out of 28 real interest rate differentials are stationary. It 
seems that the only group of financially integrated countries is Philippines, Japan 
and United States.
Third, when structural breaks are taken into account, 19 real interest rate 
differential series are found to be stationary. The null hypothesis of non- 
stationarity could not be rejected for RIDTH, RTHMY, RTHSG, RTWMY, 
RTWTH, RSGJP, RTHJP, RTHUS and RTWUS. Coincidently, most of the real 
interest rate differentials for which non-stationarity cannot be rejected include 
Thailand. The possible reason for this finding is that Thailand started opening (or 
liberalizing) its financial markets the latest and that its capital account restrictions 
and financial market controls are stronger relative to other Southeast Asian 
countries. Overall, these results provide supportive evidence for financial 
integration among ASEAN5+1 economies, excluding Thailand, and between 
ASEAN5+1 and Japan and United States, except for the cases Thailand-United 
State, Thailand-Japan, Singapore-Japan and Taiwan-United States.
These results shows the importance of taking into account the possibility 
of structural breaks in the investigation of the real interest rate parity and financial 
integration. Despite the power improvement when testing for (real) interest rate
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parity condition, allowing structural breaks also gives a better understand of 
international linkages and how economic disturbances are transmitted between 
countries. Extant studies focused on Southeast Asian countries that have not 
admitted the possibility of structural breaks in the interest rate parity have 
generally come to the conclusion that financial integration in the region is limited. 
As the BP results indicate, many of the real interest rate differentials between 
Southeast Asian countries have structural breaks around the middle 1980’s and 
early and middle 1990’s. Since the sample data usually investigated by previous 
literature include these periods, structural breaks may be the reason for the lack 
of evidence in favor of financial integration in Southeast Asia. The failure of 
previous studies to confirm the mean reversion of real interest rate differentials 
may therefore reflect the choice of the testing methodology rather then any 
deficiency in the real interest rate parity relationship.
The evidence that the real interest rates in Southeast Asia are 
interconnected reflects the substitutability of the financial assets and the intensity 
of the capital flows across their economies, which are conductive of financial 
integration and economic convergence in the region. On the other hand, it 
indicates that monetary autonomy in the region is limited, meaning that domestic 
interest rates and aggregate price levels in a Southeast Asian country would be 
influenced by external factors, originating at both regional and international 
levels. Consequently, this could have narrowed domestic policy options and 
constraint national choices over monetary and fiscal policies, which may facilitate 
excessive borrowing. Integration of Southeast Asian financial markets could
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immediately confront national authorities with a dilemma over controlling either 
interest rates or exchange rates (Obstfeld, 1998).
Empirical support for regional financial integration has also important 
policy implications regarding the future of exchange rate regime and financially 
stability in the region. It is well known that countries financially (and 
economically) integrated with each other are likely to constitute an Optimum 
Currency Area (Frankel and rose, 1998). During Asian crisis of 1997-1998, the 
affected countries were in financial trouble and did not have enough foreign 
exchange reserves to finance their imports. A move to a unified financial market 
or single currency, with the Japanese Yen taken as a benchmark, for example, 
would help countries to improve their balance of payment and create better 
mechanisms to hedge against exchange rate risk. Similarly, stronger linkages of 
their financial markets can be a force to promote stability and convergence and 
provide a collective defense mechanism against systematic failures and 
monetary instability. Furthermore, regional risk sharing through regional financial 
integration can insure against country specific income/consumption risks. The 
findings provide support for the current political will in the region to the formation 
of a single currency area. Nevertheless, the results also indicate that Thailand, a 
key member of ASEAN group, may not be ready for plans of regional unification 
and needs to make a greater effort to promote financial openness and integration 
within Southeast Asia.
Finally, results from the testing procedure to investigate changes in the 
degree of financial integration indicate that financial markets of Indonesia,
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Philippines and Thailand became more integrated with that of Japan and the 
United States, the financial market of Taiwan became more integrated with that 
of Japan and the financial market of Malaysia became more integrated with that 
of the United States. Nevertheless, the evidence in favor of increasing financial 
integration between ASEAN5+1 economies is considerably limited.
Some policy implications can be drawn from these findings. The financial 
reform and liberalization process followed in most Southeast Asian nations was 
initiated in the hope of increasing the efficiency of the domestic financial sector 
and the domestic real economy. The results of this study indicate, however, that 
one side effect of financial liberalization is that domestic real interest rates 
become more closely linked with international rates. This implies that domestic 
stabilization policy measures, to the extent that they work through real interest 
rate changes and are pursued independently of worldwide economic conditions, 
are likely to be less effective in financially open economies. Nevertheless, the 
view that financial liberalization necessarily leads to greater international financial 
integration and linkage of domestic and international real interest rates is not 
supported.
Several avenues for further research are available to investigate other 
questions concerning financial integration in Southeast Asia and to improve the 
econometric methods employed in this study. First, it would be interesting to 
analyze the temporal stability of all components of the real interest rate parity 
condition (covered and uncovered interest rate parity and change in the real 
exchange rate) separately. This could clarify the sources of structural breaks in
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the real interest parity and enrich the analysis of financial integration. Second, 
future studies examining financial integration in Southeast Asia should 
incorporate other countries into the mix, such as Hong-Kong, Korea, China and 
developed countries other than Japan and United States, in order to enhance our 
understanding of both regional and global market linkages. This would be 
possible as additional data become available. Third, computational costs of the 
available unit root tests that allows for structural breaks are prohibitive if more 
than two structural breaks are assumed. Efficiency gains can be achieved if the 
minimizing algorithm used in the Bai and Perron (1998) method could be 
employed in estimation process of these tests. Finally, a vast literature that 
investigates price parity conditions has employed band threshold autroregression 
analysis. However, none of this literature has considered the possibility that the 
parity equilibrium level of the variables may change. It would therefore be 
interesting to evaluate the effects of structural breaks, if not taken into to account, 
on the estimation results of Band-TAR models.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Table A1 -  Nominal Interest Rates used in the Construction of Ex Post Real
Interest Rates
Country Description
Indonesia three-month interbank interest rate
Japan overnight uncollaterised call money rate
Malaysia three-month time deposit rate
Philippines three-month time deposit rate
Singapore three-month interbank interest rate
Thailand three-month interbank interest rate
Taiwan three-month time deposit rate
United States three-month Treasury Bill rate
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Table A2 - List of Variables
Name Description______________________________________________
RIDMY Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and Malaysia
RIDPH Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and Philippines
RIDSG Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and Singapore
RIDTH Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and Thailand
RIDTW Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and Taiwan
RMYPH Difference between real interest rates of Malaysia and Philippines
RMYSG Difference between real interest rates of Malaysia and Singapore
RPHSG Difference between real interest rates of Philippines and Singapore
RTHMY Difference between real interest rates of Thailand and Malaysia
RTHPH Difference between real interest rates of Thailand and Philippines
RTHSG Difference between real interest rates of Thailand and Singapore
RTWMY Difference between real interest rates of Taiwan and Malaysia
RTWPH Difference between real interest rates of Taiwan and Philippines
RTWSG Difference between real interest rates of Taiwan and Singapore
RTWTH Difference between real interest rates of Taiwan and Thailand
RIDJP Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and Japan
RMYJP Difference between real interest rates of Malaysia and Japan
RPHJP Difference between real interest rates of Philippines and Japan
RSGJP Difference between real interest rates of Singapore and Japan
RTHJP Difference between real interest rates of Thailand and Japan
RTWJP Difference between real interest rates of Taiwan and Japan
RIDUS Difference between real interest rates of Indonesia and the U.S.
RJPUS Difference between real interest rates of Japan and the U.S.
RMYUS Difference between real interest rates of Malaysia and the U.S.
RPHUS Difference between real interest rates of Philippines and the U.S.
RSGUS Difference between real interest rates of Singapore and the U.S.
RTHUS Difference between real interest rates of Thailand and the U.S.
RTWUS Difference between real interest rates of Taiwan and the U.S._____
Note: A  letter D preceding the name of these variables indicates that the series is demeaned. For 
instance, DR ID JP is the dem eaned difference between Real Interest Rates of Indonesia and Japan
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Table A3 -  Sample Size of Real Interest Rate Differentials
Name Sample Sample size Sample
RIDMY Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RIDPH Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RIDSG Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RIDTH Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RIDTW Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RMYPH Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RMYSG Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RPHSG Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RTHMY Feb-78 Oct-04 321
RTHPH Feb-78 Oct-04 321
RTHSG Feb-78 Oct-04 321
RTWMY Nov-80 Oct-04 289
RTWPH Nov-80 Oct-04 289
RTWSG Nov-80 Oct-04 289
RTWTH Nov-80 Oct-04 289
RIDJP Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RMYJP Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RPHJP Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RSGJP Apr-72 Oct-04 391
RTHJP Feb-78 Oct-04 321
RTWJP Nov-80 Oct-04 289
RIDUS Jan- 8 6 Oct-04 226
RMYUS Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RPHUS Feb-76 Oct-04 345
RSGUS Apr-72 Oct-04 391
RTHUS Feb-78 Oct-04 321
RTWUS Nov-80 Oct-04 288
RJPUS Jan-70 Oct-04 418
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Table A4 -  Summary statistics of Real Interest Differentials for ASEAN5+1
Sam ple  Period
V ariab les
RIDM Y RIDPH R ID SG RIDTH R ID TW R M Y P H R M YSG R PHSG
1970:01-1979:12 P - - - - - 0 .0 2 -0 .11 -0 .13
s.d. - - - - - 0.77 0.50 0.97
1980:01-1989:12 P 1.59 0.42 1.57 0.94 1.52 -0 .56 -0 .06 0.50
s.d. 0.92 1.15 0.69 0.82 1.05 1.70 0.69 1.84
1990:01-1996:12 P 0.99 0.08 1.51 0.51 0.78 -0.91 0.53 1.44
s.d. 1.06 1.31 1.07 1.03 1.16 0.99 0.52 0.92
1997:01-1998:12 P 4.16 3.96 4.59 3.45 4 .15 -0 .21 0.43 0.64
s.d. 4.02 3.98 4.06 3.90 4.01 0.51 0.67 0.48
1999:01-2004:10 V 1.25 0.75 1.58 1.45 1.21 -0 .50 0.33 0.83
s.d. 0.68 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.93 0.57 0.30 0.46
S am ple  P eriod
V ariab les
R THM Y RTHPH RTHSG R TW M Y R TW P H R TW SG R TW TH
1970:01-1979:12 P 0.74 1 .1 0 0.45 - - - -
s.d. 0.59 1.01 0.54 - - - -
1980:01-1989:12 P 0.99 0.42 0.93 0.37 -0 .21 0.43 -0 .59
s.d. 0.83 2.06 0.84 1.15 2.20 1.02 1.00
1990:01-1996:12 IJ 0.48 -0 .43 1.01 0.21 -0 .70 0.74 -0.27
s.d. 0.72 1.05 0.61 0.77 1.17 0.68 0.82
1997:01-1998:12 IJ 0.71 0.50 1.14 0.01 -0 .2 0 0.44 -0 .70
s.d. 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.80 0.48 0.73 0.76
1999:01-2004:10 P -0 .2 0 -0.71 0.13 0.04 -0 .46 0.37 0.25
s.d. 0.42 0.50 0.25 0.66 0.54 0.54 0.51
f j : mean
s.d.: standard deviation.
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Table A5 -  Summary statistics of Real Interest Differentials for ASEAN5+1
vis-a-vis Japan and United States
S am ple  Period
V ariab les
R ID JP R M YJP R PHJP R S G JP R TH JP R TW JP
1970:01-1979:12 iu 0.02 0.00 -0 .08 0.76
s.d. 0.62 0.84 1.03 0.69
1980:01-1989:12 d 1.58 0.09 0.66 0.15 1.08 0.59
s.d. 0.83 0.87 1.89 0.62 0.85 1.05
1990:01-1996:12 d 1.37 0.39 1.30 -0 .14 0.87 0.60
s.d. 1.17 0.68 0.83 0.52 0.72 0.78
1997:01-1998:12 V 5.69 1.53 1.74 1.10 2.24 1.54
s.d. 4.10 0.75 0.58 0.68 0.78 0.53
1999:01-2004:10 V 1.80 0.55 1.05 0.22 0.35 0.60
s.d. 0.78 0.32 0.53 0.29 0.34 0.56
S am ple  P eriod
V ariab les
R ID U S R M YUS RPHU S R S G U S R TH U S RTW U S RJPUS
1970:01-1979:12 IJ 0.06 0.04 -0 .03 0.63 0.10
s.d. 0.50 0.87 1.02 0.61 0.77
1980:01-1989:12 IJ 1.30 -0 .27 0.30 -0.21 0.72 0.15 -0 .36
s.d. 0.77 0.70 1.86 0.46 0.72 0.85 0.64
1990:01-1996:12 IJ 1.31 0.32 1.23 -0.21 0.80 0.53 -0 .07
s.d. 0.91 0.54 0.99 0.32 0.59 0.62 0.59
1997:01-1998:12 IJ 4.65 0.49 0.70 0.06 1.20 0.50 -1 .04
s.d. 4.06 0.46 0.38 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.46
1999:01-2004:10 IJ 1.43 0.18 0.68 -0 .15 -0 .02 0.22 -0 .37
s.d. 0.91 0.53 0.56 0.37 0.33 0.52 0.47
f j : mean
s.d.: standard deviation.
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Table A6 -  Optimal ARMA Models Selected for ASEAN5+1
V ariab les
A R(1) A R (2) A R (3 ) A R (4)
Coefficients
A R (5) M A(1) M A (2) M A (3) M A (4) M A(5)
S.E.
R ID M Y -0.871 -0 .246 -0 .522 -0 .642 0.758 1.15
- 14.1 - 3.5 - 7.4 - 12.2 12.3
R IDPH 0.000 0.655 -0.241 -0 .183 0 .508 -0 .174 -0 .818 1.19
0.0 10.6 -4.0 - 3.2 8.9 - 3.8 - 17.2
RIDSG -0.832 -0 .206 -0 .515 -0.651 0.739 1.16
- 13.3 - 3.0 - 7.5 - 12.5 11.3
RID TH -0 .863 -0 .267 -0 .527 -0 .608 0.767 1.17
- 13.1 - 3.7 -7.4 - 11.2 11.9
R ID TW 0.000 -0 .414 -0 .275 0.442 -0 .687 1.36
0.0 -4.7 - 5.6 7.2 - 14.0
R M YPH 0.826 0.000 -0 .559 -0 .236 -0 .499 0.306 0.51
15.2 0.0 - 7.0 -4.4 -9.0 4.3
RM YSG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0 .547 0.29
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 12.1
RPHSG 0.268 0.295 0.000 -0 .362 -0 .576 0.56
5.0 4.3 0.0 -7.4 - 14.3
R TH M Y 0.498 -0 .224 -0 .258 -0.529 0.46
4.7 -3.6 - 3.9 - 5.1
RTHPH 0.588 -0 .256 0.216 -0.331 0.000 -0 .610 0.69
s.o - 3.6 3.3 - 4.6 0.0 - 8.9
RTHSG 0.652 0.000 -0 .235 -0 .875 0.47
11.6 0.0 -4.8 -22.4
R TW M Y 0.000 -0 .112 0.000 0.000 -0.771 0.51
0.0 - 1.9 0.0 0.0 -21.5
RTW PH 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0 .630 0.77
2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 13.9
RTW SG 0.000 -0 .179 0.000 0.000 -0 .703 0.50
0.0 -3.2 0.0 0.0 - 16.9
RTW TH 0.000 -0.171 -0 .180 0.000 -0 .626 0.59
0.0 -2.9 -4.1 0.0 - 14.4
Note 1: The t-statistics are presented below the coefficient values
Note 2: S.E. is the value of the standard error of the residuals of the equation
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Table A7 -  Optimal ARMA Models Selected for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan
and United States
V ariables
A R(1) A R (2 ) A R (3) A R (4)
Coefficients
A R (5) M A(1) M A(2) M A (3) M A (4) M A (5)
S .E.
R IDJP 0.141 0.573 -0 .350 -0 .167 0.635 -0 .264 -0 .729 1.16
2.1 9.5 - 5.7 -3.1 11.5 -3.9 - 11.1
R M YJP 0.790 -0 .789 -0 .204 -0 .764 0.827 -0 .342 0.583 -0 .504 0.30
8.9 -8.9 - 2.3 - 9.4 10.6 - 3.7 10.6 - 10.5
R PHJP 0.335 -0 .247 -0.391 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.59
6.7 -4.8 - 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
RSG JP 0.000 -0 .237 -0 .090 0.000 -0.741 0.47
0.0 -4.8 -2.7 0.0 -22.5
RTHJP 0.000 -0 .452 0.374 -0 .130 0.340 -0 .794 0.45
0.0 - 7.0 6.5 - 3.6 7.8 - 18.4
RTW JP 0.000 0.000 -0 .212 0.000 0.000 -0 .585 0.47
0.0 0.0 - 2.8 0.0 0.0 - 9.1
R IDUS 0.101 0 .567 -0 .309 -0 .168 0.589 0.729 1.15
1.5 9.2 - 4.9 - 3.1 10.5 10.6
RM YUS 1.197 -0 .226 0.000 0.000 -0 .619 0.27
22.6 -4.2 0.0 0.0 - 12.7
RPHUS 0.947 0.000 -0 .490 0.406 0.389 0.53
23.4 0.0 - 8.4 8.1 7.0
RSGUS 1.849 -0 .879 -1 .007 -0 .144 -0 .380 0.619 0.38
127.3 - 53.5 -24.2 - 2.3 -6.0 15.3
RTHUS 0.345 0.000 0.496 0 .530 0.357 -0 .456 -0 .358 0.41
3.6 0.0 8.2 5.2 3.6 -4.9 - 6.0
RTW US 0.803 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 -0 .768 0.45
18.1 0.0 3,0 0.0 0.0 - 16.3
R JPUS 1.118 -0 .495 0.312 0.000 0.279 -0 .629 0.32
23.4 - 5.9 5.2 0.0 5.8 - 15.5
Note 1: The t-statistics are presented below the coefficient values
Note 2: S.E. is the value of the standard error of the residuals of the equation
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Table A8 -  ZA Bootstrapped Finite-sample Critical Values for ASEAN5+1
Variables RIDMY RIDPH RIDSG RIDTH RIDTW
10.00% -3.95 -4.58 -3.96 -3.95 -4.09
5.00% -4.21 -4.83 -4.20 -4.20 -4.39
2.50% -4.47 -5.07 -4.47 -4.48 -4.73
1.00% -4.76 -5.51 -4.75 -3.73 -5.05
Variables RMYPH RMYSG RPHSG RTHMY RTHPH
10.00% -5.62 -4.10 -6.03 -4.09 -5.97
5.00% -5.95 -4.43 -6.44 -4.42 -6.33
2.50% -6.25 -4.69 -6.75 -4.69 -6 . 6 6
1.00% -6.67 -5.04 -7.12 -5.07 -7.09
Variables RTHSG RTWMY RTWPH RTWSG RTWTH
10.00% 0.40 -4.70 -4.29 -4.54 -5.62
5.00% -8.90 -5.04 -4.58 -4.92 -5.91
2.50% -9.53 -5.39 -4.89 -5.27 -6.30
1.00% -1 0 . 0 -5.81 -5.23 -5.72 -6.81
Table A9 - ZA Bootstrapped Finite-sample Critical Values for ASEAN5+1 
vis-a-vis Japan and United States
Variables RIDJP RMYJP RPHJP RSGJP RTHJP
10.00% -4.35 -3.84 -3.92 -5.32 -4.11
5.00% -4.65 -4.12 -4.23 -5.69 -4.43
2.50% -4.90 -4.44 -4.45 -6.05 -4.76
1.00% -5.16 -4.72 -4.78 -6.62 -5.16
Variables RTWJP RIDUS RMYUS RPHUS RSGUS
10.00% -4.25 -4.65 -4.95 -4.58 -5.97
5.00% -4.58 -4.93 -5.25 -4.86 -6.26
2.50% -4.94 -5.21 -5.55 -5.03 -6.50
1.00% -5.31 -5.40 -5.91 -5.46 -6.75
Variables RTHUS RTWUS RJPUS
10.00% -4.54 -5.56 -4.64
5.00% -4.85 -5.96 -4.92
2.50% -5.07 -6.30 -5.18
1.00% -5.32 -6.55 -5.43
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Table A10 -  LP Bootstrapped Finite-sample Critical Values for ASEAN5+1
Variables RIDMY RIDPH RIDSG RIDTH RIDTW
10.00% -5.05 -5.60 -5.08 -5.07 -5.19
5.00% -5.34 -5.87 -5.36 -5.37 -5.58
2.50% -5.57 -6.06 -5.59 -5.58 -5.82
1.00% -5.89 -6.41 -5.89 -5.91 -6.23
Variables RMYPH RMYSG RPHSG RTHMY RTHPH
10.00% -6.52 -5.19 -6.92 -5.23 -6 . 8 8
5.00% -6.81 -5.48 -7.30 -5.55 -7.25
2.50% -7.09 -5.73 -7.59 -5.83 -7.48
1.00% -7.49 -6.13 -7.95 -6.28 -7.79
Variables RTHSG RTWMY RTWPH RTWSG RTWTH
10.00% 0 . 0 1 -5.76 -5.37 -5.63 -6.51
5.00% -10.25 -6.08 -5.64 -5.97 -6.93
2.50% - 1 0 . 6 6 -6.50 -5.93 -6.25 -7.28
1.00% -11.06 -6.87 -6.35 -6.62 -7.78
Table A11 -  LP Bootstrapped Finite-sample Critical Values for ASEAN5+1 
vis-a-vis Japan and United States
Variables RIDJP RMYJP RPHJP RSGJP RTHJP
10.00% -5.42 -4.86 -4.99 -6.32 -5.20
5.00% -5.7 -5.19 -5.27 -6.67 -5.49
2.50% -5.92 -5.45 -5.58 -7.07 -5.82
1.00% -6.17 -5.65 -5.79 -7.60 -6.13
Variables RTWJP RIDUS RMYUS RPHUS RSGUS
10.00% -5.34 -5.74 -6 . 0 0 -5.71 -6.50
5.00% -5.67 -5.96 -6.28 -5.95 -6.79
2.50% -5.91 -6.25 -6.45 -6 . 2 1 -7.03
1.00% -6.26 -6.53 -6.67 -6.48 -7.42
Variables RTHUS RTWUS RJPUS
10.00% -5.75 -6.17 -5.40
5.00% -6.16 -6.49 -5.51
2.50% -6.55 -6.75 -5.82
1.00% -6.92 -7.02 -6.04
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Table A12 -  Unit Root Tests for ASEAN5+1






RIDMY -2.53 1 0 0 . 2 0 -15.34* -2.77* 0.18* 1.60* 7
RIDPH -2.31 1 0 0.47* -6.39** -1.78** 0.28** 3.86** 1 0
RIDSG -2.52 1 0 0.30 -8.38* -2.05* 0.24* 2.92* 1 0
RIDTH -2.67** 1 1 0.51+ -6.38** -1.78** 0.28** 3.85** 1 0
RIDTW -2.36 1 0 0.24 -9.92* -2 .2 0 * 0 .2 2 * 2.58* 1 0
RMYPH -4.43* 1 0 0 . 2 0 -29.36* -3.83* 0.13* 0.84* 9
RMYSG -2.63* 6 0.75+ -5.71** -1.65** 0.29** 4.41** 1 0
RPHSG -2.27 7 0.53* -7.69** -1.94** 0.25** 3.26** 14
RTHMY -2.52 1 1 1.25* -6.99** -1.87** 0.27** 3.51** 9
RTHPH -4.53* 1 1 0.64* -9.75* -2 .2 0 * 0.23* 2.55* 15
RTHSG -2.60** 9 0.48* -2.05 -0.98 0.48 11.57 9
RTWMY -2.91** 9 0.30 -2 . 0 2 -0.97 0.48 11.75 9
RTWPH -4.32* 1 1 0.19 -10.37* -2.27* 0 .2 2 * 2.38* 9
RTWSG -2.69** 9 0.71 -2.58 -1.05 0.41 9.14 9
RTWTH -2.62** 3 0 . 6 8 -1.96 -0.92 0.53 13.18 7
* Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 5%  level of significance 
** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 10%  level of significance 
+ Null hypothesis (stationarity) rejected at 5% level of significance 
ft Null hypothesis (stationarity) rejected at 10%  level of significance
Definitions: GTS -  general-to-specific method of lag selection; NLS -  number of lags selected by the test; M A IC  -  
Modified Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A13 -  Unit Root Tests for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan and United
States





RIDJP -2 . 2 1 1 1 0.42^ -5.82** -1.70** 0.29** 4.21** 1 0
RMYJP -2.72** 16 0.79f -9.91** -2.18** 0 .2 2 ** 2 .6 6 ** 16
RPHJP -3.56* 14 0.69f -34.78* -4.17* 0 .1 2 * 0.71* 14
RSGJP -2.41 8 0.39n -4.91 -1.56 0.32 5.00 16
RTHJP -1 . 6 8 6 0.49 -4.46 -1.52 0.38 4.88* 6
RTWJP -3.02* 9 0 . 2 2 -2.33 -1.06 0.45 10.36 9
RIDUS -2.83** 1 2 0.28 -7.78** -1.97** 0.25** 3.14** 1 0
RMYUS -3.36* 13 0.42+t -11.65* -2.39* 0 .2 0 * 2.19* 14
RPHUS -4.55* 1 1 0.41n -24.46* -3.49* 0.14* 1 .0 0 * 3
RSGUS -5.57* 16 0.08 -36.77* -4.28* 0 .1 1 * 0 .6 8 * 16
RTHUS -2.96** 9 0.48* -8.42** -1.84** 0.27** 2.56** 9
RTWUS -1.46 9 0.17 -4.03 -1.36 0.33 6.13 9
RJPUS -3.79* 1 2 0.46* -13.35* -2.58* 0.19* 1.84* 9
*  Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 5%  level of significance 
** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 10%  level of significance
* Null hypothesis (stationarity) rejected at 5%  level of significance 
t t  Null hypothesis (stationarity) rejected at 10% level of significance
Definitions: G TS  -  general-to-specific method of lag selection; NLS -  number of lags selected by the test; M AIC -  
Modified Akaike Information Criterion.
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Min. t-stat. Brk. Date NLS
RIDMY -0.296 0.749 1.077 -3.99*** Jun-97 15
-4.0 3.0 2.9
RIDPH -0.198 0.224 0.925 -3.26 Aug-94 1 0
-3.3 1.3 2.6
RIDSG -0.209 -0.003 -1.165 -3.53 Jun-99 1 0
-3.5 0.0 -3.7
RIDTH -0.356 0.505 1.158 -4 -|7*** Jun-97 15
-4.3 2.4 3.1
RIDTW -0.337 0.676 1.134 -4.19*** Dec-96 15
-4.2 2.7 2.7
RMYPH -0 . 2 2 1 -0.016 -0.507 -6.17** Aug-84 1 0
-6 .2 -0.3 -4.4
RMYSG -0.156 -0.074 -0.124 -3.99 Jun-97 9
-4.0 -1.9 -2.1
RPHSG -0.272 -0.053 0.713 -7.01** Aug-84 1 0
-7.0 -0 .9 5.4
RTHMY -0.244 0.319 0.164 -4.08 Aug-87 9
-4.1 3.4 1.7
RTHPH -0.305 0.438 -0.680 -6.76** Aug-84 1 1
-6.8 4.3 -4.5
RTHSG -0.283 -0.053 0.509 -4.12 Dec-80 15
-4.1 -0 .5 3.7
RTWMY -0.297 0.009 0.236 -4.39 Mar-89 15
-4.4 0.1 2 .0
RTWPH -0.396 0.496 -1.180 -6.87* Aug-84 1 1
-6 .9 3.5 -5 .3
RTWSG -0.370 0.142 0.406 -5.11** Mar-89 9
-5.1 2.0 3.3
RTWTH -0.441 -0.148 -0.388 -5.13 Aug-83 1 1
-5.1 -1.2 -2 .3
Min. t-stat.: minimum ZA  t-statistic
Brk. Date: Date of the break detected in ZA
NLS: Number of Lags Selected in ZA
Note: The t-statistics are presented below the coefficient values
* Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 1 %
** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 5%
*** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 10%
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Min. t-stat. Brk. Date NLS
RIDJP -0.167 -0.114 -1.306 -3.29 Jun-99 1 0
-3 .3 -0.6 -4.0
RMYJP -0.146 0.030 0.139 -4.67** Jan-95 16
-3 .7 0.8 2.0
RPHJP -0.284 -0.037 0.526 -6.92* May-84 1 2
-6 .9 -0.6 4.6
RSGJP -0.296 0 . 1 1 2 0.284 -4.33 Apr-94 17
-4.3 2.2 3.1
RTHJP -0.141 0.235 0 . 2 1 1 -3.64 Dec-93 7
-3.6 2.9 2.0
RTWJP -0.265 0.158 0.361 -4.35** Jun-94 15
-4.3 1.9 2.7
RIDUS -0.283 0.617 0.855 -3.96 Jun-97 15
-4.0 2 .7 2.4
RMYUS -0.136 -0.075 0.105 -5.29** Mar-92 13
-4.3 -2.4 2.1
RPHUS -0.265 -0.075 0.642 -7.16* Jun-85 11
-7 .2 -1.3 5.3
RSGUS -0.439 0.109 -0.270 -7.31* Oct-80 16
-7 .3 3.0 -4.3
RTHUS -0.302 0.191 -0.297 -4.56*** Aug-00 14
-4.6 2.7 -3.0
RTWUS -0.420 0.075 0.475 -5.21 Jul-89 9
-5.2 1.3 4.0
RJPUS -0.150 -0.033 -0 . 1 1 1 -4.36 Apr-94 1 2
-4.4 -0.9 -1.9
Min. t-stat.: minimum ZA  t-statistic
Brk. Date: Date of the break detected in ZA
NLS: Number of Lags Selected in ZA
Note: The t-statistics are presented below the coefficient values 
* Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 1 %
** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 5%
*** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 10%
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Table A16 -  LP Test Results for ASEAN5+1
Variables Coefficients Min. t-st. Bk. Dt 1 Bk. Dt 2 NLSy(t-i) const D1(t1) D2(t2)
RIDMY -0.438 0.744 2.423 -2.171 -6.45* Jun-97 Jun-99 1 0
-6 .5 3 .5 6.1 -6 .3
RIDPH -0.414 -0.039 2.276 -2.610 -5.92** Dec-97 Jun-99 1 0
-5 .9 - 0.2 5.1 - 6.1
RIDSG -0.574 0.756 3.174 -3.711 -7.53* Mar-98 Jun-99 1 0
-7 .5 3 .7 6 .7 -7 .8
RIDTH -0.575 0.320 3.496 -3.501 -6.96* May-98 Jun-99 1 0
- 7.0 1.8 6.6 - 7.4
RIDTW -0.548 0.522 2.917 -2.957 -6.63* Dec-97 Jun-99 15
- 6.6 2.2 5.9 -6 .3
RMYPH -0.306 -0.148 0.754 -1.239 -8.76* Mar-83 Aug-84 7
- 8.8 -2 .5 5.1 - 7.0
RMYSG -0.216 -0.046 0.193 0.216 -5.51** Feb-82 May-91 4
-5 .5 - 1.2 2.9 2.9
RPHSG -0.354 0.037 -0.867 1.612 -8.63* Jul-83 Aug-84 1 0
- 8.6 0.6 - 4.9 7.2
RTHMY -0.279 0.452 0.268 0.273 -4.60 Aug-87 Feb-94 9
- 4.6 4.3 2 .6 2 .6
RTHPH -0.480 0.405 1.663 -2.368 -9.85* Jul-83 Aug-84 1 1
- 9.8 4.2 7.0 -8 .5
RTHSG -0.402 0.050 0.645 0.359 -5.62 Dec-80 Mar-99 1 1
- 5.6 0.5 4.7 3.3
RTWMY -0.518 0.445 -0.643 0.537 -5.59 Nov-83 Sep-87 15
-5 .9 2 .9 -3 .6 4.0
RTWPH -0.490 0.167 1.228 -2.226 -8 .2 2 * Jul-83 Aug-84 1 1
- 8.2 1.1 4.4 -6 .9
RTWSG -0.565 0.571 -0.506 0.609 -6.31* Nov-83 May-89 9
-6 .3 4.1 -3 .6 4.6
RTWTH -0.581 -0.214 -0.714 -0.511 -6.14 Sep-83 Oct-95 1 1
- 6.1 - 1.8 -3 .7 -3 .3
Min. t-st.: minimum ZA  t-statistic 
Bk. Dt. 1: Date of the first break detected in LP 
Bk. Dt. 2: Date of the second break detected in LP 
NLS: Number of Lags Selected in ZA
Note: The t-statistics are presented below the coefficient values 
* Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 1 %
** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 5%
*** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 10%
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Table A17 -  LP Test Results for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan and United
States
Variables Coefficients Min. t-st. Bk. Dt 1 Bk. Dt 2 NLS
y ( t - i ) const D1(t1) D2(t2)
RIDJP -0.430 0.488 2.378 -2.810 -6.54* Jun-97 Jun-99 1 0
-6 .5 2.4 5 .7 -7.0
RMYJP -0.242 -0 . 1 2 1 -0.296 -0.275 -5.25** Feb-87 May-00 15
-5.2 -2.8 -3.4 -3.4
RPHJP -0.346 0.057 -1.006 1.497 -8.40* Jul-83 May-84 1 2
-8.4 0.9 -5 .2 6.9
RSGJP -0.460 0.008 0.310 0.502 -6 . 2 0 Nov-77 May-95 14
-6.2 0.1 3.2 4.5
RTHJP -0.248 0.078 0.517 0.445 -5.38*** Dec-80 Dec-94 8
-5.4 0.9 4.1 3.7
RTWJP -0.355 0.228 0.389 0.590 -5.89** Dec-83 Jun-94 15
-5.5 2.8 3.6 4.0
RIDUS -0.591 0.599 3.253 -3.838 -7.41* Mar-98 Jun-99 1 0
-7.4 3.0 6.4 -7.6
RMYUS -0.180 -0.054 0.160 0.174 -5.09 Nov-83 Mar-91 13
-5.1 -1.7 3.0 2.7
RPHUS -0.351 0 . 0 1 2 -0.892 1.561 -8.93* Jul-83 Jul-84 11
-8.9 0.2 -5.2 7.3
RSGUS -0.461 0.084 -0.342 -0.127 -7.53* Oct-80 Nov-94 16
-7.5 2.1 -4.6 -1.7
RTHUS -0.386 0.243 -0.347 -0.556 -5.51 Sep-85 Feb-99 14
-5 .5 3.5 -3.3 -4.4
RTWUS -0.658 0.457 -0.490 0.703 -6.46*** Feb-83 Jul-89 9
-6 .5 3.9 -3.7 5.3
RJPUS -0.271 -0.071 -0.352 -0.369 -6.54* Sep-80 Dec-94 14
-6 .5 -2.0 -4.7 -4.7
Min. t-st.: minimum ZA  t-statistic 
Bk. Dt. 1: Date of the first break detected in LP 
Bk. Dt. 2: Date of the second break detected in LP 
NLS: Num ber of Lags Selected in ZA
Note: The t-statistics are presented below the coefficient values 
* Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 1 %
** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 5%
*** Null hypothesis (non-stationarity) rejected at 10%
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Table A18 - Results of Bai and Perron Methodology for ASEAN5+1





o Jun-99 Jul-97 Jul-97-LZ (1,17) (38,0) (49,0)
o Jun-99 Jun-99-Lo (2,30) (1,40)
SupF Statistic
0 |1 7.8*** 8.5*** 4.4 7.3 3.0
0 | 2 Y 2 *** 5.9 7.4** 7.0*** 4.6
0|3 1 0 .0 * 9.1** 6 .1 *** 5.7 5.3
0|4 10.5* 7.1** 6 .2 *** 4.6 4.8
0|5 8 .8 * 7.4* 5.0 3.5 6.4*
0 | 6 3.5 6.3* 4.2 2.9 6.9*
UDMax Statistic: 10.5** 9.1*** 7  4 *** 7.4 6.9
WDMax Statistic: 16.2* 14.9* g 4*** 7.5 15.5*
SupF(/+f|/) Statistic:
2 |1 1 1 .8 ** 6 .1 7.0 7.0 8.5
3|2 8 . 6 1 2 .0 ** 10.7*** 2.9 8.3
4|3 7.0 2 . 6 2.3 4.1 8.3
5|4 1.7 2 . 2 0.7 1 .0 8.3
6|5 1.7 0 .1 0.7 0.5 2 . 6
Estimated Equations
R-squared 0.47 0.52 0.47
F(m,n): 66.5 59.0 48.8
Coefficients:






















_J-A  model with these breaks is estimated even though tests for the presence of breaks are inconclusive or evidence is weak; 
* indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 1% level of significance;
** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 5% level of significance;
’ ** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 10% level of significance;
Note 1: intervals below the estimated break dates are the 5% confidence interval in terms of months around the break date. 
Note 2: values below the estimated coefficients [a(Sj)j are their t-statistics.
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Table A18 - (continued)
Variables RMYPH RMYSG RPHSG RTHMY RTHPH
Break Dates
A Jun-82 Sep-84 Jun-91 Sep-841 (8,47) (22,44) (16,59) (1 0 ,6 6 )
o Feb-87 Dec-01Z (7,20) (22,31)
O Oct-900 (43,4)
SupF Statistic
0 |1 3.3 6.7 9.8** 21.3* 9.4**
0 | 2 4.4 5.1 5.2 19.3* 1 0 .2 *
0|3 3.2 9.6* 4.7 14.8* 15.2*
0|4 3.7 7.1* 7.7* 1 2 .8 * 13.7*
0(5 3.5 5.7* 5.2** 1 1 .0 * 11.4*
0 |6 3.3 7.2* 4.5** 9.2* 9.5*
UDMax Statistic: 4.4 9.6** 9.8** 21.3* 15.2*
WDMax Statistic: 5.7 16.3* 11.7** 24.8* 24.3*
SupF(/+f|/) Statistic:
2|1 6 . 8 3.9 3.7 1 2 .1 ** 12.7**
3|2 0.7 11.7** 1.9 4.1 2.7
4|3 0 .6 2 . 2 1 .0 4.2 0.9
5|4 0 .2 2 . 2 1 .0 4.1 0.9
6|5 0 .2 1 .8 1 .0 4.2 0.9
Estimated Equations
R-squared 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.32
F(m,n): 48.9 76.5 53.7 73.3
Coefficients:
a (s ,) -0.345 -0.407 0.984 1.496
-1.4 -0.8 6.7 2.4
a (s 2) 0.407 1.226 0.281 -0.490
3.0 5.3 2.7 -2.7
« 0 3) -0.241 -0.424
-2.2 -2.4
« 0 4) 0.490
3.8
A  model with these breaks is estimated even though tests for the presence of breaks are inconclusive or evidence is weak; 
*  indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 1 % level of significance;
** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 5% level of significance;
*** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 10% level of significance;
Note 1: intervals below the estimated break dates are the 5% confidence interval in terms of months around the break date. 
Note 2: values below the estimated coefficients [a(Sj)j are their t-statistics.
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Table A18 - (continued)
Variables RTHSG RTWMY RTWPH RTWSG RTWTH
Break Dates
A Feb-81 Nov-83 Nov-83-1- Sep-831 (35,20) (3,13) (15,45) (8,28)
9 Apr-99 Aug- 8 6 Mar-89-L Aug- 8 6
(1,29) (26,19) (19, 32) (15,14)
o Feb-OU Sep-98o (14, 53) (9,46)
SupF Statistic
0 |1 35.1* 8.5*** 6 .1 3.3 17.0*
0 |2 23.7* 9.9* 6.9 6 . 2 12.7*
0|3 19.9* 8.7* 5.1 6.9** 16.5*
0|4 18.2* 7.3* 6.3*** 5.7 17.1*
0|5 18.8* 6.9* 4.8 5.6** 14.5*
0 |6 15.6* 5.7* 4.5*** 4.9** 13.2*
UDMax Statistic: 35.1* 9.9* 6.9 6.9 17.1*
WDMax Statistic: 37.7* 12.5* 8 . 6 8 . 6 30.4*
SupF(/+7|/) Statistic:
2|1 1 1 .2 ** 10.9** 7.7 9.5*** 3.3
3|2 2.9 7.1 1.3 10.4*** 16.0*
4|3 9.8 1.4 2 . 0 0.9 8.7
5|4 1.3 2.5 0 . 8 0 . 8 4.3
6|5 0.9 1.5 2 . 6 1 .0 3.3
Estimated Equations
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.33
F(m,n): 46.6 43.4 24.4 34.8
Coefficients:
a (^ i) 0.272 1.343 1.169 0.069
1.3 3.1 2.9 0.2
a (s 2) 1.043 -0.703 -0.085 -1.470
9.2 -3.0 -0 .4 -6 .2
a (s 3) 0.126 0.158 0.704 -0.392
1.8 1.5 6.7 -3 .2
« (^ 4) 0.198 0.239
1.7 2.4
-1- A model with these breaks is estimated even though tests for the presence of breaks are inconclusive or evidence is weak; 
* indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 1 % level of significance;
** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 5% level of significance;
*** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 10% level of significance;
Note 1: intervals below the estimated break dates are the 5% confidence interval in terms of months around the break date. 
Note 2: values below the estimated coefficients [a(Sj)j are their t-statistics.
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Table A19 - Results of Bai and Perron Methodology for ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis
Japan and United States
Variables RIDJP RMYJP RPHJP RSGJP RTHJP
Break Dates
1
Jan-95 May-92 Jun-84 May-95 Aug-95





0 |1 7.5*** 17.7* 1 1 .8 ** 9.1** 11.9**
0 |2 6.3 16.9* 8 .0 ** 6.4 28.4*
0|3 12.4* 13.6* 6 .2 ** 12.4* 21.5*
0|4 1 0 .8 * 1 0 .0 * 5.2** 6 .0 *** 18.4*
0|5 8 .6 * 16.6* 7.8** 5.4*** 20.4*
0 |6 7.2* 13.8* 6.4** 4 y*** 17.3*
UDMax Statistic: 12.4** 17.7* 1 1 .8 ** 12.4** 28.4*
WDMax Statistic: 19.2* 33.3* 15.6* 19.1* 40.9*
SupF(/+f|/) Statistic:
2 |1 7.9 3.9 7.5 5.8 17.0*
3|2 26.0* 2.5 7.5 4.1 8 .6
4|3 3.1 5.2 0 .1 2.4 9.0
5|4 0 . 6 14.3** 2.4 2 . 0 8 . 6
6|5 0 . 6 0 . 8 4.2 0.4 1.3
Estimated Equations
R-squared 0.57 0.23 0.27 0.09 0.31
F(m,n): 73.7 50.2 64.7 18.9 47.4
Coefficients:
« 0 i ) 1.219 0.030 -0 . 2 0 2 -0.030 0.914
5.4 0.3 -0 .5 -0 .3 5.4
a ( s 2 ) 2.674 0.794 1.352 0.456 2 . 1 2 2
15.8 5.8 8.1 3.4 12.1




a ( s A) 1.838
7.4
-L A model with these breaks is estimated even though tests for the presence of breaks are inconclusive or evidence is weak; 
* indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 1 % level of significance;
** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 5% level of significance;
*** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 10% level of significance;
Note 1: intervals below the estimated break dates are the 5% confidence interval in terms of months around the break date. 
Note 2: values below the estimated coefficients [a(sj)j are their t-statistics.
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Table A19 - (continued)
Variables RTWJP RIDUS RMYUS RPHUS RSGUS
Break Dates
1
Oct-83 Jul-97 Mar-91 Sep-84
(8,38) (19,0) (88,91) (43,72)
o Jun-94 Jun-99
(4,20) (1 ,2 0 )
May-01O (5,8)
SupF Statistic
0 |1 3.7 4.8 8.9** 9.5** 0.7
0 | 2 1 0 .8 * 28.9* 8 .1 ** 4.7 2.5
0|3 19.0* 2 1 .0 * 9.1* 3.9 3.5
0|4 14.0* 16.7* 8.9* 9.3* 2 . 6
0|5 1 1 .6 * 13.8* 9.9* 6 .1 ** 2 .1
0 |6 9.5* 11.9* 10.3* 8 .8 * 3.4
UDMax Statistic: 19.0* 28.9* 10.3** 9.5** 3.5
WDMax Statistic: 29.3* 37.1* 23.3* 2 0 .0 * 5.8
SupF(/+f \ l )  Statistic:
2|1 13.7** 27.7* 4.9 3.8 6 . 8
3|2 23.4* 2.9 3.7 3.8 6 . 8
4|3 2.7 2 . 6 1 0 .1 0.9 0.4
5|4 2.7 1.5 4.9 0 . 8 0.4
6|5 2.7 1 .6 3.7 0 . 8 0.3
R-squared 0.37 0.51 0.17 0.25
F(m,n): 42.0 76.6 33.8 57.8
Coefficients:
« O i ) 1.488 1.326 -0.179 -0.419
3.3 5.5 -2.3 -2 .0
a (s 2) 0.215 6.189 0.342 1.045
1.6 10.4 2.5 4.3




« 0 4 ) 0.339
3.0
-1-A  model with these breaks is estimated even though tests for the presence of breaks are inconclusive or evidence is weak; 
* indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 1 % level of significance;
** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 5% level of significance;
*** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 10% level of significance;
Note 1: intervals below the estimated break dates are the 5% confidence interval in terms of months around the break date. 
Note 2: values below the estimated coefficients [a(Sj)j are their t-statistics.
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Table A19 - (continued)








(1 0 ,6 )
SupF Statistic
0 |1 24.3* 5.2 8 .0 **
0 | 2 2 2 .6 * 6.9 25.0*
0|3 1 2 .1 * 6.7 1 2 .0 *
0|4 9.8* 5.7 19.9*
0|5 1 0 .6 * 4.7 16.7*
0 | 6 9.8* 3.7 14.6*
UDMax Statistic: 24.3* 6.9 25.1*
WDMax Statistic: 29.0* 8.5 35.6*
SupF(/+f|/) Statistic:
2|1 5.0 7.1 2 1 .8 *
3|2 3.6 4.9 1 .8
4|3 3.6 2.3 2 .1
5|4 3.6 2.3 4.0
6|5 6 .1 0.5 4.0
Estimated Equations
R-squared 0.23 0 .2 1
F(m,n): 47.1 36.3
Coefficients:
« O i ) 0.784 -0.062
7.1 -3.5
a (s 2) -0.028 -0.890
-1.2 -11.8
« 0 3 ) -0.118
-0.9
« 0 4 )
-1- A model with these breaks is estimated even though tests for the presence of breaks are inconclusive or evidence is weak;
* indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 1 % level of significance;
** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 5% level of significance;
*** indicates the null hypothesis is reject at the 10% level of significance;
Note 1: intervals below the estimated break dates are the 5% confidence interval in terms of months around the break date. 
Note 2; values below the estimated coefficients (a(Sj)] are their t-statistics.
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Table A20 -  LLR Bootstrapped Finite-sample Critical Values for ASEAN5+1
Variables RIDMY RIDPH RIDSG1 RIDSG2 RIDTH
10.00% 8.24 8.08 4.77 6.45 5.51
5.00% 12.81 10.92 6 . 8 8 8.5 9.18
2.50% 18.96 13.62 9.82 11.36 13.47
1.00% 25.46 16.55 12.42 16.37 20.25
Variables RIDTW RMYPH RMYSG RPHSG RTHMY
10.00% 4.73 10.87 3.68 4.33 3.43
5.00% 7.58 15.9 5.46 5.89 5.22
2.50% 1 0 . 8 6 18.52 7.36 7.22 6.47
1.00% 13.78 23.54 9.31 8 . 8 6 9.88
Variables RTHPH RTHSG RTWMY RTWPH RTWSG1
10.00% 4.23 4.07 3.63 4.47 3.92
5.00% 5.79 5.16 4.59 6.05 5.43
2.50% 7.38 6.46 5.85 7.32 7.16
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Table A21 -  LLR Bootstrapped Finite-sample Critical Values for ASEAN5+1
vis-a-vis Japan and United States
Variables RIDJP RMYJP RPHJP RSGJP RTHJP
10.00% 5.84 3.47 3.88 3.86 3.47
5.00% 1 1 . 1 2 5.21 5.517 5.56 5.03
2.50% 19.87 7.11 7.64 7.26 7.48
1.00% 23.59 8.91 10.729 9.32 11.93
Variables RTWJP RIDUS RMYUS RPHUS RSGUS
10.00% 3.32 8.35 3.94 4.64 3.82
5.00% 4.65 13.51 5.46 6.32 5.54
2.50% 6.33 19.19 8 . 2 0 7.07 6 . 2 2
1.00% 7.5 23.56 8.95 8.60 7.93

















Table A22 -  Results for B -TAR  and CB -TAR  Models for ASEAN5+1
Variables
B -T A R  Model CB -TA R  Model LLR
StatistsT 5 UB NB LB Lb T1 B(r) h *2 5 UB NB LB L('B
RIDM Y-L 0 .97 -0 .8 0.18 0.67 0.15 -336 D ec-93 1.12 0.41 -0 .73 0.27 0.47 0.26 -330 12.71**
r i d p h -l 0 .78 -0 .7 0.28 0.49 0.23 -353 D ec-90 1.36 0.65 -0.71 0.25 0 .5 0 .26 -348 9.28**
R IDSG1-L 0.5 -0 .64 0.31 0.41 0.27 -363 Mar-91 0.79 0.36 -0 .62 0.27 0.42 0.31 -358 1.03
R IDSG2-L 1.84 -0 .26 0.44 0.55 0.01 -348 Dec-93 1.57 2.49 -0 .29 0.4 0.59 0.01 -3 .48 0.01
RIDTH-L-L 0.42 -0 .32 0.23 0.31 0.46 -389 Mar-91 0.49 0.48 -0 .32 0.22 0.34 0.44 -389 0.03
R ID TW -1- 1.21 -0 .28 0.54 0.44 0.02 -421 Sep-90 1.45 1.2 -0 .28 0.54 0.45 0.02 -399 42 .56*
r m y p h -l 0.51 -0 .15 0.26 0.46 0.28 -281 Jan-89 0.98 0.35 -0 .16 0.25 0.48 0.27 -279 5.75
RMYSG-L 0.17 -0 .3 0.36 0.32 0.32 -95 Aug-90 0.17 0.24 -0 .32 0.33 0.39 0.29 -91 8.32*
RPHSG-L 0.42 -0 .22 0.32 0.33 0.35 -320 Jan-89 0.78 0.4 -0 .25 0.29 0.39 0.31 -318 4.27
R TH M Y 0.24 -0 .4 0.33 0.32 0.36 -214 Sep-90 0.31 0.19 -0 .43 0.33 0.33 0.35 -212 5.25**
RTHPH-L 0.37 -0 .25 0.31 0.32 0.37 -364 D ec-88 0.42 0.34 -0 .24 0.31 0.31 0.37 -364 0.00
RTHSG 0.21 -0 .47 0.32 0.32 0.36 -214 Jun-91 0.4 0.15 -0 .54 0.29 0.38 0.33 -212 4.52**
R TW M Y 0.31 -0 .52 0.33 0.32 0.36 -264 Feb-89 0.48 0.32 -0 .56 0.31 0.35 0.34 -263 1.70
RTW PH -1- 0.43 -0.2 0.32 0.32 0.36 -361 Nov-88 2.16 0.35 -0 .35 0.15 0.68 0.16 -357 6.47*
RTW SG1-L 0.25 -0 .58 0.33 0.32 0.35 -248 Feb-89 0.61 0.22 -0 .68 0.3 0.38 0.32 -246 4 .5 5**
R TW S G 2 0.34 -0.31 0.56 0.31 0.13 -265 May-90 0.32 0.36 -0 .3 0.55 0.33 0.13 -265 0.36
R TW TH  1 0.24 -0 .62 0.31 0.33 0.36 -271 Feb-89 0.45 0.25 -0 .67 0.27 0.41 0.32 -269 3.31**
* indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 5%  significance level 
** indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 10%  significance level 
indicates the series is stationary at 5% level of significance 
-L-L indicates the series is stationary at 10%  level of significance












Table A23 -  Results for B -TAR  and C B -T A R  Models (ASEAN5+1 vis-a-vis Japan)
Variables
B -T A R  Model C B -T A R  Model LLR
T 5 UB NB LB l b T1 B ( t ) h *2 8 UB NB LB L(;b Statistic
RIDJP-L 0.4 -0 .66 0.32 0.36 0.32 -377 D ec-93 0.93 0.32 -0 .67 0.25 0.47 0.27 -363 28 .40*
r m y j p -l 0.24 -0.31 0.33 0.31 0.35 -219 Jan-89 0.34 0.22 -0 .32 0.33 0.33 0.34 -217 3.36
r p h j p -1- 0.41 -0 .26 0.35 0.31 0.34 -366 S ep-94 0.47 0.27 -0 .27 0.34 0.32 0.33 -363 5.64*
R S G JP 0.23 -0 .49 0.32 0.37 0.31 -312 Oct-91 0.27 0.48 -0 .54 0.26 0.47 0.27 -303 19.02*
R TH JP -1- 1- 0.27 -0.31 0.33 0.33 0.35 -203 M ar-89 0.79 0.24 -0 .46 0.28 0.43 0.29 -192 10.49*
RTW JP-L 0.22 -0 .52 0.33 0.33 0.35 -237 M ay-90 0.67 0.2 -0 .65 0.27 0.43 0.30 -233 6.84*
* indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR  alternative at the 5%  significance level 
** indicates the B-TAR  null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the C B -TAR  alternative at the 10%  significance level 
-1- indicates the series is stationary at 5%  level of significance 
indicates the series is stationary at 10%  level of significance 
Definitions: Columns UB, NB and LB show the percentage of the sample data above x, inside [-x,x] and below -x, respectively.
Table A24 - Results for B - TAR and CB -TAR  Models (Southeast Asians vis-a-vis United States)
Variables B -T A R  Model C B -TA R  Model LLR
r 8 UB NB LB As T1 B { t ) h 2^ 8 UB NB LB L cB Statistic
R ID U S-1- 0.45 -0 .68 0.35 0.32 0.33 -369 Feb-93 0.79 0.45 -0 .69 0.27 0.48 0.26 -356 25 .79*
r j p u s -1- 0.18 -0.27 0.35 0.32 0.32 -194 Dec-88 0.24 0.15 -0 .28 0.35 0.32 0.33 -194 0.01
RM YUS-L 0.24 -0 .24 0.34 0.32 0.34 -104 Nov-89 0.42 0.24 -0 .29 0.3 0.41 0.29 -93 20 .97*
RPHUS-L 0.39 -0.2 0.34 0.32 0.34 -328 Dec-88 1.17 0.38 -0 .25 0.24 0.49 0.27 -324 7.21*
RSGUS-L 0.2 -0.32 0.34 0.32 0.34 -210 M ar-90 0.25 0.16 -0 .33 0.34 0.32 0.34 -210 0.04
R TH U S -1- 1- 0.23 -0 .47 0.34 0.31 0.35 -239 Dec-91 0.74 0.18 -0 .64 0.3 0.43 0.27 -244 6.47*
R TW U S 0.21 -0 .35 0.33 0.33 0.34 -163 Apr-89 0.52 0.18 -0 .43 0.3 0.43 0.27 -164 2.54
* indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 5% significance level 
** indicates the B-TAR null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the CB-TAR alternative at the 10%  significance level 
-*- indicates the series is stationary at 5%  level of significance 
-L-L indicates the series is stationary at 10%  level of significance
Definitions: Columns UB, NB and LB show the percentage of the sample data above x, inside [-x,x] and below -x, respectively.
oo
Table A25 - Bai and Perron Estimates of aO,) and Regime Averages of the 
Nominal Interest Rate and Inflation Rate Differentials for ASEAN5+1
Variables « (A i) a(s2) a ( s 3) <*0 4) Variables a (A ,) cc(s2) a 0 3) « 0 4)
Jul-97 Jun-99 Jun-91 Dec-01
RIDMY 1 . 2 0 5.76 1.27 RTHMY 0.98 0.28 -0.42
Ai(Sj) 0.52 3.18 0.67 Ai(Sj) 0.25 0.06 0.05
Arc(Sj) 1.72 8.82 1.92 Alt(Sj) 1.24 0.35 -0.36
Sep-94 Jul-97 Jun-99 Sep-84
RIDPH -0.09 1.31 5.27 0.77 RTHPH 1.50 -0.49
Ai(Sj) 0.01 -0.01 2.77 0.34 Ai(Sj) -1.14 0.36
Ajt(Sj) -0.08 1.25 7.95 1.16 Ajt(Sj) -0.36 -0.85
Jan-95 Jul-97 Jun-99 Feb-81 Apr-99
RIDSG1 1.39 2 .2 1 6.08 1.60 RTHSG 0.27 1.04 0.13
Ai(Sj) 0.64 0.58 3.66 0.75 Ai(Sj) -0.79 -0.25 -0.10
An(Sj) 2.04 2.74 9.63 2.41 An(Sj) -1.06 -1.29 -0.23
Nov-83 Aug-86
RIDSG2 2.04 RTWMY 1.34 -0.70 0.16
Ai(Sj) 0.97 Ai(Sj) -0.28 0.03 -0.10
Arc(Sj) 3.01 ArcfSj) 1.05 -0.59 0.05
RIDTH 1.36 RTWPH -0.42
Ai(Sj) 0.73 Ai(Sj) -0.77
An(Sj) 2.08 Ajt(Sj) -1.20
Nov-83 Mar-89 Feb-01
RIDTW 1.58 RTWSG1 1.17 -0.09 0.70 0 . 2 0
Ai(Sj) 0.91 Ai(s,) -0.12 0.07 0.06 0.00
Art(Sj) 2.50 An(Sj) 1.04 0.01 0.77 0.21
RMYPH -0.54 RTWSG2 0.51
Ai(Sj) -0.69 Ai(Sj) 0.03
Aji(Sj) -1.22 Ajt(Sj) 0.54
Jun-82 Feb-87 Oct-90 Sep-83 Aug-86 Sep-98
RMYSG -0.35 0.41 -0.24 0.49 RTWTH 0.07 -1.47 -0.39 0.24
Ai(Sj) 0.09 0.14 -0.02 0.18 Ai(Sj) -0.28 -0.06 -0.23 -0.12





Ai(sj): average nominal interest rate differential for regime Sj 
Ajt(Sj): average inflation rate differential for regime Sj
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Table A26 -  Decomposition of the Mean Real Interest Differentials for ASEAN5+1
Japan__________ Malaysia________ Philippines_______ Singapore________ Thailand__________Taiwan
r e n u a
RID UID R ED RID UID RED R ID UID RED RID UID R ED RID UID R ED RID UID R ED
86-89 1.58 0.30 1.27 1.59 1.12 0.47 0.42 -0.38 0.80 1.57 0.55 1.02 0.94 -0.07 1.01 1.52 -0.38 1.90





90-96 & 99 1.84 1.98 -0.14 1.41 1.53 -0.12 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.92 1.93 -0.02 0.98 1.16 -0.19 1.18 1.46 -0.28
97-98 5.69 2.08 3.61 4.16 2.73 1.43 3.96 1.82 2.14 4.59 2.26 2.34 3.45 1.50 1.95 4.15 1.66 2.49
"O
c 00-05 1.76 2.13 -0.37 1.21 1.42 -0.20 0.69 1.18 -0.49 1.53 1.73 -0.20 1.42 1.67 -0.25 1.23 1.57 -0.35
70-05 2.18 1.68 0.49 1.69 1.54 0.14 0.91 0.64 0.26 2.04 1.62 0.40 1.35 1.07 0.27 1.58 1.13 0.45
70-96 & 99-05 1.76 1.63 0.12 1.39 1.40 -0.01 0.55 0.50 0.04 1.73 1.55 0.17 1.11 1.02 0.07 1.28 1.06 0.21
71-79 0.02 -0.24 0.26 0.02 -0.35 0.37 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 -0.74 -1.12 0.39
81-89 0.09 -0.56 0.65 -0.56 -0.57 0.00 -0.06 -0.34 0.28 -0.99 -1.11 0.13 -0.37 -0.89 0.52
(0
90-99 0.65 0.23 0.42 -0.77 -1.00 0.24 0.49 0.23 0.26 -0.49 -0.54 0.05 -0.18 -0.26 0.08
V)
> * 90-96 & 99 0.43 0.46 -0.02 -0.90 -1.02 0.12 0.51 0.41 0.10 -0.43 -0.37 -0.07 -0.22 -0.06 -0.16
£
<0 97-98 1.53 -0,65 2.18 -0.21 -0.91 0.70 0.43 -0.47 0.90 -0.71 -1.23 0.52 -0.01 -1.07 1.05
2
00-05 0.55 0.72 -0.16 -0.52 -0.23 -0.29 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.01 0.16 -0.14
70-05 0.36 -0.02 0.37 -0.54 -0.63 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.17 -0.56 -0.64 0.08 -0.21 -0.41 0.20
70-96 & 99-05 0.27 0.03 0.24 -0.56 -0.61 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.12 -0.55 -0.60 0.05 -0.23 -0.35 0.12
71-79 0.00 0.11 -0.11 -0.02 0.35 -0.37 -0.13 0.34 -0.47 -1.10 -0.81 -0.29
81-89 0.66 0.01 0.65 0.56 0.57 0.00 0.50 0.22 0.28 -0.42 -0.55 0.12 0.21 -0.35 0.56
W
0)
90-99 1.42 1.24 0.18 0.77 1.00 -0.24 1.26 1.23 0.03 0.28 0.46 -0.18 0.58 0.74 -0.15
'C
*5. 90-96 & 99 1.33 1.48 -0.14 0.90 1.02 -0.12 1.41 1.43 -0.02 0.47 0.66 -0.18 0.68 0.96 -0.28
Q .
97-98 1.74 0.26 1.48 0.21 0.91 -0.70 0.64 0.44 0.20 -0.50 -0.32 -0.18 0.20 -0.15 0.35
£
Cl 00-05 1.07 0.95 0.13 0.52 0.23 0.29 0.84 0.55 0.29 0.73 0.49 0.24 0.53 0.39 0.15
70-05 0.90 0.61 0.29 0.54 0.63 -0.08 0.73 0.65 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.25 0.18
70-96 & 99-05 0.83 0.64 0.21 0.56 0.61 -0.04 0.74 0.66 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.44 0.29 0.16
Notes: (i) R ID -  average real interest rate differential, U ID= average uncovered interest rate differential, R E D  = average real exchange rate change; (ii) The series of real 


















Table A26 -  (continued)
Japan__________ Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand__________Taiwan
r e n u u
RID U ID RED RID UID R ED RID UID RED RID UID R ED RID U ID RED RID UID R ED
71-79 -0.08 -0.21 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.13 -0.34 0.47 -0.45 -0.80 0.36
81-89 0.15 -0.22 0.37 0.06 0.34 -0.28 -0.50 -0.22 -0.28 -0.93 -0.77 -0.16 -0.43 -0.67 0.24
0) 90-99 0.16 0.00 0.15 -0.49 -0.23 -0.26 -1.26 -1.23 -0.03 -0.98 -0.77 -0.21 -0.68 -0.49 -0.18
o




97-98 1.10 -0.18 1.28 -0.43 0.47 -0.90 -0.64 -0.44 -0.20 -1.14 -0.76 -0.38 -0.44 -0.59 0.15
( 0 00-05 0.23 0.40 -0.16 -0.32 -0.32 0.00 -0.84 -0.55 -0.29 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 -0.31 -0.16 -0.14
70-05 0.11 -0.05 0.17 -0.20 -0.02 -0.17 -0.73 -0.65 -0.09 -0.77 -0.64 -0.12 -0.51 -0.49 -0.01
70-96 & 99-05 0.05 -0.04 0.09 -0.18 -0.05 -0.12 -0.74 -0.66 -0.08 -0.74 -0.63 -0.10 -0.52 -0.48 -0.03
71-79 0.76 1.89 -1.13 0.74 1.12 -0.39 1.10 0.81 0.29 0.45 0.80 -0.36
81-89 1.08 0.56 0.53 0.99 1.11 -0.13 0.42 0.55 -0.12 0.93 0.77 0.16 0.59 0.15 0.44
90-99 1.14 0.77 0.36 0.49 0.54 -0.05 -0.28 -0.46 0.18 0.98 0.77 0.21 0.30 0.28 0.03
~o
c(0 90-96 & 99 0,86 0.82 0.04 0.43 0.37 0.07 -0.47 -0.66 0.18 0.94 0.77 0.17 0.21 0.30 -0.10
‘c5 97-98 2.24 0.58 1.66 0.71 1.23 -0.52 0.50 0.32 0.18 1.14 0.76 0.38 0.70 0.16 0.53
.cH 00-05 0,35 0.46 -0.11 -0.21 -0.26 0.05 -0.73 -0.49 -0.24 0.11 0.06 0.05 -0.19 -0.10 -0.09
70-05 0.94 0.71 0.23 0.56 0.64 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.64 0.12 0.31 0.15 0.16
70-96 & 99-05 0.84 0.72 0.11 0.55 0.60 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.74 0.63 0.10 0.27 0.15 0.12
81-89 0.59 0.59 0.01 0.37 0.89 -0.52 -0.21 0.35 -0.56 0.43 0.67 -0.24 -0.59 -0.15 -0.44
90-99 0.83 0.50 0.33 0.18 0.26 -0.08 -0.58 -0.74 0.15 0.68 0.49 0.18 -0.30 -0.28 -0.03
c 90-96 & 99 0.65 0.52 0.14 0.22 0.06 0.16 -0.68 -0.96 0.28 0.73 0.47 0.26 -0.21 -0.30 0.10
(0
S 97-98 1.54 0.42 1.13 0.01 1.07 -1.05 -0.20 0.15 -0.35 0.44 0.59 -0.15 -0.70 -0.16 -0.53
«H- 00-05 0.54 0.56 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 0.14 -0.53 -0.39 -0.15 0.31 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.09
70-05 0.68 0.54 0.14 0.21 0.41 -0.20 -0.42 -0.25 -0.18 0.51 0.49 0.01 -0.31 -0.15 -0.16
70-96 & 99-05 0.61 0.56 0.05 0.23 0.35 -0.12 -0.44 -0.29 -0.16 0.52 0.48 0.03 -0.27 -0.15 -0.12
Notes: (i) R ID = average real interest rate differential, U ID= average uncovered interest rate differential, R E D  = average real exchange rate change; (ii) The series of real 
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BP A  LP
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,



















































 RPHSG  BP ■ ZA
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,












Figure B5 -  BP Results, 5% Confidence Interval for BP Break Date Estimates and ZA and LP Break Dates Estimates
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-RTVUVIY -BP A LP
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,
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Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,



















































4 .0 0 0
 RSGJP BP ■ 2A
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,


















































 RMYUS  BP
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,


















































 BP RTWUS m ZA
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii) The square and triangle shows the location o f the breaks estimated by ZA and LP,





















 RJPUS  BP A  LP
Notes: (i) The line BP shows the shifting level estimated by BP; (ii)
The square and triangle shows the location o f  the breaks estimated by 
ZA and LP, respectively; (iii) The vertical dotted lines around a break 
estimated by BP (shift in BP line) is its respective 5% confidence 
interval.
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Figure B11 -  Results from the LLR Test for B -  TAR against CB -  TAR
(Indonesia vs. ASEAN5+1)
Before 1988 i After 1993
RID PH  RIDSG
RIDTH RIDTW
Notes: The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does
not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases 
(increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).









RMYID — RMYPH ----- RMYSG
— RMYTH — RMYTW
Notes: The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does 
not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases 
(increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).
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Before 1988 I After 1993
RPHID — RPHMY ----- RPHSG
RPHTH — RPHTW
Notes: The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does 
not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases 
(increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).







; t i i
Before 1988 ! After 1993
RSGID RSGMY  RSGPH
RSGTH RSGTW
Notes.The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does 
not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases 
(increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).
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Figure B15 -  Results from the LLR Test for B -  TAR against CB -  TAR
(Thailand vs. ASEAN5+1)
0 .45 -1-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1    - .... - ................... -.-.-..... -




0 2 5 '
0.2 - *  *  * * * * *  * * * *  *  * * * * * *  * *
0 .15  - 
0.1 - 
0.05 -
<— Before 1988 ! After 1993 —>
RTHID RTHMY ----RTHPH
RTHSG RTHTW
Notes: The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does 
not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases 
(increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).




Before 1988 After 1993
 RTWPHRTWMY
RTWSG RTWTH
Notes: The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does
not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases 
(increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).
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0.05Before 1988 i After 1993 Before 1968 I After 1993












Before 1988 | After 1993 Before 1988 I After 1993 Before 1968 j After 1993
S G J P  SGUS •T H J P  THUS
Notes: The lines show the threshold estimated for the periods before 1988 and after 1993. If the line does not change across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is not statistically significant compared to 
the B-TAR model and, therefore, the degree of financial integration did not change. If the line decreases (increases) across periods it means that the CB-TAR model is statistically significant compared to the B- 
TAR model and therefore the degree of financial integration increased (decreased).
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1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Notes: Figure B16 shows the real exchange rate of Philippines versus United States, Japan, Singapore and 
Thailand. Since the data for exchange rate for Philippines versus Japan, Singapore and Thailand is very 







SO,US and S,PH TH
PH.US
TH,US
where St ' is the price of country D’s currency in terms of country F’s currency and D , F  =  P H
(Philippines), J P  (Japan), U S , T H  (Thailand) and S G  (Singapore). Figure 16B also shows the trend function 
estimated for each real exchange rate series over the periods 1970-1983 and 1984-2005.
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